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ABSTRACT . This work is not a ‘reinterpretation’ of the nowadays Hilbert-Dirac quan-
tum mechanics, QMHD. It offers the principles of a new representation of microstates called
a second quantum mechanics and denoted QM2, that is devoid of interpretation problems and
fully reconstructed conceptually and formally in its structural principles.
First a qualitative but formalized representation of microstates is developed quite indepen-
dently of the quantum mechanical formalism and outside it, under exclusively [epistemological-
operational-methodological] constraints. This representation is called infra-quantum mechanics
and is denoted IQM. The specific purpose of IQM is to constitute a reference-and-imbedding-
structure directly rooted into the a-conceptual physical reality, able to insure comparability
with QMHD and thus to endow with criteria for estimating the adequacy of its formalism from
defined points of view and in defined terms. IQM is the very first realization of a new basic kind
of scientific discipline.
Then, by systematic reference to IQM, are first worked out preliminary critical exami-
nations of several aspects of the Hilbert-Dirac formulation of QM that play a key role in the
nowadays quantum mechanical representation of measurements. These reveal that nowadays
QMHD is devoid of any general formal representation of the individual, physical, actual ‘mi-
crostates’ and of individual operations on these that bring them from still a-conceptual physical
factuality, into scientific knowledge. And it appears that, consequently, QMHD is simply devoid
of an acceptable representation of the quantum measurements.
This lacuna is then constructively compensated for unbound microstates that do not
involve possibility of quantum fields. But for unbound microstates that do involve quantum
fields it is found that – apart from the general fact that the QMHD representation of the
quantum measurements is not acceptable – furthermore the Hilbert-space representation of the
microstates themselves entails predictions on the results of measurements of the fundamental
momentum observable that are not verifiable. A way of confronting this situation is constructed
by recourse to the de Broglie definition of guided momentum, a changed Hilbert-space repre-
sentation of the unbound states with non-null quantum potentials, and a generalized equation
for eigenstates and eigenfunctions of the momentum-observable.
The mentioned results permit to delineate a representation of the quantum measurements
that takes into account all the classes of unbound microstates, while the bound microstates (that
have a marginal role from the conceptual points of view that characterize this approach) are
treated like in QMHD.
The representation of quantum measurements constructed in this work is directly rooted
into the microphysical factuality by a formal-factual procedure that makes no use of the
Schrödinger equation of the problem. Furthermore, when this equation is available and can
be solved the mentioned formal-factual procedure permits to control and to optimize the math-
ematical outputs of the equation: The use of Schrödinger’s equation is quite generally duplicated
by a factual-formal procedure of establishing the predictions.
Around the representation of the quantum measurements indicated above are finally
sketched out the general principles (source-domains, postulates, and inner structure) of a fully
intelligible second quantum mechanics – QM2 – that emerges as a synthesis between IQM,
QMHD, and several basic elements from the de Broglie-Bohm approach.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
« The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather,
not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order
to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think
both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able
to think what cannot be thought).»
Wittgenstein, Preface of the Tractatus
The first attempts at a representation of microscopic physical entities started in terms of
usual ‘objects’ endowed with delimited spatial volumes. Therefrom classical models and ways of
reasoning were more and more deeply lowered into the domain of small space-time dimensions.
This process however has come to a clear crisis around 1900: The connections with classical
physics ceased being compatible with the experimentally established facts. Therefore Bohr and
Plank introduced non-classical but ad hoc "principles".
And then, de Broglie’s model fractured the evolution: It changed the origin on the
vertical that connects knowledge of macroscopic physical entities, to knowledge concerning mi-
croscopic entities.
Indeed de Broglie’s model is placed just upon the extreme frontier between the micro-
scopic, still a-conceptual factual physical reality, and the realm of the already conceptualized.
And therefrom it tried to proceed upward, toward the previously conceptualized and to connect
to this. So
The direction and the nature of the actions of construction of knowledge along the men-
tioned vertical were reversed.
Instead of continuing to try to guess top-down starting from the classical level and advanc-
ing ‘downwards’ into the realm of microscopic space-time dimensions via mental extrapolating
procedures that were unconsciously trussed up into inertial strings developed since millennia
inside the classical knowledge and thinking, there timidly began to emerge a new, fluctuating
tendency to construct representations bottom-up, by a sort of conceptual climb in the dark
along strictly operational-observational-formal requirements.
The direction of constructive thought – where it begins and how it acts in order to reach
a definite representational purpose – is quite determinant. So the specified inversion of construc-
tion of representation involved quite fundamental changes in the process of conceptualization,
and these, in their turn, induced obscure and strong mental confrontations between ancestral
habits of thought, and new procedures that still lacked definite and stable contours, but of
which the imperative necessity was strikingly sensed. The method of constructing scientific
representations of physical reality was undergoing mutation.
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The mathematical representations of Schrödinger, directly connected to de Broglie ones,
as well as Heisenberg’s quasi simultaneous algorithms, that for bound states offered equivalent
results, led to impressing first successes, and these, for a while, neutralized the conceptual
disquietudes.
Meanwhile Bohr, struck by the radically new characters of the emerging theory of the
presence of which he was strongly aware but of which the source and nature withstood iden-
tification inside his mind, tried to protect maximally these characters from any premature
restriction via a preventive interdiction of any model of a microsystem. And furthermore, as it
is well known, he founded this interdiction upon the assertion of a general philosophical require-
ment of a strictly ’positivistic’ attitude in science consisting of the acceptance, exclusively, of
purely operational basic procedures free of any interpretive assumption. But this, in fact, was an
impossible requirement: When the entity to be studied is quintessentially un-observable and of
a still entirely unknown nature and structure, it is not possible to decide what sort of operation
deserves being considered to be a ’measurement-interaction’ with ’it’ ; nor how to decide what
value of the involved qualifying quantity is entailed by the observable marks obtained by one
given ’measurement-interaction’ of the chosen sort. One cannot even know in advance where in
space-time the entity to be studied ’is’, what extension the space-time support of this entity
possesses; its inside and outside keep non-conceived ; nothing insures even that such classical
delimiting notions possess meaning with respect to what, a priori, we have named ’microsystem’
and ’state of a microsystem’. No specifically adequate language has been constructed as yet,
nor criteria for constructing it. So a fortiori there is no intuitive basis for beginning to construct
knowledge on it. When one wants to enter upon a bottom-up process of conceptualization of
physical entities, as de Broglie conceived to attempt, the perspective of a whole implicit order
of constructability opens up like a ladder from the as yet never conceptualized toward the sky
of classical knowledge. This ladder has to be constructed and climbed step by step.
So, in a certain very warped way, Bohr’s interdiction protected indeed the development of
the emerging Schrödinger-Heisenberg mathematical representation, and later its mutation into
the nowadays Hilbert-Dirac reformulation. But on the other hand this interdiction led to hidden
violations of certain laws that – remarkably – do irrepressibly work inside the human construc-
tive processes of conceptualization. And this entailed unintelligibility of the achieved formalism.
Namely, de Broglie’s ’corpuscular-wave’ model, though rejected by Bohr’s positivistic philosoph-
ical diktat, remained quite essentially involved in the quantum mechanical formalism. But it
remained there in an only concealed way, masked inside mathematical forms, so immobilized
in atrophy by absence of a declared and definite conceptual-semantic status. In consequence of
this – up to this very day – this model keeps acting most fundamentally inside the formalism,
without being exposed to overt control and optimization. This circumstance led to the occulta-
tion, inside the quantum mechanical formalism, of many other features, factual, operational and
conceptual, that irrepressibly do act, but without being mutually distinguished, named, and
genuinely dominated from a semantic point of view. The most massive such occultation is that
of the radical difference of nature and role between individual representations and statistical
ones.
Therefore, since 90 years our representation of microstates irrepressibly nourishes endless
questionings and fumbling that pulverize systematically against a paradoxical ‘negative’ dike of
absence of definite criteria for defining the exact contents and the adequacy of the mathematical
representations. The mathematical representations proliferated densely and they still do so, like
a sort of formal cancer. While in their core there subsists a deleterious semantic magma.
There is an urgent need to overtly organize meaning. What lacks – dramatically
– for realizing this is a structure of insertion-and-reference constructed independently of
the quantum mechanical formalism and outside it, that offer an explicit, clear and thor-
ough understanding of the non-classical specificities required by the process of bottom-up
construction of a human representation of non-perceptible microscopic entities.
Only this could permit an explicit, exhaustive and coherent domination of the way in which a
mathematical representation of micro-phenomena can be brought to signify adequately.
In the first part of this work I construct such a structure of insertion-and-reference; the
very first one of this kind and that might open the way toward many others of the same type
but tied with other disciplines.
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In the second part, by reference to this structure, are identified the main lacunae that
vitiate nowadays quantum mechanics; and moreover some of these are immediately compensated
locally, thus offering a cleansed ground for a new construction. This, I think, will remain.
In the third part are outlined the main contours – only the main contours – of a second
quantum mechanics 2 denoted in advance QM2, freed of interpretation problems via an explicit
control of semantic-syntactic consistency. If this outline is accepted it will initiate much subse-
quent work for achieving the theory; and if these will not be accepted they will have sown some
basic new suggestions 3.
2For Maxwell’s classical electromagnetism, because “fields” are not directly perceptible, a fully new syntax of
specifically adequate field-descriptors has been independently created before the formulation of the theory itself.
3For the sake of effectiveness, throughout the whole following work all the involved descriptional elements
are posited finite, so discrete.
PART I
INFRA-QUANTUM MECHANICS
A qualitative but formalized structure of reference-and-insertion,
built outside the Hilbert-Dirac mathematical formalism for guiding
the construction of a fully intelligible Quantum Mechanics
“ To reach the truth, once in the life one
has to unbound oneself from all the received
opinions and to reconstruct the whole sys-
tem of knowledge, starting from the ground.”
René Descartes
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I
A human being who wants to construct knowledge concerning ‘microstates’ makes use of phys-
ical entities to which he associates this denomination, of instruments and operations, and he
introduces representational aims and corresponding methods of acting and thinking. Thereby
the human observer introduces severe constraints that structure the process of construction of
knowledge. It is not possible to preserve this process from such constraints. They are precisely
what ‘forms’ it. Nor is it possible to eliminate a posteriori the effects of theses constraints from
the constructed knowledge, these are essentially incorporated to the achieved form to which
they have led. Any piece of knowledge is a construction and this construction remains irre-
pressibly relative to its whole genesis. So, if the observer-conceptor wants to stay in control
of the knowledge that he has generated, to be able to understand and to freely optimize it –
he has to be thoroughly aware of the epistemological-operational-methodological weft of this
knowledge.
In what follows – quite independently of the mathematical formalism of quantum me-
chanics – the necessary and sufficient features of a procedure that is appropriate for creating
specific scientific knowledge on microstates (i.e. communicable, consensual, verifiable knowl-
edge) will be structured in qualitative but explicit terms; in formalized4 and finite (effective)
terms. The result is called in advance infra-(quantum mechanics) and is denoted IQM.
In order to insure for the exposition self-sufficiency and controllable inner coherence the
trivialities will not only be implied, they will be spelled out, insistently. This should permit
a direct and contrasted perception of the specificities involved by the cognitive situation in
which a human being places himself if his aim is to create knowledge on "microstates", not on
perceivable entities and changes of these. Historically this aim is very new. And only when all
the involved cognitive specificities and the ways to deal with them will be known explicitly, will
the mathematical structure of nowadays quantum mechanics stay openly face to face with the
meanings that it should express.
I would like to convey to the reader from the start what follows. Nothing – throughout
the construction elaborated below – is conceived as an assertion of ‘objective intrinsic factual
truth’. I just figure out a succession of methodological steps, each one of which, in order to instil
intelligibility, is deliberately tied to the structure of our classical thought-and-languages that
have emerged and settled in our minds by interactions with entities that are perceived: this is
just a constructive choice, but it seems very useful, and it probably cannot be avoided. On the
4We employ the word ‘formalized’ in the sense that: The posits are explicitly stated; all the specific basic
terms are endowed with explicit and finite definitions; and the elements introduced in this explicit way are
constructed as general and syntactically related void loci for receiving in them particular unspecified semantic
data. Furthermore, once posited or constructed, the elements are explicitly connected in full agreement with
current logic, i.e. with the usual syllogistic.
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other hand, each one of the steps mentioned above transgresses our classical forms of thought
by definite features commanded by the novelty of the aim to establish how to proceed in order
to create ‘scientific’ knowledge concerning a limiting sort of entities that not only cannot be
perceived, but furthermore are operationally drawn out – directly – from a still a-conceptual
physical factuality.
IQM is the global procedural whole that is obtained when these methodological steps
are put together. It is a procedural reference-and-hosting-structure for building a specifically
appropriated representation of microstates.
Though the main and global aim of this work is to construct a fully intelligible scientific
mathematical representation of knowledge on microstates – QM2 – that permit to predict-
and-verify consensually concerning microstates, I begin by constructing a reference-and-hosting
structure, IQM, because I think that this is an unavoidable pre-condition for reaching the
above-mentioned main aim.
The approach developed in this work is organically tied with a general view on the con-
struction of scientific human knowledge, the Method of Relativized Conceptualization, MRC 5.
Inside this approach is brought into evidence that ‘factual truth on how intrinsically is’ what
we posit to exist outside ourselves, transcends scientific knowledge quite essentially, radically
and definitively. The sequence of words ‘factual truth on how intrinsically is a physical entity’
is meaningless. It designates a vicious circle that is so vast and drawn on a ground so irregular
that we do not make out its contour and therefore we ignore the imprisonment inside it. Any
search for entirely ’neutral’, objective descriptions of ‘how this or that fragment of physical
reality truly is in itself’, manifests a naïve illusory sort of realism that modern microphysics
irrepressibly dissolves. Any scientific knowledge is just communicable and consensual descrip-
tion, and any description is marked in a non-separable and non-removable way, as much by
what is described as by how the description has been worked out, via what aims, constraints,
choices. Only non-analysable dense lumps of such what-s and how-s can emerge inside what
we call knowledge. These lumps however can be subjected to an explicit genetic organization,
optimized with respect to definite methodological requirements of coherence and intelligibil-
ity. When this is explicitly achieved for some domain of reality, a corresponding independent
’infra-discipline’ should be brought forth that works like an reference-and-hosting structure, a
reference-and-insertion structure for later constructing also a mathematical scientific represen-
tation for the considered domain of reality.
IQM is the very first such ’infra-discipline’ ever constructed, and QM2 is the correspond-
ing mathematical representation obtained by its help.
The general framework for constructing various infra-disciplines in a unified way is in-
sured by MRC. It seems likely that many other infra-disciplines will follow once that the power
of organization and clarification of an infra-discipline has been brought forth in the paradig-
matic example contained in this work6. For indeed, various recent works suggest that many
other researchers try more or less overtly to achieve precisely infra-disciplines that are somehow
unified inside a common framework.
We warn the reader that while watching how IQM emerges with a sort of necessity, he
might often experience a feeling of strangeness and an impression of shamefully slipping out of
’science’, into philosophy, which after all should be interdicted even if models were admitted
thus violating Bohr’s interdiction. But this feeling is only an inertial cultural reflex instilled
into our minds by a hundred years old orthodoxy. This inertial reflex withstands the urgent
decision to explicate the consequences of the basic fact that our science consists of human
processes of construction of human knowledge where the epistemological features play a central
role. So I take the liberty to ask the reader to accept to pay utmost attention to precisely the
epistemological features that determine the structure of IQM.
5The general Method of Relativized Conceptualization (MRC) that keeps being developed since 1980. The
most elaborated forms published up to now are : M. Mugur-Schächter (MMS), [2002A], [2002B], [2006]).
6For the sake of brevity in this work the involved general MRC requirements are not explicated, they work
hiddenly. Only their form specifically entailed by the aim to represent ’microstates’ is stated explicitly.
(1.I) 7 THE FIRST GERM OF DESCRIPTION
OF A MICROSTATE: GENERATION OF A
MICROSTATE AND QUALIFICATION OF
ONE SPECIMEN OF A MICROSTATE
(1.I).1 DEFINITION OF: OPERATION OF GENERATION OF A
MICROSTATE COMPOSED OPERATION OF GENERATION
In agreement with Dirac we distinguish between stable characteristics assigned to a ’micro-
system’ (mass, spin, etc.), and unstable dynamical characteristics assigned to a micro-state
(position, momentum, etc.). So in this work we consider microstates. So far this is just a verbal
sign to be used like a sort of coordinate of where the attention is to be focalized: Each considered
microstate is presupposed to be a physical thing that is entirely unknown as to all its specificities.
(1.I).1.1 A Basic Question, a Methodological Decision, Mutation of the Classical
Concept of Definition
Basic question . In current languages and in classical grammars and logic, an object-to-be-
qualified is usually supposed to pre-exist. Its definition is realized by use of grammatical pred-
icates or by pointers (“bring me the brown thing from that drawer”), verbal pointers (’there’,
etc.) or even by just pointing physically toward it. But how can a non-perceivable and unknown
microstate be introduced as what-is-to-be-studied? How can it be defined in some stable way so
as to be kept available for further cognitive action upon it, when it is not even known whether
it pre-exists, nor where and when?
Of course as soon as it is named an unknown microstate is already a priori conceived
to possess some minimal class-characters. But in order to become a possible subject of factual
study, it has to be factually generated as such via some definite, macroscopically controllable
physical operation of generation that – accordingly to some previously established knowledge –
should produce it on some specifiable space-time support: If not we cannot even think of it. So
a fortiori we cannot study it.
Let us then denote such an operation of generation by G, and by msG the physical and
individual microstate that ’corresponds’ to G.
The aim of constructing scientific knowledge concerning msG requires possibility of a
communicable and consensual language and verifiability of predictions. For this aim a defined
notion of repeatability of G and of its result msG are unavoidable pre-conditions.
But how can we know that when G is repeated the result denoted msG is systematically
the ‘same’? How can we know that G itself emerges ‘the same’? Well, we cannot know this a
priori, nor can we insure it factually, because ‘G ’ can be inter-subjectively specified only by some
finite definition that, quite essentially, is unable to constrain the whole factual singularity of any
realized replica of the operation ‘G ’. (Umberto Ecco has said that as soon as we speak or write
we conceptualize and thereby we quit and lose irreversibly the infinite singularity possessed by
any realized factual entity). However giving up because of this the project of establishing how
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one can create knowledge on microstates would be an unacceptable weakness from the part of
a human mind.
Methodological decision. This difficulty has to be dominated. Therefore we introduce
the followingmethodological decision of language denoted MD1 that organizes a way of speaking
that permit to advance. Namely:
MD1 . Each time that an operation of generation of a microstate denoted G, is realized
in agreement with a definition expressed in terms of a finite number of controllable parameters
– the only sort of possible factual definition – this operation itself is considered to come out the
‘same’, and that what emerges in consequence of this realization of G is verbally designated as
a specimen of something that – like ‘G’ – is also each time the ‘same’. This ‘same’ something
we label by ‘msG’ and we call it ‘the microstate corresponding to G ’, whatever be the a priori
unknown but certainly present factual singularities of each one of its specimens. This amounts
to denote msG ≡ {σ(msG)} (σ: specimen) and to posit – by just a choice of language that does
not involve any assertion of factual truth – a one-to-one relation between a conceptual-factual
operation and a whole class of specimens {σ(msG)} of what is denoted ‘msG’:
G↔ msG (1)
Each one realization of the operation G will be said to have generated one specimen
of ‘msG’; and a very big number of repetitions of the operation G will be considered to have
realized the class msG ≡ {σ(msG)} that is posited to be in the one-one relation (1) with the
operation of generation G.
This way of starting might seem strange. But as soon as one realizes that absolute
‘sameness’ is just nonsense, this impression vanishes. Only relative ‘sameness’ can make sense
– by comparison – and only via some sort of qualification of that to what the verdict of ‘same’
or ‘not same’ is applied. In what follows it will appear that the relation (1) organizes a priori
verbal expressions that can deal naturally with all the possible future situations entailed by the
use of the concept of operation G of generation of a microstate.
The statement MD1 introduces ‘msG’ in a way that is purely factual-operational-
methodological. That what is denoted msG is still entirely void of any knowledge on ‘msG’
itself, and this participates in the impossibility to start here on the basis of some adequate
knowledge of this. Here, by construction, any element is lacking for some comparison of the
specific effects of the individual realizations of the operation G. But the posit (1) suffices as a
ground for just starting a subsequent experimental research on ‘a microstate’ that will generate
the possibility of such comparisons. And here our local purpose is precisely and exclusively
this: to start. It is an essentially provisional goal. MD1 acts as a methodological provisional
definition; as a syntactical statement of the same nature as the position of an axiom in a logical
or mathematical construction. It endows for the moment with the crucial possibility to speak,
to think and to act for trying to later create some definite knowledge tied with that toward
which points the symbol ‘msG’.
Mutation of the classical concept of ‘definition’. By this very first step the con-
struction attempted here has already imposed upon us a quite notable egress from the domain
of classical thinking. We are in presence of a sample of a feature of the way in which knowledge
on an as yet entirely unknown specimen of an admittedly as yet un-studied sort of entity can
begin. The microstate msG to be studied has been brought in as a void locus for a fragment of
physical factuality that – as to its specificities – is conceived to be entirely unknown. It is true
that this void locus is conceived in advance to belong to a certain class called ‘microstates’ that,
on the basis of previously constructed knowledge is admitted to point toward something that
is posited to be conceivable, and possible to be brought into physical existence, and has been
named. These however are no more than minimal instrumental pre-requisites for just connecting
as yet non-specified subsequent cognitive actions and the knowledge that will be entailed by
these, with previously organized thought, language, and knowledge.
MD1 just places us systematically, repeatedly, on a sort of local platform of strictly
zero-level of specific knowledge on the considered singular outcome 8 of what is denoted msG,
8The expression ‘one outcome of The expression ‘one outcome of msG’ is to be understood only as ‘the
microstate tied with considered nth realization of the operation G’ (our time-and-space where we are imprisoned
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wherefrom we can begin to act via the operation G and we can think an speak of what this
action entails.
This situation is entirely new with respect to the classical concept of definition where
usually already known qualifications of the defined entity yield support for new qualifications of
this same entity. The direct perceptibility permits this confortable ellipsis where the operation
of generation ‘G’ is absorbed in already performed qualifications. But for microstates this is
not possible originally. So in order to deal with this limiting case, the action of ’defining’ in
the classical sense has been explicitly split into a succession of steps: A preliminary step that
introduces a void, purely formal-methodological – but operational and consensual – conceptual
receptacle for semantic content; and subsequent qualifying steps that will have to construct
a way to pour into this receptacle specific singular semantic contents that will constitute a
posteriori, by abstraction, a factual-conceptual definition of the class denoted in advance ‘msG’.
This compensates the absence for microstates of a direct biological perception that permit the
classical way of defining tied with the whole classical way of thinking and speaking 9.
(1.I).1.2 Composed Operations of Generation: a Physical-Conceptual Principle
of Composition of Operations of Generation
From its start, the study of microstates has brought into evidence a class of microstates that
have been called ‘(auto)-interference-states’ and that played a founding role in the emergence
of quantum mechanics (the paradigmatic case is Young’s two slits experiment). The process of
generation of an interference-state permits to distinguish at least two operations of generation
G1and G2 that are ‘involved’, but in the following very peculiar sense: Each one of these two
operations can be produced separately, in which case two different corresponding microstates
msG1 and msG2 emerge. But when G1 and G2are ‘composed’ into only one operation – let us
denote it G(G1, G2)10 – accordingly to (1) there emerges only one corresponding microstate
msG(G1,G2) that manifests ‘auto-interference effects’.
On this factual basis tied with the just indicated way of speaking, we introduce here an
only qualitative – but nevertheless general – ‘principle of composition of operations of genera-
tion’ according to which in certain operations of generation of a microstate, two or more such
operations – deliberately produced by human researchers or brought forth by natural processes
– can ‘compose’ while acting upon one preliminary unspecified microstate, so as to generate
together ‘one’ microstate-to-be-studied, in the sense of MD1. When this happens we shall speak
of one microstate msG(G1,G2,...Gn) with composed operation of generation G(G1, G2, ..., Gk)
11.
When this does not happen, for contrast or precision we can sometimes speak of a ‘simple’
operation of generation.
forces us to distinguish between the realizations). So, if we introduce a numerical indexation in a sequence
of 1, 2, ..., n...N successive realizations of G by writing (G)1, (G)2, ..., (G)n...(G)N , the result of (G)2 is the
particular outcome of msG that is denoted msG(2).
9By the posit (1) the construction we enter upon quits from the start the realm of classical representations
and acquires a formal and deductive character. This character is comparable to that imparted to the natural
syllogistic of Aristotle via the fact that each syllogism is founded – by construction – upon a universal ‘major
hypothesis’ that cannot be verified, but closes by method the explored domain of facts rendering it – hypo-
thetically – absolute, whereby it permits to reach consequences that can be expressed as certainties. This too is
just a procedure for generating a dynamic of progressive investigation. (This does not prevent to keep into full
evidence the posited hypothetical character, for instance by choosing to express a syllogism in the form of an
implication, or by exploring factually the extension of the effective domain of validity of the major hypothesis,
or both).
10This notation stresses that only that only one operation of generation has been effectively achieved by
’composing’ other operations of generation that could have been achieved separately but have not been separately
achieved.
11We do not try to specify the conditions that restrict the possibility of such a composition (in particular,
the space-time conditions) though such conditions do certainly exist. Nor do we try to specify some limit to
the possible number of composed operations of generation. These are features that are still unexplored from
both a factual and a conceptual point of view because inside nowadays quantum mechanics – together with the
concept of operation G of generation of a microstate itself – they remain hidden beneath what is mathematically
expressed, in consequence of a basic confusion between "superpositions" in the mathematical sense of this terms,
and factual superpositions in a physical sense, in space-time. The consequences of this basic confusion will be
narrowly surveyed and in the third part of this work they will play a quite essential role.
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The operation of ‘composition of operations of generation of a microstate’ posited above,
as well as the principle of applicability of such an operation, are only very feebly defined here.
But in the Parts II and III of this work this principle will gain more specification and it will
entail most essential consequences.
(1.I).2 BASIC FEATURES OF THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF
QUALIFICATION OF ONE SPECIMEN OF A MICROSTATE
Classical qualification . Inside the classical thinking an act of qualification involves more or
less explicitly a genus-differentia structure. The genus can be conceived as a semantic dimension
(or space) and the differentia can be regarded as values from a spectrum of values carried by
this semantic dimension. The spectrum can be numerical or not, ordered or not, and it can be
specified by material samples or otherwise. Let us denote the semantic dimension by X and by
Xj , j = 1, 2, . . . J , the values from the spectrum posited to be carried by X (for instance X can
be ‘colour’ and then the spectrum of values Xjcan be posited to consist of a finite number of
definite colours {red, green, blue, etc.}, (since for effectiveness we consider only finite definitions
of operational concepts)).
The semantic dimension and the spectrum of values carried by it are currently imagined
inside classical thought with its languages, logic and grammars, to somehow pre-exist. But here
– even for classical acts of qualification – we conceive them as being in general freely con-
structed by the human observer who conceptualizes accordingly to his local aims of description
and under the general and permanent, though ignored, control of the irrepressibly restrictive
human cognitive ways and possibilities that, considered globally, are acting like an a priori
net of constraints. According to this classical conception there also, usually, just ‘exists’ some
possibility to estimate what value Xj of X is found for a given entity-to-be-qualified when
it is examined via X : this amounts in essence to imagining more or less explicitly a sort of
act of ‘measurement-interaction’ – biological or not, spontaneous or scientific – between some
‘measurement apparatus’ A(X) and the entity to be qualified. Let us denote by MesA such
an act of measurement-interaction. The result Xjof an act MesA, when perceived by the ob-
server, becomes a knowledge concerning the examined entity: indeed, by the definition of this
concept, ‘knowledge’ of some thing is qualification of this thing, since what is not qualified in
any way is not known. This apparent triviality is simply ignored by our spontaneous conception
on what we call ‘reality’, and even inside scientific thought the aim to know how things truly
are, ‘intrinsically’; ‘in themselves’, is not yet generally perceived like a self-contradicting aim.
The operation MesA cannot be defined otherwise than by some finite specified set of
controllable parameters. Unavoidably these are transcended by circumstances that cannot be
conceived a priori. So again, like in the case of (1), there is no other way than just admit that
all the realizations of MesA are the ‘same’, which in fact can only mean the same with respect
to a necessarily finite set of parameters that has been specified 12).
When the estimation of a value Xj of a quantity X assigned to an ‘object’ in the classical
sense, is performed directly via a human biological sensorial apparatus, the ‘measurement-
interaction’ generates in the observer’s mind a quale, a strictly subjective perception of a definite
particular ‘quality’ that cannot be described but of which the subjective existence can usually
be communicated by words, gestures, or other signs that label it consensually in connection
with its exterior source that is publicly perceivable, namely the considered classical ‘object’ 13.
Let us denote globally this classical coding process by cod.proc(Xj). So, in short, a classical
grid of qualification (gq) is a structure that can be symbolized as
gq[X,Xj ,MesA, cod.proc(Xj)] (2)
12Suppositions of this kind are made everywhere inside science.
13For instance – as it is well known – one experiences the feeling of a quality that he calls ‘red’ and says the
word ‘red’ while referring to the source to which he connects this value of the quality ‘colour’ (say a flower).
Thereby that quale and its values acquire – by learning and via contextuality – common inter-subjective verbal
labels that point inside each given mind toward strictly subjective non-communicable events. So in classical
circumstances each very usually arising quale acquires an inter-subjective labelling that is tied with the illusion
that it just ‘exists’, ‘objectively’, ‘outside there’, ‘in the object itself’.
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Qualification of one specimen of a microstate . But how can be qualified a specimen
of an unobsevable microstate msG? This, when closely examined, appears to be a genuine saga.
Consider a qualifying quantity A with ‘values’ aj . Obviously, the operation of generation
G must be followed immediately by a measurement interaction MesA realized inside the space-
time neighbourhood of the space-time support supposed for the operation G. Indeed – by
definition – each outcome of msG is a dynamical state of a changing physical entity denoted
msG, an entirely unknown changing entity but a physical entity. So the human observer, though
any specific knowledge of this changing entity is still lacking in his mind, assigns it irrepressibly
some space-time support 14 and to this he can assign a location and form – an only vague one
– on the basis of previously constructed knowledge and of assumptions of continuity15. But
because of the dynamical character assigned by definition to a ‘microstate’ this location cannot
be supposed to last. Furthermore, usually MesA destroys the involved outcome of msG. In
short:
A whole succession [G.MesA] has to be realized for achieving each one act of measure-
ment.
This is well known but usually it is not explicitly mentioned. So the implications, that are
unexpectedly complex, have remained unanalysed. Also, an act of measurement on a microstate
necessarily requires a non-biological apparatus, and its result must consist of publicly observable
marks. And so on. These questions have been already discussed very much indeed and they have
suffered heavy trivialization without having been solved. But much more radically, and rather
curiously, a huge gap seems to have been unanimously left entirely implicit, as it appears below.
The coding problem
What criteria do permit to define the procedure that deserves being called a
measurement-interaction MesA between a specimen σ(msG) of a given sort of microstate msG
and a given pre-defined quantity A? What procedure – let us denote it cod.proc(aj) – can endow
the publicly observable marks produced by one given act of ‘measurement-interaction’Mes(A),
with meaning in terms of a given value aj of – precisely – the quantity A that one wants to
measure?
When the physical characters indicated by the symbol ‘msG’ are unknown so that not
even the applicability to specimens of msG, of qualifications via a given dynamical quantity A
from the classical mechanics (position, or momentum, or energy, etc.) can asserted be a priori,
how can one get answers to the coding problem? This is a most fundamental problem. Never-
theless it has been left implicit. So it has been confronted only intuitively, without generality,
nor rigor. Let us stop on this problem to specify it very explicitly.
The general content of a grid for mechanical qualification of a microstate accepts the
same general form (2) of a classical grid. But when a microstate is the object of qualification,
the signs A, aj , MesA, cod.proc(aj) point toward contents, toward entities and circumstances,
that with respect to the human observer involve cognitive constraints radically different from
those that act in the case of classical ‘mobiles’:
- That what is to be qualified – one outcome of [‘the micro-state msG’ for which the
one-to-one relation (1) G ↔ msG is posited] – has been extracted by the operation G from,
directly, the as yet a-conceptual physical reality. It is still radically unknown in its physical
specificities. It is only posited to exist and is labelled.
- Every involved individual outcome σ(msG) of the studied microstate remains constantly
and entirely non-perceptible itself by the observer. Supposing that a given sort of measurement
MesA (for instance of the momentum) does make sense with respect to what the symbol ‘msG’
represents and that we know how to perform such a measurement, exclusively groups {µ}kA of
some publicly observable marks (with kA = 1, 2, ...mA) can be obtained on registering devices
of some corresponding measurement apparatuses Ap(A) when one act of measurement MesA
14We mention this in order to stress how the restrictive human processes of ‘thinking’ do come in, irrepressibly.
In MMS [2002] and [2006], etc. is posited a frame principle that specifies in utter detail this very fundamental
feature, of which – only – the essence has already been posited by Kant. It is important to deal with this principle
overtly when one considers Einstein’s general relativity where space and time are treated as physical entities,
not as basic bio-psychical characters of the human processes of construction of knowledge.
15Cf. in Henri Boulouet [2014] for these basic contributions that involve the hypothesis of continuity.
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is performed upon one specimen σ(msG) of msG (for instance a spot on a sensitive screen and
some sound-registration at a time t before or after the registration of the spot).
- Since msG is not directly perceivable no qualia directly tied with exclusively the entity-
to-be-studied can never be formed and triggered in the observer’s mind via an act of measure-
ment MesA: The observer gets no inner subjective feeling tied with the nature of A and with
one specimen of the studied microstate msG.
- The meaning of the registered group of marks {µ}kA – whatever it be – cannot be con-
ceived in terms of some ‘property’ assignable to the involved specimen of the studied microstate
alone. In consequence of the circumstances listed above these marks characterize exclusively the
achieved measurement interaction as a whole, where both the involved specimen of the studied
microstate and the utilized apparatus have been active, while in the considered cognitive situ-
ation no criteria are conceivable for separating a posteriori inside {µ}kA the contributions from
these two sources.
The characters mentioned above will be indicated globally by speaking of results of
primordial transferred measurement-interactions, interactions of which the result consists ex-
clusively of observable marks that are transferred on the registering devices of apparatuses and
cannot entail any sort of qualia tied with the studied microstate itself 16. This concept will be
thoroughly established in (2.I)2.
Essential conclusion . And now we come back to the synthetic formulation of the
central question asked in this section: How are we to conceive an act of measurement-interaction
MesA in order to found the assertion that the registered marks do qualify the involved specimen
of msG in terms of a given value aj of a given measured quantity A? In what a way can an
observable group of brute marks be brought to signify in terms of one definite value aj of
A? How has an interaction MesA to be conceived in order to mean something at all? The
preceding remarks bring into full evidence the quite essential conclusion that:
In the absence of any general model of a specimen of a microstate it is not possible
to define a primordial transferred measurement-interaction for a given pre-defined qualifying
quantity. So a consensual study of the microstates cannot even begin.
We hit again the transparent wall that imprisons us inside our human thought. That is a
major epistemological fact that cannot be transgressed. Then we must let it work freely. We must
organize a framework where we be insured that working freely accordingly to the specific laws
of our thought, we develop clearly visible, amplified and controllable results. If not, instead of
genuine knowledge we will construct non-intelligible heaps of unintelligible signs, verbal, logical,
mathematical heaps of signs that are just fakes and will generate in our minds only unease and
passive, vile, idolatrous submission to illusory ‘results’. In the classical physics we are protected
from such failure by the models that emerge spontaneously from the perceptions generated by
our biological sensorial apparatuses, which we, implicitly, identify firmly with ‘reality such as
it truly is’. But when no sensorial perception generates models any more, this natural resort
dissolves and we are blocked as long as an efficient model is not constructed conceptually, in
connection with observable data and previous classical conceptualization, because this is the
only way in which organized meaning can emerge for us..
But on the other hand, inside a pre-structure like that attempted here, that is required
by construction to be fully general in order to define the common features of any acceptable
theory of microstates, no particular definite model of a microstate can be asserted without
perpetrating vicious circularity. Hence the coding problem cannot be treated inside a mere
reference-and-insertion-structure valid for any theory of microstates. So here we just want to
draw attention immediately and strongly upon the existence of the coding problem, and upon
16Any very first – primordial – registration of results of measurement interactions, are ‘transferred’, even in
the case of directly perceived entities, like in the classical case. What is specific here is the fact that no qualia
can be formed in the observer’s mind, because a microstate cannot be directly perceived. As soon as it accedes
to some direct perceptibility via some apparatuses this specificity ceases (as it happened for molecules and
atoms). Which does not entail that the qualia formed in this way can be confounded with ‘intrinsic truth’.
Any material entity is nowadays conceived to merge with universal ‘sub-quantic substance’ that is devoid of a
delimiting contour, which cannot be perceived nor even genuinely imagined; and furthermore, even this absence
of spatial delimitation is just a model conceived by human mind, not some sort of unconceivable ‘thing-in-itself’
supposed to be represented ‘how it really is’ (a self-contradiction, cf the third before-last paragraph at the end
of the Introduction to the Part I).
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the unavoidable necessity, in any given definite theory of the microstates, to posit a general
model of microstate. In the second part of this work the model of a microstate that acts inside
quantum mechanics will play a fundamental role.
The conceptual situation brought into evidence above refutes the very possibility to
obey Bohr’s positivistic interdiction of any model. Which in its turn proves that in fact this
interdiction has never been genuinely taken into account. It has only enormously intimidated the
minds of the physicists and pushed them, as it will appear, into passive and abstruse acceptance
of basic conceptual impossibilities.
Graphic representation of the qualification of a specimen of a microstate. The
global content of the two basic points exposed so far are summarized graphically in the Fig.1
where: (A(G): apparatus for producing the operation of generation G) ; Ap(MesA): apparatus
for producing the measurement interaction for the dynamical quantity A).
Fig.1. Summary of the definition and qualification of one outcome of a microstate: the germ
structures of primordial transferred qualification
The figure 1 introduces one chain
[(G↔ msG)−[G.MesA]−{µ}kA coded in terms of one aj)], kA = 1, 2, . . . ,mA, j = 1, 2, . . . , J
(3)
This chain represents the emergence of the result of only one act of measurement-
interaction performed upon one outcome of one specimen of the microstate msG defined in
(1). It will be called a (one) coding-measurement-succession. It is the very first germ of the
representation of generation of knowledge on a microstate. This germ is already endowed with
a rather complex inner structure. In what follows however this germ will be developed into a
still far more complex concept, namely a general representation of – not only the information
generated by one outcome of only one specimen of a microstate – but of deliberate stable consen-
sual, predictive and verifiable knowledge on the microstates themselves: scientific descriptions
of microstates.
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(2.I) DESCRIPTION OF A MICROSTATE
AND THE HUMAN GENESIS OF
DESCRIPTIONS OF UNBOUND
MICROSTATES
(2.I).1 PRELIMINARY CONSTRUCTION OF LANGUAGE.
DEFINITION OF MICRO-SYSTEM, AND TYPES OF
MICRO-STATES
The general problem . In our current life we begin by embedding structures of thought in
structures of some current language that emerged collectively, by an anonymous and sponta-
neous process. But from a scientific point of view the pre-existing structures of thought from a
current language are most often beds of Procust. This is so because the aim of natural languages
is to be contextual in order to maximally permit rapid, allusive, suggestive, approximating
transmissions of meaning, of poetic connotations, of humour, etc. Whereas the aim of a scien-
tific language is to induce maximally strict consensus inside some definite group of consensus,
via a priori definitions that point as precisely as possible toward only one significance; which
can be realized (nearly strictly) only via axiomatic constructions. These are opposite aims. And
quantum mechanics, like the majority of the mathematical theories of Physics, is not axiomatic,
it is just imbedded in the natural language where one relies on contextual communication. This
blurs the significance of many basic verbal terms that do currently occur in the language that
accompanies the mathematical representations from quantum mechanics. Thereby much con-
fusion is induced. All the more so as the use of the Hilbert-Dirac mathematical formalism is
associated with the use of current words for which no additional specification is given (to ‘pre-
pare’ (the ‘system’, the ‘state’), to ‘measure’, ‘superposition’, etc.). In what follows we suppress
a priori the possibility of several basic confusions of the sort mentioned above.
The specific problem . Consider a measurement-interaction involving a specimen of
a microstate generated by an operation G. This produces observable marks that have to be
translatable in terms of one value aj of ..... of what, exactly? One value aj of only one measured
dynamical quantity A for any sort of involved microstate, or possibly of several such quantities
or values of quantities for one given sort of involved microstate? Shall we organize our concepts-
and-language so as to imply that one act of measurement on only one outcome of the studied
microstate msG brings forth necessarily only one value aj of each measured dynamical quantity
A? Or that it might imply necessarily (at most) only one set of ‘compatible’ quantities (which is
not the same thing as in the preceding question)? What restrictions are we prepared to accept?
The answers are not obvious because the words ‘micro-state’ and ‘micro-system’ designate
different concepts and one micro-state tied in the sense of (1) with one operation of generation
G can involve one or more micro-systems. So how are we to count such ‘one’ and ‘two’? What
presuppositions have to be incorporated in order to stay in agreement with, both, the current
ways of speaking that accompany the formal quantum mechanical writings? Introducing clear
distinctions might come out to be a major advantage.
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Definitions. So consider a microstate.
(a) The whole human conceptualization associates the concept of ‘state’ to some more
stable support. Violating such a fundamental slope of natural human conceptualization would
uselessly waste energy. The stable support of a state can be called ‘system’.
(b) MD1 introduces the basic posit (1) G↔ msG, with msG = {σ(msG)}, according to
which one operation of generation G produces one specimen σ(msG) of the microstate denoted
msG while the number of the involved ‘systems’ is not restricted by (1).
(c) Concerning (a) and (b) quantum mechanics, beneath the more or less obscure and
moving ways of speaking and writing, introduces certain general constraints. We assert that
these can be re-expressed here by the following sequence of definitions:
Definition [(micro-state) and (micro-system)]. Accordingly to (a) and (b) one
definite micro-system is the concept delimited by the set of stable characters (mass charged
etc.) assigned to the set msG = {σ(msG)} of mutually distinct micro-states generated via the
operation of generation G.
Definition [(one micro-system) and (one micro-state of one micro-system)].
Consider a micro-state msG that is such that one act of measurement accomplished upon one
specimen σ(msG) of this micro-state can bring forth only one group {µ}kA of observable marks.
We shall say that this micro-state brings in one micro-system and so we shall call it a micro-state
of one micro-system.
Definition [ one micro-state of n micro-systems]17. Consider now n > 1 micro-
systems of a type of which we know that, for each one of them separately it is possible to
generate a micro-state in the sense of the preceding definition ; which, if done, would lead to
‘n micro-states of one micro-system’ in the sense of the preceding definition. But let G(nS)
(nS: n systems) denote only one operation of generation that, acting upon some physical initial
support regarded as ‘prime matter’ relatively to G(nS), has generated one common micro-state
for all these n micro-systems18; or even, out of some initial substratum, has simultaneously
generated altogether the n micro-systems themselves with their common one-micro-state. In
both these cases we shall say that the microstate generated by G(nS) is one micro-state of n
micro-systems and we shall denote it by msG(ns)19
Definition [complete measurement on one micro-state of n micro-systems].
One act of measurement performed on one specimen σ(msG) of a microstate msG(ns) of n
micro-systems, can produce at most n distinct groups of observable marks signifying n observable
values of dynamical quantities. An act of measurement that effectively realizes this maximal
possibility will be called a complete act of measurement on the one specimen σ(msG) of the
one micro-state msG(ns) of n micro-systems. We do permit – by definition – the quantities A
and the values aj to which these n distinct groups of marks are tied, to be either identical or
different.
Definition [ incomplete measurement on one micro-state of n micro-
systems].One act of measurement accomplished upon one specimen σ(msG) of a microstate
msG(ns) of n micro-systems that produces less than n distinct groups of observable marks, will
be called an incomplete act of measurement on msG(ns).
Finally, for self-sufficiency of this sequence of definitions, we restate here telegraphically
the definition from 1.I of a micro-state msG(G1,G2,..Gk) generated by a composed operation of
generation:
Definition [ one micro-state generated by a composed operation of genera-
tion]. Consider – indifferently – either one micro-state of one micro-system, or one micro-state
of n > 1 micro-systems. If this micro-state has been generated by a composed operation of gen-
17This definition is crucially fertile: it will permit to open a constructed door toward unifying fundamental
quantum mechanics and the fields-theories.
18This is the case, for instance, when G(nS) consists of an interaction between two pre-existing elementary
particles that brings forth ‘a pair’.
19The posit (1) entails that the uniqueness of the operation G(nS) is to be a priori conceived as a source
of global observational specificities of each specimen of ‘msG(ns)’ and so of ‘msG(ns)’ itself (for instance, in
particular, of what is called ‘auto-interference’ aspects).
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eration G(G1, G2, ..Gk) in the sense defined in 1.I then we call it ‘a microstate with composed
operation of generation’.
Definition [ one ‘bound’ micro-state of several micro-systems]. This is the usual
verbal designation of the result of a ‘natural operation of generation’ – accomplished in con-
sequence of the laws of nature, before any human aim of investigation (like in the case of the
natural realization of an atomic structure). But in principle it can be also thought of in terms
of the result of a ‘composed’ operation of generation, so much more so as a bound micro-state
of several micro-systems manifests systematically ‘interference’ effects.
Un-bound microstates and bound microstates: a choice . With respect to unbound
microstates, the features of bound micro-states can be regarded as particular cases, for at
least two reasons. The first one is that a bound state can pre-exist any desired investigation,
just as it is supposed for classical ‘objects’. The second reason is that furthermore a bound
state can be assigned – in a certain relative sense of course (cf. note 16) – a definite spatial
delimitation, again as in the case of a classical mobile. This might explain why the mathematical
representation of bound microstates has constituted the natural passage from classical physics to
quantum mechanics when the practised approach still was top-down. But in this work we want
to explicate and stress the radical novelties imposed by the representation of microstates. So the
bound microstates with their quasi-classical characters will occupy here a marginal position.
We shall mainly consider unbound microstates. These will permit to bring into evidence:
- To what a degree the scientific representations can become a deliberate consensual
construction of which the necessary and sufficient conditions of possibility depend strongly on
the involved cognitive situation (that can evolve with the evolution of the sciences and the
techniques).
- This should also modify our conception on scientific representation and stress the utmost
importance of the relativity to the constraints and the aims that act.
Conclusion . We hold that the definitions from this point (2.I)1 insure, both, global
coherence relatively to the implications carried by the language practised inside nowadays mi-
crophysics, and continuity with the basic principles of the classical language. If one contests
the adequacy of some feature from these definitions, then he must specify the reason why he
does so and propose a better usage of words. Meanwhile the definitions from (2.I)1 are adopted
throughout what follows. On this basis we now enter upon the construction of the general
concept of description of a microstate.
(2.I).2 PRIMORDIAL TRANSFERRED DESCRIPTION OF AN
UNBOUND MICROSTATE
What follows in this point (2.I)2 is formulated in terms that are valid for any microstate.
Preliminary requirements. Inside current thinking and speaking the qualifications are
in general just asserted freely concerning an ‘object-for-qualification’ that is conceived to pre-
exist such as we qualify it (this tree is big, today the air is cold, etc.). But a ‘scientific description’
is required to be communicable with precision, to be endowed with a consensual definition, and
to be predictive and verifiable. These requirements entail constraints, and, as already stressed,
when the entities to be described are not directly perceivable these constraints can acquire
new and previously unsuspected features. In particular verifiability entails repeatability as well
as the existence of some definite descriptive invariant with respect to repetitions that shall
permit corresponding predictions. In the case of microstates these implications entail specific
consequences among which the following three are the most important:
1. Repeatability. In general a microstate-to-be-studied does not pre-exist in some known
and attainable way, but has to be first generated in order for the observer-conceptor to become
able to create some knowledge on it; while furthermore in general the studied microstate is
destroyed by a measurement interaction. So in general one cannot consider a measurement
operation MesA separately from an operation of generation G, as it is currently done in the
case of a ‘mobile’ in the classical sense. For each observation of a result, one has to realize a
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whole measurement-succession [G.MesA] (3). So when repetitions are necessary sequences of
successions [G.MesA] have to be realized.
2. Descriptional invariant: "factual (, δ,N0)-probabilities" . Consider now the
constraint of existence of some descriptional invariant with respect to repetitions of successions
[G.MesA]. In general when one given succession [G.MesA] is repeated one obtains different
results Xj. This is an experimental fact , notwithstanding that in each succession [G.MesA]
the operations ‘G’ and ‘MesA’ are both ‘the same’ but only with respect to the parameters
that define them.
Thereby we come to an arm-wrestling between IQM and the classical presuppositions
for scientific descriptions. In classical mechanics the basic laws are conceived and formulated
as individual in-variants with respect to repetition, and these invariants are conceived to
characterize exclusively the studied entity itself (i. e. the result is not explicitly referred to
some measuring interaction, it is regarded as a ‘property’ of the measured entity). Whereas
the current assertion that the micro-phenomena ‘possess’ a primordial (or essential) statistical
character points toward precisely the fact – a physical-cognitive fact – that repetitions of a
‘same’ succession of strictly first acts of qualification [G.MesA] (cf. the figure 1) generates a
whole statistical distribution of mutually distinct observable results; and the observable result
of one act [G.MesA] of primordial qualification does not characterize the studied entity itself
considered in isolation20.
Now, in order to succeed to formulate some sort of ‘law’ that permit predictions and
verification of these, some invariant with respect to repetition has to be identified for also
the case of a scientific study of microstates. And since one starts on an observational ground
that – with respect to knowledge – has a primordially statistical character, the only possible
observational invariant that could be asserted is the existence of a primordially ’probabilistic’
invariant for the global result of a big number N of repetitions of the succession [G.MesA].
But the classical concept of probability is founded upon the weak law of large numbers that
is a non-effective mathematical concept, while here we have chosen to develop from the start
a strictly effective approach (cf. the introduction to Part I). So we have to specify an effective
concept of probability. For this we proceed as follows. From the weak theorem of large numbers
∀j, ∀(, δ), (∃N0 : ∀(N ≥ N0))⇒
∏
(|[n(ej)/N−]pi(ej)|) ≤ ] ≥ (1− δ) (4)
where – by deliberate requirement of systematic effectiveness every descriptive element is finite
– we extract explicitly the following well-known finite implication. Consider a universe of events
U = [e1, e2, ....eJ ], j = 1, 2, ..., J , with J a finite integer. If the probability pi(ej) of an event ej is
postulated to exist for any ej , then (4) insures by construction that for any pair of two arbitrarily
small real numbers (, δ) there exists an integer N0 such that – for any N ≥ N0 and with an
uncertainty not bigger than δ – the meta-probability
∏
of the event [n(ej)/N−]pi(ej) ≤ ]
that the relative frequency n(ej)/N observed for the event ej inside a sequence of N events
from U , does not differ from pi(ej) by more than , is bigger than (1 − δ). This statement,
with N0 chosen freely and the corresponding pair (, δ), will be considered in what follows
to define a general and factual , finite concept of probability pi(ej) of the event ej denoted
"(, δ,N0)-probability p(ej) of the event ej" 21. In our case U consists of the finite spectrum of
values aj assigned to A. And we make the strong assumption that the one-to-one relation (1)
20In consequence of the development of nanotechnology each one of these circumstances – as well as that one
posited by Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty – might change in the future. It is not a conceptual necessity,
but a cognitive-technical one, and that evolves.
21In (MMS [2014B]) I have examined Kolmogorov’s non-effective, purely mathematical concept of probability
and I have constructed in finite terms a corresponding concept of ‘factual and numerically specified probability
law’: The abstract probability measure from a Kolmogorov probability space is not numerically specified; it
is just posited as an existing void receptacle for numerical specifications of a certain ‘corresponding’ set of
statistics, namely those that are factually obtained and manifest relative stabilities: I have shown that a ‘factual
statistical-probabilistic law’ consists of a statistic that, with respect to repetition, is endowed with stability
relatively to the triad (, δ,N0(, δ)) denoted (, δ,N0), namely with improvement of the stability with respect
to increases of N0 and/or diminutions of  and δ – which can be understood only if it is conceived to stem
from a permanent whole of which we cannot acquire an integral perception, but only a fragmented one; or as
the result of some other permanent global constraint. In this sense the abstract concept of probability is just a
conceptual explanation of a set of factual consensual statistical stabilities. Moreover a probabilistic situation very
rarely emerges naturally. In most cases it is deliberately constructed as a strategy for generating a consensual
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msG ↔ G together with the systematic repetition, for any A, of the corresponding succession
[G.MesA], are sufficient constraints for entailing ‘convergence toward an (, δ,N0)-probability
pi(aj)’, for any association between a chosen pair (, δ) and the relative frequency n(aj)/N
found for a value aj , j = 1, 2, ..., J that is present inside the chosen qualification grid (2)
gq[A, aj ,MesA, cod.proc(aj)]
22. In short, given a definite microstate msG ↔ G, the stated
assumption introduces for any couple of pairs ((G,A), (, δ)) a corresponding factual (, δ,N0)-
probability law
(, δ,N0)− {pi(aj)},∀j) (5)
3. Compatibility of quantities versus specific’ knowledge on a given mi-
crostate. The aim to construct a ‘description of a microstate msG’ amounts in fact to the
aim to substitute to the initial only formal and general definition (1) of this microstate msG
via a posited one-to-one correspondence G↔ msG, a factual and verifiable definition of msG in
terms of semantic contents that establish specific knowledge on this particular microstate itself.
But nothing entails that a probability law (5) established formsG relatively to only one dynam-
ical quantity A, cannot be observed also for another microstate different from msG. It seems
likely however that two probability laws (5) corresponding to two mutually different dynamical
quantities A and A′ 6= A – considered conjointly – do already much more likely constitute an
observational factual specificity associable to the particular considered microstate.
This draws now attention upon the way in which measurement operations of distinct dy-
namical quantities can be associated in order to reach an observable knowledge that is factually
specific of the studied microstate:
Is it possible to subject one specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG – simul-
taneously – to operations of measurement of two or several distinct dynamical quantities X
defined for a microstate?
Consider two distinct dynamical quantities A and A′ 6= A and one outcome of a mi-
crostate msG of one or several microsystems. Suppose that it is possible to specify for A and
A′ one common measurement-interaction with a unique outcome of msG. This involves that
it is possible to achieve for A and A’ one common factual measurement-interaction with one
specimen of msG – so that only one common space-time support is covered and finishes by the
registration of a unique group {µ}(AA′),k, k = 1, 2, . . .mAA′ of brute observable marks – but
out of which, afterwards, are worked out two conceptually distinct values aj and a’j that are
assigned, respectively, to A and to A′ 6= A. In other words, A and A′ are mutually compatible
in this sense that – in the considered circumstances – they are physically – operationally and
individually – constructed in the same way, but conceptually they are distinguished from one
another on an exclusively abstract level 23 24.
If on the contrary the considered operational and individual procedure is not possible
with respect to the considered pair of dynamical quantities A and A’ (or more) we shall say
that these are ‘mutually incompatible quantities’, in the considered circumstances.
So the concepts of compatibility or incompatibility of dynamical quantities that have
been defined above are essentially relative to: the concept of one individual outcome (specimen)
sort of factually observable stability on the basis of some factual invariant that is introduced with this aim
(think of games, and also of most experimental situations (since strict individual stability is practically never
realized). Concerning the conceptual status of – merely – a statistic, with respect to the conceptual status of a
probability law, there are huge confusions that last since centuries (the researchers begin to grow conscious of
this (Wasserstein&Lazar [2016], Leek&Penn, [2015]) : A statistic is just the set of relative frequencies obtained
when a given sort of measurements is realized once upon a set of samples that are of the same nature from
some point of view, in order to gather some necessary information; no invariance with respect to repetitions is
required, nor pre-organized).
22Xj being identified starting from a group of observable physical marks, via the utilized coding-procedure that
inside IQM cannot be defined but is supposed to have been defined inside the employed theory of microstates.
23If the initially considered microstate is one micro-state of two micro-systems – in the sense of the definitions
from (2.I)1 – the sort of compatibility between A and A′ that has been defined above can cease when one
considers one micro-state of one micro-system (cf. the future point (3.I)2).
24This happens, for instance, for the classical quantities p and p2/2m = T for which it is possible to first
determine in a physical-operational way the numerical value of the common basic quantity |p| = m(vx+vy+vz),
and out of this basic operational determination, to work out afterward, conceptually, the two results ‘p’ and
‘p2/2m’ that are mutually distinct from a conceptual point of view as well as by their numerical values).
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of the considered microstate; the sort of considered microstate (in the sense of the definitions
from (2.I)1); the considered set of quantities; the available techniques for measuring , that
vary as times changes; the model of a microstate that is presupposed, that constantly plays
the central role; so the coding procedure that is involved25.
When A and A’ are compatible in the sense defined above with respect to the considered
sort of microstate, the corresponding (, δ,N0)-probability laws (5) involve for that sort of mi-
crostate only one same physical substratum. And obviously, for the considered sort of microstate
this can happen more frequently with only one group of mutually compatible quantities, than
for two or more such groups. So a maximal dynamical specificity of a given microstates is ob-
tained by establishing the statistical behaviour of this microstate with respect to all the groups
of mutually incompatible dynamical quantities that are defined with respect to it.
Primordial description of a microstate. The considerations from the preceding
point lead us to posit by definition that – notwithstanding that the laws (5) do not concern the
studied microstate msG itself, separately from the measurement interactions from the succes-
sions [G.MesA], ∀A that led to them – nevertheless:
The set of sets
{(, δ,N0)− {(pi(aj)}, ∀j 26, }G, ∀A} (5’)
of all the factual (, δ,N0)-statistical-probabilistic laws (5) established with respect to one given
operation of generation G and all the dynamical quantities A defined for a microstate, can be
regarded as a mechanical description ‘of ’ msG.
Indeed this is the maximally specifying characterization that can be realized for the
considered microstate msG, by use of all the qualifying quantities that are defined for it. And it
is a reasonably specifying characterization. Indeed, to the initial definition (1) of the microstate
msG that only labels this microstate by the operation G that generates it, and to the chain
(3) that endows us with a very first and feeble dot of meaning tied with this microstate itself,
(5’) substitutes finally a characterization of msG in terms of a whole stable and dense structure
of communicable, consensual, predictive and verifiable pieces of statistical data that exhausts
the defined possibilities to qualify it and that are all specifically tied with also this particular
microstate itself, with also effects of its own interactions with measurement procedures, not
only any more with the way ’G’ in which msG is generated. While via the coding-procedures
cod.proc(aj), ∀A, necessarily posited to be involved by the definitions of the measurement
interactions MesA, ∀A, this structure is intelligible, because it is connected to the knowledge
established in classical mechanics.
This, finally, installs the concept of a microstate msG as a scientific concept that is
endowed with a definite, stable and specific ‘own’ semantic content. In this sense we are now
finally in presence of knowledge tied with the microstates themselves.
This knowledge is tied with the concept of a microstate msG but it is not knowledge
exclusively on the microstates themselves. Thereby the sort of knowledge represented in (5’)
violates strongly the current classical ways of thinking in terms of objects that – as delimited
wholes – are endowed with a stable global space-time location that entails an inside, an outside,
and an inner organization, and can be qualified in terms of properties that these objects would
possess. Moreover the genesis and the content assigned to (5’) also violates surreptitiously but
radically the clear-cut conventional views on objective facts. By the epistemological constraints
and descriptional aims and choices that are involved it violates the classical notion of knowledge
of some ‘thing’.
Notations, denominations, comments. Let us now immediately organize and denote
in detail the new sort of knowledge involved by (5’). In order to deal efficiently with all the
25These relativities draw attention upon the fact that in nowadays quantum mechanics the concepts of mutual
compatibility or incompatibility of dynamical quantities are uncritically assigned a rather mysterious absolute
nature, which is the source of unending astonishment, confusions, and philosophically shaded considerations
that are devoid of any clear and operational definition.
26From now on, for the sake of simplicity, for a usual repetitive index like ‘j’ in aj we do no more write
j = 1, 2, ...., J but only ∀j, keeping in mind that the cardinal J of the se of indexes is finite.
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unusual elements we shall now improve and summarize the names and notations associated
with this knowledge.
- The grid of qualification introduced by a dynamical quantity A defined for microstates
will be called the aspect-view A. The definition of each aspect-view A is assumed to contain
the explicit specification of a coding-rule, in order to compensate for the absence of direct
perceptibility and of qualia assignable to the studied microstate itself: this is what insures a
way to associate to the group of observable brute observable marks {µ}kA, kA = 1, 2, . . . ,mA
produced by one act of measurement-interaction from a succession [G.MesA], a meaning in
terms of a definite value aj of A.
- The whole set of all the dynamical quantities defined for a microstate will be called the
mechanical view defined for a microstate and will be denoted VMec. So: {A} ≈ VMec
- The triad of basic genetic elements
(G,msG, VMec) (6)
will be called the genetic triad of (5’). It acts globally. It can be regarded like a sort of inorganic
physical-conceptual DNA.
- The whole vast set
{[G.MesA]},∀A ∈ VMec (7)
of repeated successions of operations of the general form [G.MesA] achieved by the use of all
the genetic triads (6) realized inside the process (5’) will be called the genesis of (5’).
- Consider the brute result of the genesis {[G.MesA]}, ∀A ∈ VM of (5’) that consists
exclusively of the set-of-sets of observable marks {{µkA}, kA = 1, 2, . . .mA,∀A}}. This will be
called the factual data produced by (5’) and will be denoted by (fd)(msG). So we write
{{µkA}, kA = 1, 2, . . .mA,∀A ∈ VMec}} ≡ (fd)(msG) (8)
The totality (8) of all the factual data emerges at very dispersed moments, and also very
dispersed spatially, on various registering devices of possibly various apparatuses. Observation-
ally, it is just heaps of a powder of traces of vanished interactions, transmuted into meaning by
a man-made operational-conceptual-methodological machine.27
The factual data from (8) and their explicitly meaningful final expression (5’) are devoid
of any own space-time organization, as well as of any qualia assignable to the studied microstate
msG alone. This is a striking feature of any probabilistic description. But here, in consequence
of total non-perceptibility of the entity to be studied, it acquires a limiting degree of purity.
The definitions (5) and (5’) of the primordial probabilistic predictive laws concerning
msG – separated from their geneses (7) – will be re-noted now, respectively, as:
(D/A)(msG) ≡ {(, δ,N0)− pi(aj)}G (9)
DM (msG) ≡ {{(, δ,N0)− pi(aj)},∀A ∈ VMec (9’)
and will be called, respectively, the primordial transferred description of the microstate msG
with respect to the given mechanical qualification A (a description entirely ‘transferred’ on
registering devices of apparatuses), and the primordial transferred mechanical description of
the microstate msG (‘Mec’ : mechanical). Isolated from their genesis as they are in (9) and (9’)
these representations are devoid of any own physical-operational and conceptually internalized
content ; they are just distributions of numbers referred mentally to revolved human physical-
operational contents.
Let us notice that (9) (D/A)(msG) – referred to one given qualifying quantity A – is the
basic concept of transferred description.
The whole that is constituted by, both, geneses (7) of repeated successions [G.MesA],
and their result (9) or (9’), will be called the genetic symbolization of the description (9),
(respectively (9’)) of the microstate msG and will be denoted, respectively
(D/A)(G,msG, A) or DM (G,msG, VMec) (10)
27Let us stop a moment to realize how simplistic it would be to assert that this knowledge pre-existed and
has been ‘discovered’, when so obviously it has been invented and constructed
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The symbol (10) stresses that in the case of microstates, the gained knowledge and the
conceptual-physical-operational generation of this knowledge by the human observer-conceptor,
constitute an intimate unity wherefrom the intelligibility stems.
The challenge involved by the preceding results with respect to realism and ‘objectivity’
in the ancient classical sense is clearly expressed by the writings from (4) to (10) 28.
28This acquires fundamental importance when it appears that – as shown in MMS [2002A], [2002B] [2006] –
both concepts DM(msG) and (D/A)(msG) of primordial transferred description are endowed with universality:
any very first stage of a description is ‘transferred’, either on the biological sensorial receptors, or on upon
registration devices of instruments that prolong the biological receptors.
(3.I) THE PROBABILITY TREE OF THE
PRIMORDIAL TRANSFERRED
DESCRIPTION OF AN UN -BOUND
MICROSTATE
In spite of all the comments from the section (2.I)2 the content of that section, expressed only by
words and symbolic writings, still remains too abstract for being able to trigger an intuitive and
sufficiently detailed perception of the whole novelty of the concept of a primordial transferred
description. Therefore, for the main sorts of unbound microstates defined in (2.I)1, we shall now
construct graphic representations of the contents carried by the whole representation [(1)→(10)]
achieved up to now.
(3.I).1 THE PROBABILITY TREE OF THE ONE UNBOUND
MICRO-STATE OF ONE MICRO-SYSTEM WITH
NON-COMPOSED OPERATION OF G OF GENERATION
Throughout what follows we distinguish radically between distinct levels of conceptualization.
We begin with the basic case of one un-bound microstate of one microsystem. On this
case we shall already be able to reveal many non-classical specificities involved by (9) and (9’).
Individual level of conceptualization . The very numerous successions of operations
[G.MesA], ∀A ∈ VMec involved in a genesis (7) start all by definition with one same trunk
operation of generation G. But afterward – in consequence of individual and relative com-
patibilities and incompatibilities between dynamical quantities (cf.(2.I)2) the set of all the
individual space-time supports of these successions of operations [G.MesA] fall apart, in gen-
eral, in distinct space-time ‘branches’. So in general there emerges a tree-like structure. But for
simplicity we presuppose only two non-compatible quantities A and B (in the sense of (2.I)2);
the generalization is obvious.
The two mutually incompatible dynamical quantities A and B introduce respectively the
two qualification-grids of form (2)
gq[A, ak,MesA, cod.proc(ak)], j = 1, 2, ....,M gq[B, br,MesB, cod.proc(br)], r = 1, 2, ....,M
(2’)
(for simplicity we endow them with the same number M of possible values, respectively aj and
br, and we shall write only ∀j, ∀r) (cf the note attached to (5’)).
Let [dG.(tG − t0)] (d: distance; t: time) denote the invariant space-time support of each
one realization of the operation G of generation of the studied microstate msG, that plays
the role of a common ‘rooting’ into the microphysical factuality; and let [dA.(tMesA − tG)]
and [dB .(tMesB − tG)], respectively, denote the – mutually distinct – space-time supports of a
measurement-operationMesA and a measurement-operationMesB, the time origin being re-set
on zero after each time-registration (obvious significance of the notations). So each realization
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of one whole succession [G.MesA] covers a global space-time support
[dG.(tG − t0) + dA.(tMesA − tG)]
and produces a group of observable marks {µkA}, kA = 1, 2, . . .mA, that is coded in terms of a
value ajaccordingly to (2’); while each realization of a succession [G.MesB] covers in its turn a
global space-time support
[dG.(tG − t0) + dB .(tMesB − tG)]
and produces a group of observable marks {µkB}, kB = 1, 2, . . . ,mB that is coded in terms of
a value br of the quantity B. Thereby for the considered case the genesis (7) from the level of
individual conceptualisation involved by the representation (5), is achieved.
This individual phase of elaboration involved by the representation (5) has a dominant
physical-operational character.
Probabilistic level of conceptualization . Let us start now from the fact that one
succession [G.MesA] produces one group of observable marks, {µ}kA, with kA = 1, 2, . . . ,mA.
This group of marks {µ}kA is then coded into a value aj of A via an adequate choice of the
definition of a measurement-interaction MesA, accordingly to the coding procedure required
by the utilized theory of microstates on the basis of the model of microstate posited inside it
for the considered pair (G,A). The coding value aj is stored. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds
for a succession [G.MesB].
Suppose now that a sequence of a big number N of realizations of a succession [G.MesA]n,
n = 1, 2, ...., N , has been realized. The relative frequencies n(aj)/N , ∀j. where the symbol
(n(aj) is to be read ‘the number n of values aj of A’) have been established and an (, δ,N0)-
convergence in the sense of (5) has been found to emerge indeed for these relative frequencies. In
these conditions the primordial transferred description (9) has been specified fully, operationally
and numerically. Furthermore on the top of the branch we have constructed a corresponding
effective Kolmogorov-like probability-space ((, δ,N0) space) for the pair (G,A): The universe of
elementary events from the probability space is U = {aj}, ∀j, and the probability law from the
space, namely the primordial transferred description (9) (D/A)(msG) ≡ {(, δ,N0)− pi(aj)}G,
∀j, is numerically defined for all the values {aj} considered for the measured quantity A 29.
(For the moment the algebra on the universe of elementary events is not considered explicitly).
Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for the quantity B and its values br.
Thereby the probabilistic level from the representation (9) is also constructed. On this
level – out of the brute observable factual data (fd)(msG) generated for the quantities A and B
by the genetic, individual and physical-operational phase (7) – has been worked out a purely nu-
merical probabilistic content. So when this level of conceptualization is achieved the probability
law obtained on it – when it is considered separately, not inside the context of a whole probabil-
ity space – has a purely abstract mathematical character 30. It induces a promontory into the
realm of the mathematized. As soon as we count, irrepressibly, we generate mathematization,
spontaneously.
A meta-probabilistic level of conceptualization . But we cannot stop here. The
explicit awareness of the role of the unique operation G of generation of all the outcomes of
the studied microstate msG – from both branches – hinders that. Indeed since the two different
29As it is well-known, a complete Kolmogorov probability space has the structure [U, τ, pi(τ)] where τ is an
algebra on the universe U of elementary events. As for the probability pi(τ) – defined on τ – it designates
exclusively the general concept of a probability measure, without specifying it numerically; while nowhere in the
mathematical theory of probabilities is indicated how to construct the numerically specified probability law that
works in a given, factual, particular probabilistic situation (cf. MMS [2014]. But here it has been explicitly stated
how is constructed in (5), (5’) and so in (9) and (9’) the factual, finite and numerically specified probability law,
and this makes an essential difference.
30We stress this because inside quantum mechanics the asserted probability laws are indeed considered sep-
arately from the corresponding probability spaces, so in particular separately from the universe of elementary
events that generate these laws. They are not explicitly defined factually. They are regarded to be calculable
from a state-ket, a mathematical entity defined by Scrödinger’s equation and an initial state-ket ’given’ by the
conceptor-observer. This circumstance deserves being noted immediately and kept in mind because it plays a
major role in the parts II and III of this work.
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effective probability laws {pi(G, aj)}, ∀j and pi(G, br)}, ∀r 31 that crown the operational space-
time branches from the zone of individual conceptualization, stem both from one same trunk-
operation of generation G, the graphic representation stresses that in consequence of (1) the
two branch-probability laws concern one same microstate msG. In these conditions it seems
unavoidable to posit that there exists some sort of meta-probabilistic correlation between the
two factual probability laws pi(G, aj)} and {pi(G, br)}. Such a correlation accepts an expression
of the general form
pi(aj) = Faj,Y {pi(G, b)}, ∀r (11)
FAB(G) = {Faj,B{pi(G, aj)}}, ∀j (11’)
where FajB{pi(G, br) and FAB(G) are two functionals that represent, respectively, the individual
probability pi(aj) in terms of the whole probability law {pi(G, br)}, ∀r, and the global correlation
between the two whole laws {pi(G, aj)}, ∀j, and {pi(G, br)}, ∀r. Together, the relations (11) and
(11’) will be called the meta-probabilistic correlations involved by G ↔ msG with respect to
(A,B) and will be symbolized by (Mpic(G))AB(Mpic: ‘meta-probabilistic correlation’)32. So the
description (9’) of the studied microstate has to be explicitly completed:
DM (msG) ≡ {[(, δ,N0)− pi(G, aj)}, (Mpic(G))AB ], ∀A, ∀AB ∈ VMec, ∀j33 (9”)
And in order to distinguish clearly between the probability-laws pi(G, aj)}, ∀A ∈ VMec
from (9) and the meta-probabilistic correlations (Mpic(G))AB , ∀AB ∈ VMec defined by (11),
(11’), we shall say by definition that (9’) contains probabilistic qualifications of the first order
whereas (Mpic(G))AB ,∀AB ∈ VMec from (9”) expresses probabilistic qualifications of the second
order34.
31For the sake of brevity, from now on we cease to always write explicitly the specification ‘(, δ,N0)’; but it
will be constantly presupposed.
32The two functionals Fl{pi(G, Yr) and FAB(G) can acquire a definition only inside a theory of microstates
where are specified the general model posited for a microstate and the corresponding general concept of MesA,
∀A, with the involved coding procedure.
34We note that the whole process of description (9”) has been developed inside an a priori given cell for
conceptualization, namely the pair (G,VMec), that acted like a local epistemic referential.
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The global geometrized final result: the ‘probability tree’ T (G, (A,B)). The figure
2 represents graphically the totalized result of the preceding genesis.
Fig.2. The probability-tree T (G, (A,B) of an unbound microstate msG
We have remarked that, in contradistinction to its purely numerical result this genesis
itself possesses a definite space-time structure. Therefrom the character of successive emergence
is abstracted away because factually it evaporates from the structure while it is progressively
accomplished. Thereby what remains is a geometrized, only spatial tree-like structure that
conserves in it just marks of the role of time generated by the mutual compatibilities or incom-
patibilities between the measured dynamical quantities, with respect to the considered type of
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microstate 35. So let us denote by T (G, (A,B)) (T : ‘tree’) this geometrized structure of the
genetic process of a description (9”)36.
The green zone of genetic conceptualization – purely individual and physical-operational
– is clearly separated from the yellow zone of more abstract conceptualization that reaches a
final purely mathematical probability law consisting of, exclusively, results of counts of coding-
values Xj or Yr (drawn from coding procedures that here remain undefined but that are posited
to be available inside any theory of microstates).
More detailed examination of T (G, (A,B). The concept of probability-tree of a mi-
crostate involves significances that are far from being trivial. They have helped to develop
Kolmogorov’s purely abstract, mathematical concept of probability – where the particular fac-
tual distributions of probability registered in factual probabilistic situations are not defined –
into a new and much more complex, factual concept of probability (MMS [2014]).
Probabilistic point of view
- Random phenomenon. The classical theory of probabilities offers no formalization of the
concept of random phenomenon. It just makes use of the current verbal expression. Whereas on
the figure 2 one literally sees how – from nothingness – a Kolmogorov probability-space emerges
for a microstate, factually and conceptually and up to several numerically specified probability
laws and meta-probabilistic correlations between these. Thereby the basic concept of random
phenomenon acquires for this case a detailed inner structure, expressed in definite terms [G,
MesA or MesB, marks {µ}kA or marks {µk}kB , code {aj} or code {br}], wherefrom Kolmogorov
probability-spaces are then constructed. But these are factually defined probability-spaces,
that contain numerically specified (, δ,N0)-probability laws that are effective and explicitly
relativized to all the actions and features that determine them. And this result can then be
generalized and induced in an enlarged theory of probabilities (MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006],
[2013], [2014]).
- Probabilistic dependence. The complete Kolmogorov probability spaces that crown the
two branches from the figure 2 admit, respectively, the denotations
[U(aj), τA, {pi(G, aj}], ∀j, [U(br), τB , {pi(G, br)}], ∀r
where τA and τB are the respective algebras of events. Let us consider now explicitly these
algebras also. Inside the classical theory of probabilities the concept of probabilistic depen-
dence is defined only for events from the algebra of one given space. Kolmogorov has written
(Kolmogorov 1950, p.9) :
«. . . ..one of the most important problems in the philosophy of the natural sci-
ences is – in addition to the well known one regarding the essence of the concept
of probability itself – to make precise the premises which would make it possible to
regard any given real events as independent.»
And he has posited, just posited by definition, that two events a1 and a2 from the algebra
τ of a probability space are mutually independent from a probabilistic point of view if the
numerical product pi(a1).pi(a2) of the probabilitiespi(a1) and pi(a2) of their separate occurrences
is equal to the probability pi(a1∩a2) of their (set)-product-event a1∩a2 from τ ; whereas if this
is not the case, then a1 and a2 are tied by a probabilistic dependence. But inside the classical
theory of probabilities the concepts of probabilistic dependence or independence are not defined
for elementary events from one same universe U. (Such a dependence can be apprehended only
indirectly, by comparison with the probability law that acts upon a universe of elementary events
defined as a Cartesian product of two universes, one of which is U. But this involves another
35I perceive this as a hint that time could be conceived as just a very basic artefact of human thought brought
forth by the biological evolution of man in order to connect to fitness for subsisting a species that is constrained
to parcel the spatial extensions in order to conceptualize [Donald D. Hoffmann & Ananda Gefner [2016]. In such
a perspective space would be more fundamental than time, while accordingly to Kant’s postulate that space and
time are a priori forms of the human intuition. Then the hiatus between Kant’s postulate and physics would
have to be replaced by a constructive philosophical-epistemological approach of the nature of those from MMS
[2002B], [2006] and Piergiorgio Quadranti [2007].
36The expression “probability tree” is already much made use of, with various significances. All these should
be very carefully distinguished from the particular significance represented by the figure 2.
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random phenomenon, distinct from the random phenomenon that generates the space where
U is the universe of elementary events). Now, these classical definitions are sufficient indeed if
each one of the two probability spaces that crown the two branches from the Fig. 2 is considered
separately from the other one. But consider now an elementary event aj from the space that
crowns the branch MesA, and an elementary event br form the space that crowns the branch
MesB. Observationally these two events are mutually independent in the sense of Kolmogorov:
Since the quantities A and B are mutually in-compatible, the measurement-operations MesA,
and MesB cannot be realized together for one outcome of the studied microstate msG, so the
elementary events aj and br cannot even coexist.
Nevertheless the events aj and br concern the same microstate msG, – in the sense of
(1). And even though one microstate in the sense of (1) cannot be identified conceptually with
one outcome of a specimen of this microstate, the considerations that led to (11) + (11’) entail
with a sort of necessity the assertion of a meta-probabilistic correlation (Mpic(G)) and the
corresponding extension (9”) of (9). Which amounts to the assertion of a sort of ‘probabilistic
dependence’ of second order. This knits into a whole all the actualized distinct branch-random
phenomena of which the common operation of generation G from the trunk of the tree had intro-
duced the mere potentially. Globally considered, the probability-tree of a microstate constitutes
a potential-actualized-potential whole of knowledge, a closed cell of fabrication of knowledge.
The classical theory of probabilities also defines the general concept of probabilistic corre-
lations, quite explicitly. But it does not singularize inside it a special class of meta-probabilistic
correlations that manifests specifically the fact that one same basic physical entity is involved in
different random phenomena37. This however is obviously an important case because it can be
an extremely frequent one and it can entail subtle explanations for queer observable behaviours.
For all the above-mentioned reasons it seems clear that – with respect to the concept of
probability that works in the case of a transferred descriptions – the classical theory of
probabilities is imprisoned in fragmenting particularizations38.
The top-down directly conceptual definition of Kolmogorov does not reach the factual root
of the concept of probability; whereas the bottom-up approach practised here starts with the
methodological decision (1) G ↔ (msG ≡ {σ(msG)} that introduces the factual-operational
definition ‘G ’ of precisely this root. The whole probabilistic output of this root – with respect
to an arbitrary but given collection of mutually incompatible branch-qualifying mechanical
quantities – can be represented inside one new sort of probability space:
[UT (ejb) =
⋃
b
U(ejb), τT =
⋃
b
τAb, {piT (G, ejb} =
⋃
b
{pib(G, ejb}], ∀b, ∀jb
where the index ‘T ‘ labels the considered probability-tree; the index ‘b’ labels the considered
branch from T ; the index ‘ jb’ labels the elementary event ejb from the branch labelled by b,
and τA designates the total algebra of events.
Logical point of view
Up to now logical considerations concerning the description of microstates have been
developed only in terms of a lattice-structure. This is a consequence of the fact that the men-
tioned considerations do not concern physical observable descriptional elements, they concern
mathematical elements involved by the Hilbert-Dirac mathematical formalism of the nowadays
quantum mechanics ((closed sub-spaces of the Hilbert-space of the state-ket assigned to the
studied microstate) and these are associated with a classical Kolmogorov probability space.
37K.J. Jung has introduced a concept of ‘synchronicity’ that seemed rather mysterious and has much struck
Pauli, possibly because quantum mechanics had suggested to him an explanation, and this has been discussed
in the correspondence Jung-Pauli (MMS [2002B], note pp. 279-281).
38The enlarged general concept of probability that permits to perceive the basic probabilistic whole – a
probability-tree – as well as all the very rich class of variants-and-qualifications entailed by it, has already been
explicitly worked out in (MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006], [2014]), in quite general terms, not only for the case of
microstates. And in the second part of this work (cf. (7II).4.5) it will appear that – implicitly – it is asserted
also inside nowadays quantum mechanics (by Dirac’s calculus of transformations), since some 60 years, but
via mathematical writings and denominations to which only an algorithmic significance is assigned, while their
significance of probabilistic nature simply is not noticed.
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The concept of a probability tree of a microstate leads to a much more deeply set and more
general and precisely structured factual ground on which to perform a logical examination39.
The particular case of a one-trunk probability tree . What happens if, for factual
or for conceptual reasons, no sort of relative mutual incompatibility does arise in the considered
circumstance? In this case the space-time domain covered by the involved operation of gener-
ation G leads to only one ‘branch’ that is common to all the considered mutually compatible
mechanical quantities; which amounts to saying that the common trunk-and-branch of the tree
is crowned by a set of probability spaces – one for each quantity A – that, inside (9’) – are only
conceptually distinguished from one another and meta-correlated to one another:
Fig.3. The probability-tree T (G, (A,B) of two mutually compatible observables
In the Part III of this work a case of this kind will be considered (Fig. 3’) that will have
a basic importance of principle.
39This has been done already but in an only primitive way in (MMS [1992C]). Much later a quite general
relativized reconstruction of the logical and the probabilistic conceptualization has been accomplished in MMS
[2002A], [2002B], [2006], that leads to a unification of these two most basic approaches of the human thought.
While for the particular case of microstates an improved but not yet achieved version of the concept of a
probability tree has been worked out for the first time only recently, in MMS [2009].
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Here the capacity of the case of one unbound microstate of one microsystem, to reveal the
non-classical contents of (9”), comes to exhaustion. Other such contents can become perceptible
only by the use of other sorts of unbound microstates. But before examining other cases we can
already read on Fig.2 and Fig.3 the global aspects that are common to the probability trees of
any sort of unbound microstate.
(3.I).2 PROBABILITY TREE OF ONE UNBOUND
MICRO-STATE OF TWO OR MORE MICRO-SYSTEMS
We now enter upon the case of micro-states of two or several micro-systems. This case will
bring forth new implications of the concepts-and-language introduced by the definitions from
(2I)2 and by the basic concept of a probability tree defined in (3.I)1: these have introduced a
structure of conditions of inner coherence that already will reveal a remarkable guiding power:
Consider one progressive micro-state msG(2S) of two micro-systems S1 and S2, in the
sense of the definitions from (2.I)2). How shall we construct the probability tree of msG(2S)?
According to (1) a microstate msG(2S) is generated by an operation of generation G(2S)
to which it is tied in the sense of (1).
According to the definitions from (2.I)2) the operation of generation G(2S) generates
one micro-state of two micro-systems and in this case one complete operation of measurement-
interaction on one specimen of the microstate msG(2S),involves two partial measurement-
interactions, one partial measurement-interactionMesA with S1 and one partial measurement-
interactionMesB with S2 (in particular the quantities A and B can identify but in general they
are different). For maximal graphic clarity instead of A, aj , and B, br, we shall exceptionally
write in this case A1, a1j and B2, b2r, respectively. So a complete act of measurement will be
denoted Mes(A1, B2).
In (3.I)1, in the case of one micro-state of one micro-system, we assigned its own branch
to each given sort of act of measurement that is involved. We must stay coherent with this
procedure. If not, we would not just apply to a new type of microstates the basic concept
of probability tree constructed in (3.I)1, we would change this basic concept. The criterion
[(one given sort of act of measurement)-(one branch)] has to be respected. So to each sort
Mes(A1, B2) of complete act of measurement we assign one branch from the probability tree
of msG(2S). Then the two partial measurements MesA1 and MesB2 from one complete act
of measurement Mes(A1, B2), operated respectively upon the two micro-systems S1 and S2
from each one specimen of the studied micro-state msG(2S) are lodged both inside one same
branch of the probability tree of which the trunk lodges the space time domain covered by the
operation of generation G(2S). So another branch of this tree will have to be assigned to the
complete measurements that involve another pair of quantities denoted for instance (C1, D2)
with values, respectively, c1k and d2z, where at least either C1 is in-compatible with A1 orD2 is
in-compatible with B2 in the sense defined in (4) – or both these possibilities are realized – while
concerning C1 and D2 there is no restriction of mutual compatibility. So a two-branches tree
founded upon the operation of generation G(2S) can be denoted T (G(2S),(A1, B2;C1, D2)).
Let us focus now upon the following fact: For one micro-state of two micro-systems the
two dynamical quantities A1 and B2 that are involved in one complete act of measurement
Mes(A1, B2) are always compatible in the sense defined in the point 3 from (2.I)2, because they
are realized via two acts of measurementMesA1 andMesB2 performed upon, respectively, the
two mutually distinct systems S1 and S2 that are involved in any one outcome of the microstate
msG(2S), so no space-time incompatibility 40 between these two partial acts of measurement
comes in necessarily (when in some particular circumstance these two space-time supports tend
to overlap it should be possible to eliminate the problem). Since the pair (MesA1,MesB2)
belongs by definition to one complete act of measurement Mes(A1, B2), the corresponding
pair of observable marks ({µ}kA1 , {µ}kB2) – let us denote it {µkA1B2} – once coded in terms of
40We recall that inside the approach developed here the compatibility or incompatibility of two dynamical
quantities is defined only for one specimen of the studied microstate and as such it is relative to both the
nature of these quantities and to the type – in the sense of the definitions from (2.I)2 – of the microstate that
is considered.
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a pair of values a1j , b2r, j, r = 1, 2, ...,M – constitutes one elementary event from the universe
of elementary events U = {a1j , b2r}, j, r = 1, 2, ...,M from the probability-space that in the
Fig.2 crowns the unique branch of the complete measurements Mes(A1, B2); while the factual
probability distribution on the universe of elementary events from this probability space consists
of the transferred description (9) with respect to the pair of quantities (A1,B2), that has to be
denoted for this case as
D/(A1, B2)(msG(2S)) ≡ (, δ,N0)− {pi(G(2S), a1j , b2r)}, j, r = 1, 2, . . . ,M
So the pair (A1, B2) of two quantities of which one qualifies the system S1 and the
other one the system S2 is everywhere involved as one whole because only one specimen of the
studied micro-state is involved. And nevertheless, as by now it is so well known:
The here-now’s of the corresponding two observable and registered physical events,
namely [the observation by a human observer of a value a1j that qualifies S1 ] and [the ob-
servation by another human observer, of the value b2r that qualifies S2 ], can be separated from
one another by an arbitrarily big space-time distance. While the corresponding description (9)
– just a factual probability law – is itself devoid of space-time structure.
Fig.4. The probability-tree T (G(2S), (A1, B2;C1, D2) of a microstate msG(2S)
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We find ourselves face-to-face with the ‘problem’ of non-locality; more, face-to-face with
a most explicit analysis of its inner texture 41. This way of reaching the problem out of nothing
conceptualized before, inside a radically first bottom-up approach, brings clearly into evidence
the up to now neglected feature that what is called ‘non-locality’ – which presupposes exterior
and global distances between spatially delimited physical entities – is tied with preconceived
classical modelling assumptions. Whereas any radically ‘primordial’ transferred description (9’)
of what here, in this reference-and-imbedding structure that we are constructing, is just called ‘a
microstate’ in the sense of (1) emerges radically void of any definite inner space-time structure
so that it cannot as yet include explicit space-time specifications, even if such specifications
were definable inside a theory of microstates where a general model of a microstate is necessarily
defined 42.
The non-locality problem emerges here in a particularly striking way because it is ex-
plicitly and essentially lodged inside the space-time frame of the human observers with their
apparatuses. One complete act of measurement Mes12(A1, B2) involves two macroscopic ap-
paratuses A(A1, S1) and A(B2, S2) that are endowed with perceptible delimited volumes and
with perceptible registering devices that pre-structure classes of possible space-time locations
of observable results, and mark perceptibly the spatial distance between them as well as the
space-time distance between the observable results coded a1j and b2r. Moreover in the nowa-
days state of absence, inside quantum mechanics, of an explicit use of a model of a microstate,
the systems ‘SI ’ and ‘S2’ are implicitly imagined more or less like two small balls radically
‘exterior to one-another’, which rises strongly and intuitively the question of what ‘exists’ and
‘happens’ outside and between them, while the experimentally registered time-distance seems
to be quasi null, in any case smaller than the velocity of a light-signal entails. So the ‘paradox’
(or the ‘problem’) emerges with respect to the classical human macroscopic conceptualization,
actions and registering ‘objects’, that quite necessarily are involved but furthermore are sur-
reptitiously extended to the entity-to-be-studied.
The conceptual situation that emerges in the case of a ‘one micro-state of two or sev-
eral micro-systems’ in the sense of the definitions from (2.I).1is also unintelligible from a very
basic purely probabilistic point of view 43. According to the conceptual organization that has
emerged here, the questions mentioned above point toward the inner features assigned sur-
reptitiously to what is here called ‘the studied microstate msG(2S)’. But they emerge in re-
lation with each one branch-probability distribution ( , δ,N0) − {p(G(2S), a1j , b2r)}, ∀(j, r)
or (, δ,N0)− {p(G(2S), c1k, d2z)}, ∀(k, z) (not only inside the meta-probabilistic ‘correlation’
(Mpic(G)) between the two probability spaces that are involved, each one of these being con-
sidered as a whole). Thereby they appear as tied with a sort of probabilistic ‘dependence’ that is
internal to each observable elementary event {(a1j , b2r)}, ∀(j, r), or {(c1k, d2z)} from
the involved probability.
The classical concept of probabilistic dependence cannot deal with such a situation be-
cause it defines a concept of probabilistic dependence or independence only for events
from the algebra posited on the universe of elementary events from one probability space.
The conceptual situation introduced by microstate msG(2S) is also unintelligible from
other two – very basic – points of view.
41Is it not surprising that an approach like that developed here, so general, brings forth so rapidly this face-
to-face, in a way so deeply tied with the basic tree-like representation of a microstate and independently of any
mathematical formulation?
42Indeed a model of a microstate should at least partially compensate this void by offering support to some
explanation of what is observed. But this cannot be offered inside barely a reference structure as that one
developed here. That is why we shall come back to the problem of non-locality at the end of the reconstruction
of quantum mechanics. It will then appear that – inside a theory of microstates – the general framework developed
here permits to analyse the phenomenon so as to understand what features of the purely observational outputs of
measurement-interactions stem from the fact that human conceptualizations and actions do necessarily introduce
space-time delimitations, while the model of a microstate introduced in the theory can introduce non-delimited
spatial features (as it does indeed in the case of the de Broglie ‘corpuscular-wave’ model implicitly admitted in
nowadays quantum mechanics).
43Let us note that in this case the quantum mechanical designation (a ‘system’ of two systems) and the
corresponding representation (by one state-vector for two ‘systems’ to each one of which evolves in ‘its own
space-time’ (which in fact means the space-time of ‘its’ human observer) is basically in semantic agreement
with the definitions from (2.I).1.
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The first one of these concerns the way, on the direction conceptualization, namely a
top-down or a bottom-up way of conceptualization. Historically the human conceptualization
has been developed top-down, and this entailed that the common trunk G from which stem
all the distinct branches of a probability-tree, have not yet been discovered at the time when
Kolmogorov elaborated the classical theory of probabilities. So only mutually distinct prob-
ability spaces have been discerned and represented separately, each one of which tops only
one branch called an ’experiment’ or a ’random phenomenon’ (Fig. 3). This is what confined
the notion of probabilistic dependence into an amputated definability that seemed mysterious.
Kolmogorov’s conceptualization separates from one another in probabilistic in-dependence the
branch-probability-spaces because these, when they are amputated of their common geneses in-
side one trunk-operation of generation G, appear as entirely un-related. Thereby the "quantum
correlations" seem surprising (the Bell case) or simply are not perceived as probability spaces
(Dirac’s "theory of transformations"). Common roots can stay hidden a long time with respect
to a top-down approach. Indeed in order "to make these premises precise" (cf. the Kolmogorov-
quotation from (3.I).1) it is necessary to conceive the possibility and the basic role of the notion
of operation of generation G of the entity-to-be-studied. The absence, in the probabilistic con-
ceptualization, of the operations of generation G that organize in tree-like probabilistic wholes
the undivided semantic prime matter of the probabilistic conceptualization, entails fa uniform
concept of probabilistic correlation that cannot distinguish between correlations interior to one
event – in the probabilistic sense – and correlations between distinct events44. It might come out
that any probabilistic correlation can be assigned to a class of branches from a corresponding
probability-tree: this would found Gustav Jung’s concept of ’synchronicity’. (MMS [2002B] pp.
the note pp. 279-281). Certain subconscious psychical perceptions of ’simultaneity’ of physical
events might be connected with some sort of reflex reactions to events from a same probability
tree that are separated from one another by an arbitrarily big spatial distance from an internal
physical sort of matter relatively to which Einstein’s ’limit-velocities’ of ’signals’ simply do not
exist (as considerations by Roger Penrose also suggest (Penrose [1999]).
44All this stresses the specific powers of a rigorously defined construction of the operational-conceptual-
methodological features of the description of a microstate, such that this description emerges when it starts
at a local zero of knowledge concerning that microstate and is then developed down-top (fig 1).
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Fig.5. The probability-tree T (G(2S), (A1, B2;C1, D2)) of a microstate msG(2S) as
encountered progressively by a top-down approach that transports with it Kolmogorov’s
classical probabilistic conceptualization.
The probability tree of one microstate of two or several microsystems illustrates with a
particular force the basic and major role hold in a study of microstates by the general concept
of operation of generation G. It also illustrates the general clarifying power entailed by an
explicit and systematic consideration of each sort of descriptional relativity involved by a given
descriptional cell (G,VMec) where a probability-tree is confined by construction: relativities to
the descriptional aim and the constraints entailed by these that command structural features
of the corresponding reference structure; relativities to the model for the entity-to-be-studied
brought in by the considered operation of generation (the sort of ‘matter’ and structure asserted
by this model that is necessarily involved by any given theory of microstates ); so also –
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globally now – the relativity of an explicitly constructed reference-and-immersion
structure .
In short, the case of the probability tree of one microstate of two or several microsystems
is paradigmatic from many distinct points of view. It is not surprising that it raised, and still
raises, so many researches and considerations 45.
(3.I).3 PROBABILITY TREE OF ONE MICROSTATE WITH
COMPOSED OPERATION OF GENERATION
Consider now a composed operation of generation G(G1, G2) ((1.I),(2.I).1) of a microstate in
which only two simple operations of generation G1 and G2 are involved, like in the Young
two-slits experiment. The construction of the primordial transferred description (9’) for the
corresponding microstate msG(G1,G2) will be found in the second part of this work to raise a
central coding-problem. The discussion of this problem and the proposed solution bring strongly
into evidence the essential importance of the fact that the probability-tree T (G(G1, G2)) is by
construction a one-microstate-tree. This however cannot be relevantly discussed here in detail
because it requires too basically a model of a microstate. So concerning this case we shall restrict
ourselves to only bring into evidence a striking experimental-conceptual-formal specificity.
Consider an effectively realized microstate msG(G1,G2). Let us compare its description
(9’) with the descriptions (9’) of the two microstates msG1 and msG2 that would be obtained,
respectively, if the two operations of generation G1 and G2 were each one fully realized sepa-
rately. Not surprisingly, such a comparison brings forth the physical fact that in general, between
the probability pi(G(G1, G2), aj) of realization of the value aj of a dynamical quantity A via an
act of measurement of MesA performed on one outcome of msG(G1,G2), and the probabilities
pi(G1, aj) and pi(G2, aj) of this same value aj for, respectively, the microstates msG1 and msG2,
there holds an inequality
pi12(G(G1, G2), aj) 6= pi1(G1, aj) + pi2(G2, aj) (12)
In this sense, the microstate msG(G1,G2) cannot be regarded as the ‘sum’ of the two
microstates msG1 and msG2.
This is indeed a noticeable circumstance. It suggests that a microstate tied with
G(G1, G2) introduces into a domain of facts of another nature than the domain where
G1 and G2, if they were realized separately, would entail the sum pi12(G(G1, G2), aj) =
pi1(G1, aj) + pi2(G2, aj). But ‘different’ in what sense, exactly? Stated in this way the ques-
tion, in this preliminary stage of the conceptualization of the microstates, remains open.
But this fact has been re-expressed in positive and absolute verbal terms by saying that
‘msG1 and msG2 interfere inside msG(G1,G2)’. Now, in the present approach – according to
(1) – this re-expression is certainly misleading from a conceptual point of view. Indeed only
the one microstate msG(G1,G2) is effectively generated by the unique operation of generation
G(G1, G2) that has been performed; and G(G1, G2) is posited to be in a one-to-one relation with
its result denoted msG(G1,G2). So according to our approach G(G1, G2) cannot be coherently
conceived to generate also the two microstates msG1 and msG2; inside the only one realized
microstate msG(G1,G2)the microstates msG1 and msG2 have to be conceived as somehow non-
achieved or non-’completed’ states that possess by construction the status of just two revolved
potentialities of two separated full operational state-individualizations G1 and G2, that have
not been actualized. The symbol G(G1, G2) suggests that these two revolved and non-actualized
potentialities G1 and G2 of full generations of msG1 and msG2, deserve being mentioned only
because they offer the possibility to refer msG(G1,G2) to msG1 and msG2, if and when this
seems useful. But since msG1 and msG2 have not been both and separately effectively realized
45The considerations from the whole sub-section (3.I).2 point toward the general method of relativized con-
ceptualization, MRC (MMS [2002B], [2006]). They can be regarded as an illustration of the peculiar powers of
this general method. On the other hand they might open up a constructed door toward unification of the quan-
tum theory with the general theory of fields and particles; and also, may be, some sort of unification between
psycho-physiology and physics.
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by G(G1, G2) they do not ‘exist’ inside msG(G1,G2) and so, a fortiori, ‘they’ cannot ‘interfere’
inside msG(G1,G2). Only the one tree T (G(G1, G2)) is factually realized; the trees T (G1) and
T (G2) are only two reference-trees, ghost-trees. That is why the writing (12) is very misleading
indeed.
Such surreptitious transgressions of logical entailment are frequent when data are ex-
pressed by mere words followed by a direct translation of these in mathematical terms, in
the absence of any preliminary guiding structure for reference-an-insertion of a theory of mi-
crostates. Languages and symbolizations are rich and magic resources, but sometimes they are
also very tricky, quite specially on the frontiers between consecutive sorts of conceptualization
that are introduced (individual or statistical conceptualization).
The preceding considerations can be generalized in an obvious way to the case of an
operation of generation G(G1, G2, ...Gm) that composes several operations of generation.
So we just note – in a critical state of mind – the category of ‘one microstate with
composed operation of generation’
This point (3.I)3 closes our exploration on probability trees of progressive microstates.
Indeed, for the reasons expressed at the end of (3.I)1 the concept of probability tree is not useful
for bound microstates. Therefore in what follows we only add a brief but essential remark on
the evolution of an unbound microstate.
(3.I).4 ON THE EVOLUTION OF ANY UNBOUND
MICROSTATE
Is it possible to assert something concerning the evolution of a progressive microstate inside this
only qualitative and semantically ‘open’ approach for constructing a general reference-structure
for how to create knowledge on microstates? The answer is yes, and again it brings into evidence
the crucial role of the concept of operation G of generation of a microstate.
Imagine the final moment t assigned to an operation of generation G from (1) that
introduces initially the microstate to be studied, msG. In contradistinction to what has been
assumed before, let us admit that during some time interval ∆t1 = t1 − t the human observer
does not act upon the microstate msG. But during ∆t1 = t1− t the initial microstate msG can
be posited to ‘evolve’ in the exterior conditions EC that it encounters (exterior macroscopic
fields, obstacles). Indeed it would seem weird to posit that it remains immobilized from any
conceivable point of view. Now, this evolution can be integrated in (1), in the following way.
Nothing interdicts to posit, in full logical coherence with the preceding development,
that the association of the initial operation of generation G and what happens to msG during
∆t1 = t1 − t, act together like another operation of generation – let us denote it Gt1 =
F (G,EC, (t1−t)) (F : some functional) that generates another, corresponding microstate msG1,
in the sense of (1)). This other microstate msG1 can be studied via sequences of successions
[G1.MesA], j = 1, 2, . . . ,M , ∀A ∈ VMec as specified before for any microstate msG. The
time interval t1 − t can be chosen with any desired value, the external conditions EC being
kept unchanged. So one can study successively a set of mutually ‘distinct’ microstates msGk
(accordingly to the language imposed by (1)) that correspond respectively to the set of successive
operations of generation:
G,G1 = F (G,EC, (t1 − to)), . . . , Gk = F (G,EC, (tk − tk−1)), ....,
Gf = F (G,EC, (tf − tK−1)); k = 1, 2, . . . ,K; f ≡ K (13)
(K: an integer; ‘f ’: final). For each operation of generation Gk from this set one can construct
the corresponding probability tree T (Gk, A), ∀A ∈ VM , and so the corresponding description
(9’).
For the sake of brevity, for any Gk 6= G we write Gt.But for the initially considered
microstate we preserve the general notations G and msG and we write:
[G.(t− t0)] ≡ Gt with Gt ↔ msGt and also Gt = F (G,EC, (t− t0) (13’)
In particular however, if we want to stress the moment t0 when finishes the initial operation of
generation from (1) G↔ (msG = {σ(msG)} we can write G0. So, when the operation G from
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(1) is followed by a time of evolution of the involved specimenσ(msG) of the studied microstate
msG instead of an immediately following act of measurement MesA, we can adequately indicate
this by writing:
[Go.(t− t0)] ≡ Gt, with [Gt = F (G0, EC, (t− t0)), G0 ↔ msG0 (13”)
The relations (??), (13”) absorb the concept of ‘evolution before measurement’ of
any involved specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG, into the general concept
of operation of generation G, while the concept of ‘one act of measurement MesA’ is
absorbed – in the sense (13)-(??)-(13”) – by the concept of one realization of a succession
[Gt.MesA].
So inside a succession [Gt.MesA] the ‘initial’ state of the involved specimen of msG is by
definition to be understood as the state of this specimen when the act of measurement MesA
begins. In the chapter (7.II) this will come out to be important. And here it permits to re-write
the basic descriptions (9) and (9’) produced by IQM in forms that integrate the extension (13”)
of the concept (1) of ’G’ :
(D/A(msGt) ≡ [(, δ,N0)− {pi(Gt, aj)}] ∀A,∀t,∀j
DM (msGt) ≡ {(D/A(msGt), (Mpic(Gt))XY } ∀A,∀AB, ∀t, ∀j (9” ’)
To sum up on notations: when this is convenient, we can re-write G as Gt and msG as msGt or
G as G0 and msG as msG0 . However in general we continue to make use of the basic writing
(9”).
(3.I).5 ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND THE VERIFICATION
OF THE DESCRIPTION OF A MICROSTATE
What follows here is very brief to be stated, but it is so important in the present context that
it deserves a separate sub-section.
How can we verify a description (9) of any sort – (9’) or (9”) or (9” ’) ?
The answer is obvious: only by reconstructing it (as many times as one wants and by
modifying the parameters (, δ,N0) from the definition (5) (, δ,N0) − {pi(aj)},∀j) until one
observes the desired degree of stability.
So inside IQM the sequence of operations [G.MesA] from (7) or the variant [Gt.MesA] of this
sequence constitute the basic operator for both the construction and the verification of a
description of a microstate.
This closes the announced construction of a reference-structure for embedding and esti-
mating a theory of microstates.
Let us now examine the final result.
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(4.I) INFRA-(QUANTUM MECHANICS)
The result of the approach developed here has been a priori named Infra-[Quantum Mechanics]
and is denoted IQM. This denomination is an ellipsis for: the organization beneath the quantum
theory, of a procedural global structure of reference-and-embedding for constructing a fully intel-
ligible mathematical theory of a mechanics of microstates. The mentioned organization has been
constructed independently of any mathematical formalism. It has been subjected to the choice
of a strategy for reaching a definite aim: To start on the lowest level of conceptualization that
can be attained (fig.1) – the level of zero pre-accepted knowledge on the physical, individual and
fully singular outcomes of any microstate-to-be-studied – so as there-from, to be able to control
explicitly each phase of progressive elaboration of mutually connected moulds for optimally re-
ceiving in them the semantic elements (concepts, physical operations, methodological choices)
out of which can be drawn intelligible scientific46 knowledge concerning microstates. By this
bottom up approach we have tried to suppress the gaping lacunae installed by the up-down
approach that has first imposed itself historically. We have tried to bring into evidence and to
incorporate – without omissions and organized in a logical way – all the decisive constraints
that have to be obeyed in order to reach the mentioned aim. Directly such an approach is
not conceivable, it becomes possible only a posteriori, once an initial top-down approach has
been already performed. The final result is a qualitative but formalized structure that can be
characterized as follows.
1. The core of IQM consists of the concept of a primordially and factually-probabilistic
transferred description developed inside the conceptual cell delimited by an a priori chosen
epistemic referential (G,VMec). The most comprehensive variant of this sort of description has
been symbolized by the writing
(DM (msGt) ≡ [(, δ,N0){pi(Gt, aj)}, (Mpc(G))AB ], (∀A,∀AB) ∈ VMec, ∀j (9” ”)
while the most basic form is written time-independent and relative to only one quantity A:
D/A(msG) ≡ [(, δ,N0){pi(G, aj)}], ∀A ∈ VMec, ∀j (9)
The descriptional structure (9” ’)-(9’) has never before been identified and characterized in
explicit terms.
It is marked by very remarkable peculiarities:
- It is strongly relative to three genetic elements (6) [G,msG, VMec] where the cell of
conceptualization delimited by a pair (G,VMec) can be freely formed in strict adequacy with
the particular cognitive aim.
46Which means: communicable and intelligible, consensual procedures for generating microstates, for predict-
ing concerning microstates and for verifying the predictions.
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- The physical operation G of generation of the individual specimens of the microstate
to be studied has never been noticed before, while here it reveals a ubiquitous and central role.
- The global genetic process (7) {[G.MesA]}, ∀A ∈ VM that brings forth a description
(9” ’) or (9’) involves a characteristic that is new with respect to the classical way of performing
measurements, namely: The fact that each act of measurementMesA performed on a microstate
requires in general a previous corresponding realization of also the operation of generation G of
a specimen of the microstate msG to be studied, because in general a measurement-interaction
with a specimen of the studied microstate msG destroys this specimen of the involved state
even if the system involved does persist.
- The brute observable result (8) of each one genetic succession [G.MesA] from (7) –
namely a group {µ}kA , kA = 1, 2, . . . ,mA, of publicly observable physical marks – is entirely
meaningless by itself because it carries no perceivable qualities (qualia) associable with, sepa-
rately, the specimen-of-the-microstate that is involved, nor with the measured quantity A, and
not even with the equally non-perceivable measurement-interaction that produces the marks
{µ}kA.
In order to gain for the observable marks {µ}kA, kA = 1, 2, . . . ,mA a meaning in terms
of a value aj of the measured quantity A, that can be somehow tied with the involved specimen
of the studied microstate, the measurement-evolution MesA has to incorporate an adequate
coding-procedure that shall connect these marks to previously established meanings. In its turn,
such a coding-procedure, in order to be definable, requires unavoidably a general model of
a microstate, as well as recourse to an explicit re-definition for microstates of the qualifying
quantity A. So:
Any acceptable theory of microstates must introduce a general model of a microstate
– considered to be just a methodological artefact, not the assertion of a factual ‘truth’.
This is an essential condition, a sine qua non.
- The descriptions (9) to (9” ’) cannot be assigned to the studied microstate itself con-
sidered separately, but only to the measurement-interactions (7) {[Gt.MesA]}, ∀A ∈ VM that
generated it, (with Gt reducible in principle to G (or G0) in the sense defined in (3.I).4).
2. In contradistinction to the descriptions (9) to (9” ’) themselves, the genetic succes-
sions of operations [G.MesA] from (7) that are achieved by the observer-conceptor in order to
construct these descriptions are themselves endowed with a specific space-time structure, quite
essentially. This is expressed by the fact that the graphic representation from the Fig.2 of the
final global geometrized result of all the genetic processes [G.MesA] from (7) has in general a
tree-like character. And this tree-like feature entails non-classical extensions of the basic concept
of probability. These extensions:
• Require a modified concept of probabilistic dependence.
• Vary with the sort of microstate – in the sense of the definitions from (2I)1 – that is
considered. Namely they vary according to:
– Whether one micro-state of one micro-system is involved, or one micro-state of
several micro-systems; and in the second case the entailed probabilistic extensions
violate quite brutally the classical ways of thinking.
– Whether the studied microstate is tied with a simple operation G of generation, or
with a composed one47.
• The extensions mentioned above of the classical concept of probability are intimately
connected with basic extension of also the classical logical conceptualization.
The probabilistic-and-logical extensions from IQM mentioned above have been
shown elsewhere (MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006]) to possess a universal character that
47In the case of a composed operation of generation G the consequences upon the corresponding probabilistic
predictions are so deep that they entail, in the third, constructive part of this work, the necessity to modify the
mathematical Hilbert-space representation of a microstate with composed operation of generation.
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marks the whole human conceptualization. And they lead to a quite general unification
of the logical and the probabilistic approaches, dissolving obstacles that withstood such
unification since a very long time48.
3. The concept of probability-tree of an operation of generation of a microstate embod-
ies and summarizes intuitively the whole complex and unexpected structure of the genesis of
the basic time-independent form (9”) of the description of a microstate. When one progresses
bottom-up along the vertical of conceptualization of the tree from the Fig.2 one can watch step
by step how finally a radical scission sets in between all the individual physical and conceptual
genetic human actions that do involve space-time, and the final result (9”) of all these actions,
where not even traces of the revolved space-time genetic organization do subsist any more. On
the graphic representation from the Fig.2 the purely numerical content of the final descrip-
tion (9”) still appears displayed on mutually disjoint purely spatial zones of the globalized and
geometrized structure of the factual space-time support of the successive genetic space-time
operations that have generated the tree. But on this graphic representation the temporal as-
pects have all ceased being actual. They have evaporated in, literally, ‘the air of time’. The
mutual geometrical disjunctions of the different branches of the tree are now only persisting
representational vestiges of the temporal features of the genesis of (9”) via human operations;
just traces of a revolved succession of descriptive aims, of conceptual-operational method, and
of cognitive actions.
The global final statistical description (9”) itself – considered separately of its genesis
that involves constraints imposed by human aims and human ways of thinking and acting as
well as some given context of technical possibilities – is radically devoid of any own space-time
organization. It is a purely numerical synthetic extract from the whole space-time conceptual-
operational-methodological genesis that has determined (9”) by successive acts dictated by local
descriptive aims and by corresponding methodological choices.
Of course, a scission of the same kind appears already in any classical statistical or prob-
abilistic description; and even in any human process of construction. But nowhere with this
radical character; nowhere entirely devoid, even inside the memories from human minds, of
any ever-perceived material substrate of what is studied, notwithstanding that what is stud-
ied is posited to be of physical nature and to exist inside space and time. Here, in the case
of microstates, we have been compelled to entirely replace any assignation of a space-time
structure to the description obtained for what is studied, by previous, conceptually constructed
constraints dictated by the laws of human thought, by human descriptional goals, and by the
previously developed human scientific knowledge.
This, once explicitly expressed, entails much intelligibility and permits to contemplate
the fine structure of all what direct perceptibility permits to economize.
The conceptual-operational-methodological genesis of a description of a microstate expli-
cated in the qualitatively formalized structure denoted IQM, certainly is somehow involved in
any valid mathematical theory of the microstates. But there it only can be much less striking,
because there a model of a microstate is constantly working in the minds of the observer-
conceptors – even if only implicitly – in order to conceive appropriate measurement operations,
coding-procedures, etc. This thins down considerably the mental visibility of the possibility
and the utter usefulness of a fully explicit general method for constructing an adequate math-
ematical theory of microstates via guidance from an independently pre-constructed structure
of reference-and-immersion. Moreover, inside an already constructed mathematical theory of
microstates, the the epistemological features act simultaneously with the mathematical ones
and they get mixed up with these. While inside IQM the process of emergence of the new
concept of a primordial transferred description is exposed from A to Z and its final result (9”),
(9” ’) itself emerges conceptually pure. It remains exposed naked before the mind’s eyes, freed of
any mathematical clothing that hinders a full perception of its semantic peculiarities. Thereby
48The concept of a primordial transferred description itself, of which a probability tree exposes the genesis,
in fact founds the whole human conceptualization, universally (MMS [2002], [2006]), the macroscopic classical
conceptualization as much as the conceptualization of microstates. The only difference is that inside the classical
domain of conceptualization the direct perceptibility of the involved physical entities permits to economize
an explicit knowledge of this unity. The concept of a primordially transferred description and its tree-like
representation – by themselves – constitute a basic epistemological novelty.
52 Mioara Mugur Schachter
the tortuous path along which a primordial transferred description deposits on the flour of the
realm of the conceptualized, new fragments of factual physical reality extracted directly from
a material substratum that has never as yet been conceptualized before, and draws an intial
knowledge from these, becomes finally crystal-clear.
Considered globally now, IQM illustrates two essential methodological facts, and it raises
a major problem of the scientific conceptualization.
The methodological facts are the following ones.
• Taking systematically into account any involved descriptional relativity, restricts and
thereby it specifies, thus entailing precision. This is strictly opposed to the usual meaning
of the word relativism.
This huge confusion should be suppressed.
• The genesis of a description is the vehicle of the semantic contents poured into that
description. So explicit geneses are precious to be known explicitly.
As for the announced major problem of scientific conceptualization raised by IMQ, it is
the following one:
• How can a mathematical representational entity – an equation of evolution, a Hilbert
vector, a construct from a mathematical formal system delimited by rigid abstract frontiers
determined by axioms, alphabets, rules of transformation from a well-formed expression
into another one – be strictly allied with descriptions of physical entities marked by
so radically singular factual characters that they are unspeakable, and also by human
constraints and descriptional aims, and by significances connected with contexts ?
What, exactly, happens at the junction between a factual output (9”), (9” ’) of an ap-
plication of a qualitatively formalized conceptual-operational-methodological representation of
the type developed inside IQM, and a mathematical descriptor?
How, exactly, can the radically singular and so complex physical-conceptual content car-
ried by a description (9”), (9” ’) , be loaded into an abstract construct like Schrödinger’s dif-
ferential equation, or into a Hilbert vector-space?
What is wrong or insufficient in the formulation of this question, that makes a general
satisfactory answer so difficult to be imagined?
This multi-faced question, when one accepts to stop on it long enough, emits a sort
of stupefaction. I think that Wigner’s famous considerations on the "unreasonable" power of
mathematics concern very precisely this question. One senses a gap disguised in a miracle.
Finally let us recall that IQM is marked by two related, big, deliberate absences. The
absence of a general model of microstate and the absence of definite coding rules for assigning
meaning to the observable result of an act of measurement succession [G.MesA] from (7).
These deliberate absences are conditions of the full generality of IQM because any manner of
compensating them can stem only from definite, so from particularising postulations that can be
introduced only inside a definite theory of microstates. By contrast and somewhat paradoxically,
these absences impose with full evidence a highly non-trivial assertion: Without a model of a
microstate that shall permit to conceive ‘appropriate’ modalities for measuring a given quantity
A, on a given sort of a microstate, and without explicit coding procedures for translating the
observable marks produced by one act of measurement MesA, into a meaning in terms of a
definite value aj of A, the primordial transferred descriptions (9”), (9” ’) are just a heap of
inert puppets. The necessary and sufficient strings that can bring these puppets to work and to
create effective knowledge on microstates, consist precisely of a general model of the concept of
microstate that permits to state explicit coding-measurement-interactions.
Out of nearly a nothingness of explicit previously available knowledge on how knowledge
on microstates can emerge, there has been constructed a whole formalized epistemological-
operational-methodological pre-mathematical structure, 1QM : a reference-and-imbedding
structure to be imposed upon any acceptable theory of microstates, so in particular also upon
the Hilbert-Dirac quantum mechanics 49. This reference-structure is a morphological-functional
49I recall that the particular construct for reference-and-immersion called IQM possesses an already con-
structed general framework called the Method of Relativized Conceptualization (MRC) (cf. the note 4).
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construct of void conceptual loci of which here only the general nature and the denotation
are specified. This construct has been endowed with a formalized but qualitative structure tied
step by step with specifications of a semantic nature in the sense that each void locum has
been introduced for lodging a specified sort of semantic content. As soon as IQM will be com-
pared with a given theory of microstates, some of these void loci50 will be confronted with
a mathematical representation of the corresponding semantic data that it can lodge. These
confrontations will reveal lacunae, inadequate assumptions, wanting formal expressions. The
whole structure of IMQ will act like a syntactic-semantic machine that produces criteria for
constructing a coherent and entirely intelligible mathematical theory of microstates. A whole
new, organized Universe of referred criteria will be at work in order to reach this aim. (Remem-
ber how Descartes’s systems of reference have deepened and enhanced mathematics, techniques,
human thought and life).
50Never all, because the whole construct is immersed in current language and in factual operationality.
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CONCLUSION ON PART I
When one watches the way in which IQM emerges the naïvely realistic view that scientific
knowledge is ‘discovery’ of pre-existing ‘truth’ collapses into dust. And in its place one sees, one
feels in what a sense conceptual-operational procedures – pointing toward physical operations or
abstract ones – can progressively be assembled into a method born from the unlimited human
curiosity and inventiveness, from the constraints imposed by the human ways of thinking and
acting, and from explicit aims chosen by men. What has been obtained here is no more than just
a particular method of the mentioned kind. But it is a global coherent method for constructing a
definite particular piece of procedural knowledge directed by a definite specific project. It is not
in the least a discovery of pre-existing intrinsic ‘truths’ about how physical reality is, absolutely,
‘in itself’. Such discoveries are mere illusion, just an emanation from the self-contradicting notion
of ’knowledge of reality-in itself ’ ; a genuine Fata Morgana (MMS [2006], pp. 127-136).
We are trapped in a cage where absolute ‘intrinsic truth’ is irrepressibly felt to pre-exist
but to constantly stay out of reach, frustratingly, definitively hidden beyond a non-organized and
changing swarm of lures toward ill-defined targets. One feels assaulted by a sort of impotence,
of inefficiency, of enslavement.
I perceive only one attitude that preserves from this sort of major fail: With a blind-
fold deliberately fixed on our metaphysical eye and on the basis of entirely declared data and
posits, to construct, humbly, hypothetically, relatively, respecting step by step the unavoidable
constraints as well as the explicitly chosen ones, and from the maximal possible depth, upward.
Thereby an only restricted, finite and methodized knowledge can emerge; but a fully definite
knowledge, endowed with an entirely exposed genesis where the unending inflow of meaning
can be watched and is constantly left open to return and to indefinite optimization, precisely
because this genesis is only hypothetical and finite and relative.
PART II
CRITICAL-CONSTRUCTIVE
GLOBAL EXAMINATION OF
THE HILBERT-DIRAC QUANTUM MECHANICS,
BY REFERENCE TO IQM
56
INTRODUCTION TO PART II
The second part of this work is devoted to a global preliminary examination of the Hilbert-Dirac
formulation of Quantum Mechanics QMHD, by reference to IQM .
Throughout what follows QMHD is supposed to be well known.
The main goals of the Part II are:
• By use of IQM to yield, from the outside of QMHD, a critical perspective on the general
structural features of this theory and to identify the model of a microstate that certainly
does somehow work inside QMHD, since in the absence of any model this theory would
have been radically impossible.
• To establish all the immediate clarifications induced by reference to IQM.
• To identify the precise reason why the theory of measurements from QMHD raises so
stubbornly an unending variation of problems since soon a whole century.
These goals mentioned above are pursued inside two chapters, 5.II and 6.II.
• The chapter 5.II is devoted to a brief comparison between QMHD and IQM.
• The chapter 6.II is devoted to critical and constructive clarifications:
– The identification of the model of a microstate that – necessarily – does already
mutely work inside QMHD: an essential step.
– Introduction of an explicit general use of the operations G of generation of a mi-
crostate in all the main mathematical writings from QMHD.
– An explicit refusal of the von Neumann representation of quantum measurements of
the quantum theory of measurement.
– A thorough critical analysis of the implications of the essence of the quantum me-
chanical representation of measurements on microstates.
Starting from the section (6.II)2 of 6.II – we shall begin by simply juxtaposing IQM to
QMHD. The simplistically enriched provisional framework obtained in this way will be denoted
[IMQ+QMHD]. The initial bare adjunction of IQM as just a reference-structure will already
permit clarifications and modifications. These, progressively, will entail a fusion of QMHD with
IQM. So we start here an organic process of conceptual growth. At the end of the chapter 6.II
this process will have brought us on the edge of the construction of a second quantum mechanics
inside a new framework that will be re-noted [IMQ−QMHD] and will then act and grow still
more throughout the last Part III.
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(5.II) 51 COMPARAISON BETWEEN QMHD
AND IQM AND THE PLAN OF PART II
As already statedQMHD is considered to be known. But for more self-sufficiency and commodity
we recall telegraphically the core-features of the two representations to be compared.
(5.II).1 THE QMHD-REPRESENTATION
The basic assumptions
The QMHD-formalism is founded on:
◦ Two basic representational definitions, namely a rule that defines the mathematical
representation of the studied microstate and a rule that defines the mathematical quantum
mechanical representation of the classical mechanical qualifying quantities (rule of ‘quantifica-
tion’ ).
◦ A mathematical principle.
◦ Three measurement postulates.
◦ A postulate of evolution.
* The rule of representation of a microstate). At any fixed time t a physical
microstate is defined by a state-vector (a ket) |ψ(r, t)〉 from a Hilbert-space H associated with
the studied microstate.
* The rule of ‘quantification’ 52. Any classical measurable mechanical quantity
A(r,p) is represented by a corresponding operator A called an observable, that acts on the
elements from H ; this observable is constructed from A(r,p) as follows:
- The classical quantity ‘position’ r(x, y, z) is represented by a position-observable
R(X,Y,Z) where: the classical functional form that in r(x,y,z) relates the symbols x, y, z is
conserved;X,Y,Z represent, respectively, the classical space-coordinates entailed by the chosen
Cartesian referential but each one of which is posited to act operationally by multiplying what
follows it (so that they can be re-written also as X., Y., Z.).
- The classical quantity of momentum p(px, py, pz) is represented by the momentum-
observable P(Px,Py,Pz) where: Px = i(h/2pi)dx, Py = i(h/2pi)dy, Pz = i(h/2pi)dz; the
classical functional form from p(px, py, pz) being conserved.
- A(r,p) is represented by the operational function A(R,P) of he operators R and P
constructed first with the same functional form as in A(r,p), and then symmetrized.
* Born’s mathematical principle of spectral decomposability . Any ket from H –
state-ket or eigenket – can be decomposed on the basis of eigenket {|u(r, aj)〉} introduced in
52This sort of ‘quantification’ defined here must not be confounded with the quantifications of the energy, in
the sense of Bohr.
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H by any observable A, which yields the expansion |ψ(r, t)〉 /A = ∑j c(aj , t) |u(r, aj)〉, ∀j of
|ψ(r, t)〉 that corresponds to A.
* The three measurement postulates
-Measurement postulate 1. Any actMesA of measurement of any observableA yields
necessarily as result an eigenvalue aj of A.
- Measurement postulate 2 (Born’s probability postulate).
When the observable A is measured at the time t the probability pi(t, aj) of outcome
of the eigenvalue aj of A is |〈u(r, aj) | ψ(r, t)〉|2 where |u(r, aj)〉 is the eigenket of aj and
|〈u(r, aj) | ψ(r, t)〉|2 ≡ |c(aj , t)|2 is the squared value of the coefficient c(aj , t) from the expan-
sion |ψ(r, t)〉 /A = ∑j c(aj , t) |u(r, aj)〉, ∀j of |ψ(r, t)〉 on the basis of eigenket {|u(r, aj)〉}, ∀j,
introduced in H by A.
- Measurement postulate 3 (of projection). If the act of measurement MesA has
produced the result aj then immediately after the measurement the studied microstate consists
of the re-normed projection
Pn |ψ(r, t)〉 /
√
|〈ψ(r, t) | ψ(r, t)〉|
of |ψ(r, t)〉 on the direction in H of the eigenket ∣∣uaj (r)〉 of aj .
* Postulate of evolution : The evolution of the state-ket |ψ(r, t)〉 is defined by the
Schrödinger equation of the problem
i(h/2pi)d |ψ(r, t)〉 /dt = H(t)
where H (t) is the hamiltonian observable that represents the total energy assigned to the
studied microstate.
The main algorithms
The essence of the way of working of the QMHD-formalism consists of four purely formal
problems and the correlative algorithmic procedures for obtaining the solution, and a fifth
factual -formal problem with its own solution:
Problem 1 : Determine the state-ket |ψ(r, t)〉 that represents the microstate to be studied
inside the Hilbert space H assigned to it.
Solution to problem 1 : Write the Schrödinger equation of the problem; solve it; intro-
duce the limiting conditions in order to identify the initial state-ket |ψ(t0)〉. Therefrom the
Schrödinger equation is asserted to determine for any time t the state-ket |ψ(t)〉 of the studied
microstate.
Problem 2 . For any state-ket |ψ(r, t)〉 and any observable A, determine the predictive
probability law concerning the possible outcomes of measurements MesA performed on the
studied microstate.
Solution to the problem 2 :
Write the equation A |u(r, aj)〉 = aj |u(r, aj)〉, ∀j, and calculate from it the basis of
eigenket 53 {|u(r, aj)〉} introduced in H by A. Each eigenvalue aj of the quantum mechani-
cal observable A is tied in this equation to a corresponding eigenket |u(r, aj)〉. According to
the measurement-postulate 1, the result of any act of measurement MesA is necessarily an
eigenvalue aj .
In order to determine the probability of outcome of any given value aj , form the set of
squared absolute values |c(aj , t)|2, ∀j, drawn from the expansion |ψ(r, t)〉 /A with respect to the
eigenket from {|u(r, aj)〉}, accordingly to the measurement-postulate 2 write Born’s probability
law {pi(aj) ≡ |cj |2}, ∀j.
Problem 3 . Specify the way in which you can transform the representation of the studied
microstate in H and relatively to A, into the representation in H of the same microstate
but relatively to another observable B with eigenvalues bk and eigenvectors |v(r, bk)〉, ∀k,
k = 1, 2, ....,K.
Solution to the problem 3 : Apply Dirac’s ‘theory of transformations’:
For any given value of the index k we have inside QMHD that
53As usual we write ‘ket’ without plural.
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〈vk(r, bk)|ψG,H(r, t)〉 = eiγ(B,k) |dk(bk, t)| =
∑
j
τkj(A,B)cj(t, aj), ∀j, ∀t
where τkj(A,B) = 〈vk|uj〉 , ∀j. So for any complex factor of given index k there is a separate
condition
eiγ(B,k) =
〈vk|ψG(t)〉
|dk(bk, t)| =
∑
j
τkj(A,B)cj(t, aj)
|dk(bk, t)| , ∀A, ∀B, ∀t
so that
d(bk, t) = |v(r, bk)〉 , |ψ(r, t)〉 /B =
∑
j
τbk,ajc(aj , t) où τbk,aj = 〈v(r, bk) | u(r, aj)〉 , ∀j, ∀k
Problem 4 . Represent mathematically the measurement processes by which is verified
the predictive probability law {pi(t, aj) ≡ |c(aj , t)|2}, ∀j, drawn from | |ψ(r, t)〉 /A, ∀A.
Solution to the problem 4 : Apply ‘the quantum theory of measurement’.
Problem 5 : Verify the statistical predictions of the formalism.
Solution to the problem 5 : Accordingly to the quantum theory of measurements, ‘prepare
the measurement-evolution state-ket ’ and operate the verification-measurements.
It will appear in the chapter 6.II that concerning this point 5 nothing is clearly specified.
The term ‘prepare’ applied to a formal descriptor creates confusion. Some authors seem to
consider that the microstate has to be ‘prepared’ (or to be also ‘prepared’); the coding problem
is not formulated, nor, a fortiori, treated explicitly. The implicit treatment – in so far that it
exists and can be identified – raises many questions and moreover, when examined, appears to
be restrictive. The factual and conceptual connections with the problem 4 are not worked out.
Precisely this, as a whole, is what is called globally the ‘measurement problem’. This problem is
central. Here it is only recalled. In the chapter 6.II it will be thoroughly defined and examined.
(5.II).2 THE IQM WAY OF REPRESENTING A MICROSTATE
This representation consists of the whole Part I of this work where it stays available. It will be
at work throughout what follows, with all its features.
(5.II).3 THE COMPARISON
When the two representations IMQ and QMHD are compared, the most striking conclusions
are the following ones.
Consider QMHD.
QMHD is a discipline expressed in absolute terms and via continuous unlimited mathe-
matical analysis or algebra that allows continuity and infinities.
Inside QMHD all that is explicitly ruled is defined in purely mathematical and algorithmic
ways. The main descriptional element is the concept of a state-ket |ψ〉 from the Hilbert-space
assigned to the studied microstate. This state-ket is obtained exclusively via mathematical
procedures and it produces directly and exclusively statistical-probabilistic assertions.
With the unique exception of the measurement-postulate 1, no representations
of individual and factual entities or events or procedures comes in, neither mathematically
expressed ones, nor only qualitatively defined ones.
Even the concept of ‘microstate’ – that is precisely what the whole formalism is asserted to
‘represent’ – is left devoid of a clearly stated definition; and even devoid of any symbolization. In
the current way of speaking where the theory is imbedded this most basic concept is ambiguously
indicated by the words ‘system’ or ‘particle’. A fortiori there is no concept of operation of
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generation of a microstate, and no model of a microstate is defined. The coding problem is not
declared and so it is not treated overtly. So the representation of measurements remains an
abstract problem that is dealt with via postulations and statistical mathematical algorithms
that raise problems since tenths of years.
In such conditions there is no intelligibility. Not even in the statistical domain, and even
if the measurement problems are not considered.
Indeed the way to ‘give’ the initial – statistical – state-vector |ψ(t0)〉 is purely mathemat-
ical. This deserves being stressed. The concept of ‘initial limiting conditions’ for determining
the initial state-ket |ψ(t0)〉 is used in a purely mathematical sense that should be clearly dis-
tinguished from a requirement of specification of the significant initial factual, physical data.
Moreover the initial state-vector |ψ(t0)〉 is far from being at least mathematically specifiable in
any realizable experimental situation. Thereby – in principle already – the domain of rigorous
applicability of QMHD-formalism is restricted a priori to the domain of physical problems that
permit to calculate a general solution of the corresponding Schrödinger equation and to give a
fully adequate expression of the initial state-ket. Outside this domain – roughly the domain of
conservative physical situations – the treatments are systematically marked by approximations
(parcelled treatment of the spatial support of the studied phenomenon, more or less arbitrarily
simplified formal translations of imagined micro-facts, etc.) of which the effects remain out of
control.
Quite generally and quite radically:
An exclusively statistical representation of a domain of facts cannot be fully intelligible
in the absence of any structured representation of a corresponding individual level of
conceptualization, because factually andmentally any statistic – by definition – is referred
to individual entities (things, operations, concepts).
Consider now IQM
Inside IQM the description (9”), (9” ’) is directly rooted into the factual microscopic
physical reality and is constructed on the basis of individual definitions and basic physical
individual operations, via factual -conceptual procedures or conceptual-methodological posits
declared as such.
Inside IQM the concept of an individual and physical operation G of generation of a
microstate manifests a quite determining role, namely via (1) it leads to:
- The classification of the sorts of operation of generation (simple, composed, revolved
inside the past of physical geneses (in the case of bound states).
- In consequence of (1) G ↔ msG the operation of generation G entails also a corre-
sponding basic classification of the microstates from (3.I)1.
- Inside IQM the specification of a model of a microstate and of a coding procedure for
each sort of possible microstate have appeared as basic necessities for any theory of microstates.
The whole statistical conceptualization from IQM follows from the individual one. The
basic tree-like structures from the figures 2 and 2’ that summarize graphically the whole IQM,
stems from one operation of generation, it continues with individual acts of measurement,
these lead to factually constructed probability spaces, and these entail factual probabilistic
descriptions that are correlated on a meta-level of probabilistic qualifications.
In short: QMHD contains no explicit representation of practically none of all the indi-
vidual physical operations, concepts and entities that inside the reference-structure IQM have
been shown to be basically necessary for an intelligible theory of microstates. The concepts [G,
msG, ‘general model of a microstate’, ‘individual succession of operations [G.MesA]’, coding
procedures for translating the observable physical marks produced by one succession [G.MesA]
and translated in terms of one definite value aj of the measured quantity A], all these indi-
vidual descriptional elements that in our usual processes of thought come first, inside QMHD
are devoid of any formal representation, of any only qualitative definition, even of any mere
symbolization. While IQM draws bottom-up a statistical conceptualization from an individual
one that is rooted into a-conceptual microphysical factuality, the QMHD top-down conceptual-
ization has been directly statistical, founded on extrapolations, postulates and mathematical
algorithms, and beneath it there remained a VOID of individual conceptualization. The Fig.
6 represents this situation.
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Fig.6.
Here we import the Fig. 5, for comparison:
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Fig. 5. The probability-tree T (G(2S), (A1, B2;C1, D2)) of a microstate msG(2S) as
encountered progressively by a top-down approach that transports Kolmogorov’s classical
probabilistic conceptualization.
This antagonism has settled in because in a top-down approach toward the development
of a microphysics, the statistical surface of individual factual entities – micro-phenomena, oper-
ations, concepts – appears first. Unavoidably it constitutes the first phase of the investigation.
In this first phase Bohr’s postulates acted as an efficient substitute for a general model of a mi-
crostate because at that time the bound states were at the core of all the attentions and bound
microstates – conceivable as spatially delimited and pre-existing entities – are much alike to clas-
sical ‘objects’; moreover they permit measurements via interaction-’effects’ with macroscopic
fields (Stark, Zeeman), which eliminates major specificities of the quantum measurements..
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As for de Broglie’s individual model, it emerged only some 25 years after Bohr’s initial
work, in connection with unbound microstates. And it emerged precisely at the time when
Heisenberg was developing his new top-down formalizing offensive that was still taking the
bound microstates into dominant consideration. So de Broglie’s individual model, together
with the corresponding Schrödinger equation, had to confront the already organized solidly
installed and vigorously developing ‘positivistic’ attitude of the Copenhagen school, founded
upon Bohr’s postulates and deliberately optimized for statistical predictions tied with bound
microstates and measurements on these. In these conditions the Copenhagen top-down approach
opposed de Broglie’s model, under the protection of strong socio-psychological inertial forces.
On the other hand de Broglie’s model together – with Schrödinger’s equation entailed by
it – has been progressively incorporated to the formalism of QMHD, fragmented and unnamed
as it will appear in (6.II).1.
In consequence of all this and up to this very day, nowhere inside QMHD does one find
a clear distinction between individual and statistical representations.
But for unbound microstates Bohr’s postulates are not useful any more. While an implicit
awareness developed that individual measurements on unbound microstates require a wholly
microscopic coding-rule (Cf. Bohm [1951]). Inside 1QM this requirement becomes explicit,
and so becomes explicit also the unavoidable necessity of a general model of an individual
microstate, able to guide toward a clear definition of the type of coding-measurement-evolution
that is specifically adequate for the particular type of studied microstate.
Now, in contrast to QMHD, IQM is an explicitly bottom-up construct. It starts deliber-
ately from a level of ‘zero’s of local knowledge’ on the physical specificities of the specimens of the
studied microstate. And therefrom the main features of all the successive levels of constructive
conceptualization – individual, probabilistic, meta-probabilistic – are encountered necessarily,
and they are clearly distinguished from one another and explicitly connected. That is why,
when IQM and QMHD are brought together like in the figure 3, there emerge anachronistic
antagonisms. For indeed, when referred to IMQ, the Hilbert-Dirac statistical formulation from
QMHD appears as a very finely crafted conceptual bas-relief of which the basic forms are still
undone, a mere potentiality lost in an amorphous substratum.
In what follows we shall try to extract from this substratum a statue-like outline of a
theory of microstates.
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(6.II) BASIC CLARIFICATIONS: A GENERAL
MODEL OF A MICROSTATE, USEFULNESS
OF ‘G ’, REFUSAL OF VON NEUMANN’S
REPRESENTATION OF QUANTUM
MEASUREMENTS; REFUSAL OF THE
WHOLE QMHD REPRESENTATION OF
QUANTUM MEASUREMENTS
The local problems or insufficiencies from QMHD will constantly be referered to IQM. Therefore
we introduce for our framework the symbol [IQM − QMHD]. But, to begin with, IQM and
QMHD will act as two separate structures. The reference to IQM, however, will bring forth
clarifications. Namely:
- We shall identify the general model of a specimen of a microstate that – necessarily –
does exist and work inside QMHD, since this theory introduces ‘measurements’ upon specimens
of microstates that have to be definable for any type of microstate and for any qualifying
mechanical quantity.
- The identified general model of a specimen of a microstate will be connected with the
concept (1) of operation G of generation of a specimen of microstate. This will introduce a more
specified re-definition (1’) of ‘G’ that permit to draw into the domain of scientific, of consensual
observability, what in (1) has been called a specimen of the microstate to be studied.
- We shall introduce the more specified concept (4) of operation of generation, in several
basic denotations of descriptors from QMHD.
- We shall reject the QMHD-representation of measurements.
At the end of this chapter the announced clarification will have infused a notable degree
of unifying connections between IMQ and QMHD. This will permit to initiate inside [IQM −
QMHD] a subsequent construction of a new representation of the microstates.
(6.II).1 THE [IQM −QMHD] MEANING OF AN EIGENVALUE
OF A QUANTUM OBSERVABLE AND CONSEQUENCES
Digging out the detailed meaning of an eigenfunction . Let us place ourselves inside
QMHD. Consider the equation A |uj(r, aj)〉 = aj |uj(r, aj)〉, j = 1, 2, ...J (∀j), with J finite,54
that determines the eigenfunctions {uj(r, aj)} from the basis of eigenket introduced by A in the
Hilbert space H of the studied microstate. In general such an eigenfunction is not square inte-
grable. This is considered to be a ‘problem’, in the following sense. A state-function ψ(r, t)from
a state-ket |ψ(r, t)〉 is required to be square-integrable, since it represents a set of distributions
of probability. But an eigenfunction in general is not square-integrable and furthermore it is
not required such. Why, exactly? That is the ‘problem’.
Bohm ((1954) p. 210-211) writes:
“. . .We obtain ψ = eipx/~. . . . . . Strictly speaking, the above eigenfunctions can-
not, in general, be normalized to unity...Let us recall, however, ...that in any real
54From now on any index is posited finite and any finite spectrum is denoted by a notation of the type ∀j.
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problem the wave function must take the form of a packet, since the ‘particle’ is
known to exist somewhere within a definite region, such as in the space surrounded
by the apparatus. To obtain a bound and therefore normalizable packet, we can
integrate over momenta with an appropriate weighing factor.”55
So Bohm adopts an exclusively mathematical point of view. Not a moment does he focus
on the involved meaning. He does not even make use of a specific notation for distinguishing
between eigenfunction and state-function. And in order to deal with the mathematical situation
he accepts approximations without any hesitation, notwithstanding that the considered question
seems to be a question of principle.
The same attitude is usually found in the textbooks.
Dirac (1958, p. 48), on the contrary, writes:
“ It may be that the infinite length of the ket-vectors corresponding to these
eigenstates is connected with their unrealizability, and that all realizable states
correspond to ket vectors that can be normalized so that they form a Hilbert space ”.
(« connected with their ‘unrealizability’ » suggests that Dirac, in a certain subliminal way, per-
ceived the absence – and the utility – of a representation of the way of generating a microstate,
as well as the possibility of some specific significance of the non-integrability, in general, of the
eigenfunctions).
As for the most outstanding didactic exposition of QMHD, that by CTDL56, it proposes
«a physical solution to the difficulties» (proposed also by Bohm (1954, p. 212), namely to replace
the eigenfunction by a δ-distribution centred upon the corresponding eigenvalue.
Nobody has conceived that an eigenket might simply not represent a ‘state’.
However recourse to history reveals that the ‘problem’ of non-integrability of an eigen-
function is a false problem because the concept of eigenfunction has a specific meaning that
is radically different from that of a state-function. So the problem is not mathematical, it is
conceptual. Indeed the meaning of an eigenket stems from Louis de Broglie’s Thesis (1924,
1963). Louis de Broglie has derived his famous relation p = h/λ from his well-known model
of a microstate, (erroneously named the wave-‘particle’ model). The model itself stems from
the usage made of Fourier decompositions inside classical electromagnetism. In a Fourier de-
composition of an electromagnetic wave each constant value λ of a monochromatic wavelength
is associated with a corresponding plane wave. By analogy, to each value pxj of the classical
mechanical fundamental quantity of momentum px of an unbound electron, de Broglie has
associated a plane wave with a ‘corpuscular phase-function’ Φ(x, t) = ae(i/~)β(x,t) where a
denotes an arbitrary and constant amplitude of vibration and the ‘corpuscular phase’ is written
as β(x, t) = (Wt − pxj .x) where W = m0c2/
√
1− v2/c2 is the – relativistic – energy of the
‘corpuscular-like aspect of the corpuscular wave’ while pxjdenotes the constant value posited
for the momentum of this ‘corpuscular-like aspect’ (in one spatial dimension) 57.
The ‘corpuscular-like aspect of the corpuscular wave’ remained devoid of representation
inside the mathematical expressions that Louis de Broglie associated to his model. This has
been a huge mistake because in mathematical physics only what possesses a definite mathe-
matical expression does subsist. The rest does not strike sufficiently numerous attentions and
so at last it evaporates into the air of history. But verbally, de Broglie has clearly specified
in his writings that the ‘corpuscular aspect’ is conceived to consist of a singularity of the am-
plitude of a corpuscular wave. Namely a very localized space-domain where this amplitude is
so much bigger than its surrounding value that it concentrates practically the whole energy
55Note that a ‘packet’ of eigenfunctions belonging to a formalism that introduces an axiom of superposition,
is not the unique possible way for representing mathematically a delimited spatial support (solitons, etc.).
56Cohen-Tannnoudji C., Diu B. and Laloë, F., 1973.
57De Broglie wrote in one dimension; here we introduce the notations ‘Φ’ and ‘β’ in order to distinguish from
the start the representation of a physical phase of a physical wave introduced by Louis de Broglie, from the phase
ϕ(x, t) of a mathematical ‘state-function’ ψ(r, t) = ae(i/N˜)ϕ(x,t) introduced inside a QMHD state-ket |ψ(x, t)〉
that represents a formal tool for statistical predictions on results of measurements on a microstate.
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W = mc2/
√
1− v2/c2 of vibration of the corpuscular-like singularity in the amplitude of a
wave. This singularity was posited to glide inside the wave "like a small classical mobile" that
– in consequence of its strong spatial localization and its relatively very high energy – admits
at any time the ‘mechanical ’ qualifications of position and momentum from which in classical
mechanics all the other mechanical qualifications can be constructed (whereas the rest of the
wave, of course, does not accept mechanical qualifications). In short, de Broglie’s model does
not introduce any ‘particle’ whatsoever; it introduces a ‘corpuscular-like wave’, a wave inside
which a very localized singularity of the amplitude admits mechanical qualifications that require
a wave-’mechanics’.
In the course of the construction of the relation p = h/λ de Broglie has proved the
‘theorem of concordance of the phases’ 58 according to which:
The model of a microstate of a unbound electron can be stable if and only if the
corpuscular-like singularity of the amplitude of its corpuscular wave glides inside the wave
in a way such that the phase of the up-down-up vibration of the amplitude of the localized
singularity – a clock -like phase at any given location r – in the sense of Einstein’s special
relativity – is – at any moment t – identical to the phase-function β(r, t) of the oscillation of
the extended-in-space amplitude of the portion of wave that surrounds the singularity at that
time t ; this, notwithstanding that, from the standpoint of Einstein’s special relativity, β(r, t)
designates a wave-like phase and so it obeys another sort of variance when one passes from one
inertial observer to another one via the Lorentz-Einstein transformation of coordinates 59.
This theorem is crucial for understanding the meaning of the QMHD-concept of eigen-
ket. Indeed: Inside the Hilbert-Dirac formalism Louis de Broglie’s wave-function Φ(x, t) =
ae(i/~)β(x,t) satisfies the equation PxΦ(x, t) = pxjΦ(x, t) for eigenket and eigenvalues of the
momentum observable. And the QMHD-equation A |uj(r, aj)〉 = aj |uj(r, aj)〉, ∀j, generalizes
this particular mathematical fact to any quantum mechanical observable and introduces it in
the bra-ket expressions of the Hilbert-Dirac formalism. This leads immediately to the following
identification of the general meaning of the considered equation:
The eigenfunction uj(r, aj) from the eigenket |uj(r, aj)〉 associated with the eigenvalue
aj of the observable A, plays the role of a mathematical representation of a sample
of a definite sort of wave-movement around the spatial location of the corpuscular-like
singularity in the amplitude of the involved ‘corpuscular wave’.
And if the wave-movement that surrounds the singularity is constantly represented by
the eigenfunction uj(r, aj), then – and only then – the value aj of the mechanical quantity
A that qualifies in mechanical terms the displacement inside the wave, of the location of the
corpuscular-like singularity from the amplitude of the wave, stays constant.
As soon as this is spelled out it leaps to one’s eyes that the form of the equation for
eigenfunctions and eigenvalues of A itself, simply cries it out on the roofs. So – no offense to
Bohr – de Broglie’s model of a microstate is quite basically present inside the whole formalism
of QMHD. It defines the physical-conceptual meaning of all the bases in the Hilbert-space of
any microstate, as well as all the spectral decompositions of any state-kept. While furthermore
these spectral decompositions are the core of the predictive formalism from QMHD. No more, no
less. The whole predictive QMHD-algorithm is an undeclared infusion from de Broglie’s model,
wherefrom the physical significances are mutely drawn. Indeed in any decomposition
|ψ(r, t)〉 /A =
∑
j
c(aj , t) |uj(r, aj)〉 , ∀j
of a state-ket |ψ(r, t)〉 with respect to the basis {|uj(r, aj)〉}, ∀j, introduced in H by an ob-
servable A, the eigenket |uj(r, aj)〉 from the term c(aj , t) |uj(r, aj)〉 symbolizes the sample of
that what is counted by the real squared modulus |c(aj , t)|2 of the complex coefficient c(aj , t)
(exactly as, in the expression 34m, the symbol ‘m’ means that the length that is measured is 34
times the length of the sample of a meter from the National Bureau of Standards of Weights
58The conceptual content of this proof of only several lines is a jewel of human thought.
59We note that de Broglie’s model is compatible with a relativistic model in the sense of Einstein’s special
relativity. Why, then, is QMHD as a whole not formally compatible with Einstein’s special relativity? This
question should be elucidated before any attempt at unification of quantum mechanics with relativity (MMS
[1994]).
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and Measures). And a sample of wave-movement – by the definition of the concept of ‘sample’
– has an arbitrary spatial extension. So squared modulus integration is simply senseless with
respect to it.
Consequences of the identification of the meaning of an eigenfuction . The
preceding conclusion has noteworthy consequences.
- It evaporates the false ‘problem’ why an eigenfunction is in general 60 not required to
be square-integrable: if it were required to always be square-integrable, that would be a real
problem.
- In classical thinking a unique semantic dimension (for instance ‘color’) suffices for
carrying all the ‘values’ (‘red’, green’, etc.) that one wants to singularize on this dimension.
But when a microstate has to be qualified, it obviously is very useful – if not even necessary – to
analyse the representation more, namely so as to compensate for the absence of any perception
of a quale for assigning meaning to the brute result of one act of measurement. The Hilbert-Dirac
formalism realizes this analysis by a formal splitting: An observable A represents – separately
– the considered semantic dimension and exclusively this (‘a momentum’ ‘a total energy’, etc.).
And on the other hand – like in a catalogue joined to A – inside the set {|uj(r, aj)〉}, ∀j,
are represented separately each one of the ‘values’ singularized on the semantic dimension A,
and each ‘value’ is specified by a pair (|uj(r, aj)〉 , aj), ∀j, because the wave-movement of a
corpuscular wave and a mechanical qualification of the ‘corpuscular aspect’ of that wave, are
both involved and are tied in a one-to-one connection 61. This is marvellously expressive and
it is also effective when it is discretized via the explicit adjunction of a corresponding unit for
measuring the quantity A represented by the observable A).
- This also explains the high adequacy of the use of a Hilbert space H for represent-
ing mathematically the predictions on issues of measurements on a microstate: Each ‘value’
(|uj(r, aj)〉 , aj), ∀j, of A can be placed on a separate axis reserved to it, on which the state-
ket |ψ(r, t)〉, when projected onto that axis, determines the complex number c(aj , t), so also
the probability |c(aj , t)|2 postulated by Born for the emergence of the pair (|uj(r, aj)〉 , aj) if
a measurement of A is performed upon the microstate with state-ket |ψ(r, t)〉 (which mimics
geometrically the expansion |ψ(r, t)〉 /A = ∑ jc(aj , t) |uj(r, aj)〉, ∀j, of |ψ(r, t)〉).
Thereby the representational roles of a state-ket or of an eigenket are radically separated.
- The preceding remarks specify that Dirac’s ‘theory of transformations’ expresses math-
ematically passages from a given ‘semantic space’, to another one: The semantic is defined
formally by the pairs (|uj(r, aj)〉 , aj): Dirac’s calculus is potentially a calculus with semantic
specifications 62. Thereby the Hilbert-Dirac formalism – in itself, independently of microstates
and QMHD – can be useful in many disciplines 63.
(6.II).2 FROM THE HIDDEN PRESENCE OF DE BROGLIE’S
MODEL INSIDE QMHD TO ITS EXPLICIT
PHYSICAL-OPERATIONAL INCORPORATION INTO
[IQM −QMHD]
We have posited a framework denoted [IQM −QMHD]. Inside this framework we shall be able
to define a consensual and operational variant of de Broglie’s ideal model, instead of using this
model exclusively for extracting from it a specific meaning for the concept of eigenstate of an
observable.
After the cure of positivistic purity suffered by microphysics since nearly a century,
according to which models were interdicted, what follows might be perceived as a shocking
regression into intellectual primitivism (or – equivalently – into philosophy). But I hold that
diktats and fashions have to be banished from the domain of scientific thought. And the meaning
60In a bound state of a microsystem the eigenket of the total energy has the same mathematical expression
as the state-kept; it is confounded with the state-ket and the eigenket is required to be square-integrable and it
is such: from a conceptual point of view this is a mathematically ‘degenerate’ situation.
61Degenerate spectra are not considered here.
62In Dirac’s mind might have worked implicit general criteria that he did not care to capture and communicate.
63The whole new trend called ‘Quantum Social Science’ is likely to stem precisely from this.
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identified in (6.II)1 for an eigenstate, so outstandingly important, warrants the reason to proceed
as below.
Association of the general concept of microstate, with de Broglie’s model . The
guiding ideas are the following ones:
(a) We want to reconstruct a mechanics of microstates. According to de Broglie’s model
– that appeared to be quintessentially involved in QMHD – only the corpuscular aspects from a
corpuscular wave do admit mechanical qualifications. Consider now the definitions from (2.I)1
of various sorts of microstates. It is clear that what is called there ‘system’ or ‘particle’ has to
be identified with de Broglie’s ‘corpuscular-like singularity’ in the amplitude of a corpuscular
wave. So we posit that the operation of generation G of ‘one micro-state of one micro-system’
introduces one de Broglie singularity into the domain of what can be qualified by a human
observer; whereas an operation of generation G(ns) (ns: n systems) of ‘one micro-state of n
micro-systems’ introduces n de Broglie-singularities.
(b) It seems obvious that it would be nonsense to conceive that an operation of generation
G defined by the use of macroscopic apparatuses and macroscopically controlled parameters,
cuts off radically the ‘corpuscular-like’ singularity 64 from the involved specimen σ(msG) of
the studied microsystem msG that has been generated by one realization of G, from the indef-
initely extended ‘corpuscular wave’ that, before the action of G, incorporated the singularity
and determined its displacement. Indeed de Broglie’s corpuscular-like singularity is organically
integrated to the ‘corpuscular wave’; outside this wave, by definition, it cannot be conceived.
So we posit that – in some sense and for some time – G just captures into the domain of what
can be operated upon by human observers, a portion of a corpuscular wave that carries one
de Broglie singularity if one micro-state of one micro-system is generated, or carries n such
singularities when one micro-state of n micro-systems is generated; while the main part of the
wave-like phenomenon to which this portion of corpuscular wave continues to be incorporated
after the action of G remains in the physical substratum, even though via the microstate msG
generated by G it has been connected to the domain of the observable 65.
We also posit that:
(c) The location of the de Broglie singularity inside the corpuscular wave of any specimen
of a studied msG, in general varies arbitrarily from one individual specimen of msG to another
one (this is an essential element from de Broglie’s own view (de Broglie 1956)).
(d) We do not try to specify other characters of the portion of a corpuscular-wave that is
trapped by an operation of generation G into the domain of possibility of deliberate interaction
with it. But we admit that, whatever they are, they constitute a class of similarities that justifies
their common designation in (1) as elements from the class {σ(msG)} of emergences of ‘the
one microstate msG generated by G ’: the language posited in this way has already shown its
pertinence, so we keep it.
(e) Finally, in agreement with de Broglie’s works and with those of the nowadays physi-
cists from Bohm’s school (in particular Peter Holland 1993) we also posit the famous guidance
relation according to which the phase of the corpuscular wave in the neighbourhood of the
singularity, ‘guides’ the singularity by determining its momentum.
(f) Consider now a composed operation of generation G(G1, G2, ...Gk). The methodolog-
ical posit (1) requires a one-one relation between any operation of generation G and its result
denoted msG. So – accordingly to the definitions from (2I)2 – we have to posit that:
64For simplicity we use singular expressions, but the extension to a case with several singularities is straight-
forward.
65Such a view violates the most current significance of the classical concept of ‘object’ endowed with a definite
spatial volume, even if this ‘object’ is in a liquid or even a gaseous state. We are face to face with the modern
view on the frontier between the still a-conceptual physical reality, and that – from this reality – that can be
subjected to a very first process of human conceptualization. Indeed nowadays we are aware that not even a
chair, or a living body, can be conceived to be cut in an absolute sense from the surrounding ‘physical waves’
that are posited to exist (electro-magnetic, gravitational, etc.) notwithstanding that nobody can tell what is
supposed to vibrate in these waves. Any ‘object’ in the classical sense is admitted to emit and to absorb waves
of various natures and to be traversed by such waves. Our global model of this ‘physical reality’ that cannot be
known ‘such-as-it-is-in-itself’, is still far from being achieved and self-consistent. Nevertheless, it is a fact that,
for thinking and for achieving scientific descriptions, we cannot avoid making use of models.
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An unbound one micro-state of one micro-system produced by a composed op-
eration of generation involves only one singularity in the amplitude of the corpuscular
wave of the generated microstate msG(G1,G2,...,Gk),cw.
But we also posit that the other involved operations of generation even though the
corresponding operation of generation (G1, G2, ...Gk) that can be realized separately but have
not been separately realized when G(G1, G2, ...Gk) has been realized, produce some specific
effects on the dynamic of this unique singularity, that are entailed by the guidance law quoted
at the point (e).
This is not inconsistent with the QMHD-definition of the eigenstates and eigenvalues of
the momentum observable P . And it will appear in the Part III to be a very important point
in the process of construction of a satisfactory representation of quantum measurements.
On the basis of the assumptions {(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f)} we take now the following new
step:
* The modelling postulate MP({σ(msG,cw)}). In agreement with (1) and (13”) it is
posited that any one realization of G generates one specimen of the studied microstate, that is
specified by the accordingly to the assumptions {(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f)}. Such a specimen will
be denoted σ(msG,cw) (cw: corpuscular wave) and it is called the G-(corpuscular-wave)-model of
a specimen of the studied microstate (in short, a G-cw model). Correlatively the corresponding
microstate will be re-noted msG,cw.
So from now on – but only when useful – the relation (1) G↔ msG can be re-written as
G↔ (msG,cw ≡ {σ(msG,cw)}) (1’)
When the model of a microstate plays no specific role, we shall make use of the initial
notation msG ≡ {σ(msG)}.
The G-cw model MP( {σ(msG,cw)}) has been constructed under strict constraint of
logical-semantic consistency with both IQM and the content of QMHD. It introduces a crucial
connection between IQM, QMHD and furthermore, de Broglie’s more recently re-constructed
global interpretational approach (de Broglie [1956]) that is tied with Bohm’s interpretation.
But inside [IQM −QMHD], via the G-cw model, the concepts of microstate and of specimen
of a microstate cross the frontier that separates ‘interpretations’ of QMHD from a scientific
theory of microstates.
Indeed initially, in the relation (1) from IQM, the concepts msG and σ(msG) have been
provisionally qualified exclusively by the label ‘G’ of the way in which they are produced ; later
in IQM, in (8), this initial definition has been enriched by a whole set of observable, brute,
‘transferred’ results {µ}kA , kA = 1, 2, . . . ,mA of measurement-interactions. Both these defini-
tions from IQM are already ‘scientific’ because they are operational, communicable, consensual
(so reproductible) and theyr are verifiable. But they remain exterior to the concepts msG and
σ(msG) because IQM has been constructed as only a general structure of reference and inser-
tion, not as a definite theory of the microstates. While now, inside (msG,cw ≡ {σ(msG,cw)})
where the results σ(msG,cw) of one operation G and the result msG,cw of a big set of repeti-
tions of G are posited to be endowed with characters that concern the inner organization of
the specimens σ(msG,cw) themselves, whereby they concern the own nature assigned to both
concepts σ(msG,cw) and msG,cw.
Thereby, in the present approach comes in a possibility to relate data that are interior
to the studied microstate: the inside-outside opposition enters the mechanic of microstates that
we are constructing, and this opposition can have many consequences.
In short, the postulation of the G-cw model is synergetic. It enriches the initial concept
(1) of microstate, while de Broglie’s fertile model ceases being only an ideal concept, it is drawn
explicitly into physics 66.
Even if walking on a ground that has become so very unusual after more than hundred
years of interdiction of models in microphysics, might instil uneasiness and vertigo, the results
from (6II)2 can be asserted to be a quite noteworthy advance: They offer from now on clearly
66One can immediately feel that the advances from (6.II).2 will permit to add much intelligibility to the IQM
probability-tree of one micro-state of two micro-systems.
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defined concepts, assumptions and words for conceiving specified investigations placed strictly
on the frontier between the still a-conceptual factuality and what is extracted therefrom for a
primary conceptualization able to lead to communicable, consensual and verifiable ‘scientific’
knowledge’. They also suggest subsequent developments 67. And they stress the fact that an
absolute spatial delimitation of individual ‘objects’ in the classical sense is just a human con-
struct that inside microphysics ceases to be useful and furthermore is likely to induce inner
inconsistencies. Individuality, and also stable space-time inner structure are only pragmatic
human assumptions of which the utility is relative to the cognitive aims and actions.
(6.II).3 CLARIFICATIONS VIA THE CONCEPT OF
OPERATION G OF GENERATION OF A MICROSTATE
The use of the concept G of generation of a microstate would have economized the false problem
of why eigenkets in general are not square-integrable. Below we bring into evidence other three
fundamental sorts of circumstances where the [IQM −QMHD] concept ‘G ’ entails clarification
of ambiguities or of problems raised by QMHD.
The concept of operation G of generation versus spectral decompositions, and
superposition-state-ket . Let us recall that: Inside QMHD works a mathematical principle of
spectral decomposability of any state-ket |ψ(r, t)〉, i.e. the posit that for any state-ket and any
basis of eigenket {|uj(r, aj)〉}, j=1...., 68 introduced by a QMHD-observable A it is justified to
assert the equality:
|ψ(r, t)〉 /A =
∑
jcj(t) |uj(r, aj)〉 , ∀j (14)
Furthermore, the general choice of a vector-space-representation permits to write the
state-ket associated to a microstate msG(G1,G2,...,Gn) generated by a composed operation of
generation G(G1, G2, ..., Gk) ((1.I).1), as a mathematical superposition
|Ψ12...k(r, t)〉 = λ1 |Ψ1(r, t)〉+ λ2 |Ψ2(r, t)〉+ · · ·+ λk |Ψk(r, t)〉 (15)
of the state-ket of the microstates msG1 , msG2 , . . . , msGk that would have been obtained
if each one of the operations of generation G1, G2, ..., Gk that have been composed inside
G(G1, G2, ..., Gk) would have been realized separately 69.
In QMHD the Hilbert space H of a state-ket is extended into a ‘generalized-Hilbert space
H where the eigenket are included as a limiting sort of vectors. This entails that from a strictly
mathematical point of view both writings (15) and (16) are just superpositions of vectors inside
H, permitted by the mathematical axiom – included in the definition of the algebraic structure
called a vector-space – that any two or more elements from a given vector-space admit an
additive composition; which is expressed by saying that they can be ‘superposed’. This installed
a purely mathematical language that calls indistinctly ‘superposition’ any additive combination
of ket, whether only state-ket like in (16) or state-ket and eigenket like in (15), or only eigenket
as in Dirac’s theory of transformations. No physical criteria, nor conceptual ones, are made use
of in order to make mutual specifications inside the general category of additive compositions
syntactically permitted inside H. In (6.II).2 we have seen an illustration of the consequences
67For instance: a microstate of a ‘system’ (or a ‘particle’) with electric charge or magnetic moment can be
drawn into the realm of the observable by use of macroscopic fields. But how could be manipulated the result of an
operation G if this operation generates (for instance by a nuclear reaction) a ‘particle’ that is sensitive exclusively
to a gravitational field? (Which probably means a maximally ‘simple’ de Broglie singularity, a ‘pure quantum of
de Broglie-mass’ (with non-null spin)? a ‘graviton’?). Such questions touch as much the most modern researches
in gravitation, as the dBB representation of the sub-quantic substance: In de Broglie [1956], the chapter XI, pp.
119-131 is fascinating in relation with gravitation, teleportation, etc. And the pair (MP (msG,cw), (1’)) offers
legal scientific access to the dBB representation.
68We recall that adaptation to a finite representation and the correlative finiteness of the domain of inves-
tigation – as required by our choice of effectiveness – will have to be introduced by conceptual-mathematical
adjustments subsequent to the outline of a second quantum mechanics.
69The choice to effectively make use of this formal possibility, inside a physical theory of microstates, will be
criticized in the Part III, and replaced by another choice of representation.
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of precisely this sort of blindness with respect to conceptual-physical meaning, that illustrates
strikingly the dangers entailed by the intimate relation between physics and mathematics that
emerges inside mathematical physics. We have already seen how, under the protection of this
intimacy, mathematics can chase the intelligibility out of physics.
In the case of the writing (14) this same sort of blindness induces into the minds the
more or less explicit semantic interpretation that all the eigenket-terms cj(t) |uj(r, aj)〉 from
the second member are of the same nature as the state-ket |ψ(x, t)〉 from the first member.
Which has been shown to be utterly false. And in (15) this same sort of semantic blindness
suggests that the state-ket |Ψ12...k〉 points toward a physical superposition of all the microstates
msG1 , msG2 , . . . ,msGk , themselves, supposed to ‘coexist inside |Ψ12...k〉’. This formally induced
suggestion will play a key-role in the chapter 7.II.
Inside IQM, so now also inside the framework [IQM − QMHD], any possibility of am-
biguities of this sort is avoided by construction. But this has to be stressed, both conceptually
and via modified notations:
- In (14) only the state-ket |ψ(r, t)〉 from the first member corresponds – on the statistical
level of conceptualization – to the studied microstate msG, while all the terms cj(t) |uj(r, aj)〉
from the right-hand expansion of |ψ(r, t)〉 are symbols of a product of a number cj(t) and a
model |uj(r, aj)〉 of a possible corpuscular-wave-movement.
- In (15) the resulting one microstatemsG(G1,G2,...,Gk) that is effectively generated by the
unique composed operation of generation G(G1, G2, ..., Gk), cannot be coherently conceived as
a coexistence of all the microstates msG1 , msG2 , . . . , msGk that would have been obtained via
the separate realizations of (G1, G2, ..., Gk). This has been already much explained, already in
the Part I and then in (6.II)2. So inside the framework [IQM−QMHD] the requirement of self-
consistency entails that the state-ket from the second member of (15) have to be regarded as only
virtual representational elements 70. On the other hand inside QMHD these representational
elements have been considered to be useful precisely in order to represent mathematically the
state-ket |Ψ12...k(r, t)〉 by the additive expression (15). Indeed this possibility permits to deal
mathematically with the observable factual in-equality
pi12...k(G(G1, G2, ..., Gk), aj) 6= pi1(G1, aj) + pi2(G2, aj) + .........+ pik(Gk, aj) (16)
(that generalizes the relation (12) from Part I): via the spectral decomposition (14) of
|Ψ12...k(r, t)〉 on the basis of eigenket of an observable A and application of Born’s postulate of
probability to the complex expansion coefficients cj(t), between the expansion coefficients, there
emerge mathematical ‘interference’-terms that entail the inequality (16), which at a first sight
seems useful for expressing the involvement of the operations of generation (G1, G2, ..., Gk) in
the unique effectively realized operation G(G1, G2, ..., Gk).
So QMHD and IQM involve two distinct views concerning the semantic acceptability of
writings of the form (16): This is possible because IQM is constructed to represent the involved
meanings, while QMHD occults the involved meanings under purely mathematical requirements.
Such a situation is doomed to come to some factual confrontation.
We are aware of this, and we stay attentive.
- Quite generally now: When a state-ket seems to be ‘absent’, this means that the mi-
crostate that corresponds to this state-ket is not generated separately. So it has not been
brought into factual existence. The most striking case of such ‘absence’ of a state-ket is that
of one micro-state of two or several micro-systems, tied with the problem of locality. The for-
malism of QMHD – rightly – represents such a micro-state by only one state-ket. But for each
involved micro-system it introduces a distinct representation-space, and the mathematical re-
lation between these spaces is specified in a way that is indicated by the now current words
‘intrication’ and ‘non-separability’. Certain authors speak of «’absence’ of an ‘own’ state-ket for
each ‘system’ »; other authors speak of «absence of ‘information’» (in what a sense, exactly?);
as if a state-ket were a planet or a lake, something that ‘is’ somewhere outside but nobody
70We do not assert here physical facts, but consequences of the requirement of inner consistency of the
framework [IQM −QMHD]. What this entails in the domain of physical facts will be examined later.
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knows how to go and see where and how it ‘is’. In the textbooks it is written that « often a
micro-system ‘is’ represented by a state-ket and, if so, the state is ‘pure’»; while if it ‘is’ not
pure, then it ‘is’ a ‘mixture’, but in such a case (happily) one can nevertheless dispose of a
statistical operator (how, exactly, one should factually act in order to construct this operator,
is not clearly defined). But in the case of the ‘problem of locality’ not even a true statistical
operator does ‘exist’, only ‘a partial-trace’ operator ‘exists’; but this cannot change the fact
that there is non-separability because a statistical correlation is observed even when the spa-
tial distance between the involved systems is very big. All the mentioned ways of speaking
suggest that the state-ket, the statistical operators, etc., are conceived to possess an existence
quite independently of the representational choices, decisions, constructions, of human beings,
of physicists. As soon as there ‘is’ a ‘system’, ‘its’ state-ket should also ‘be’, and nevertheless
sometimes it is absent and we do not know why, nor where it is gone. The special case of a
microstate of two microsystems in the sense of (2.I)1 is a particularly strong discloser of how
the whole mathematical formalism of QMHD is currently conceived:
We are in presence of a huge reification of the mathematical formalism of QMHD, con-
sidered to constitute the whole of QMHD by itself, alone.
The fact that the whole QMHD is just a human construction achieved by men in order to
represent what men name ‘physical microstates’, has receded far out of the minds. How much
more far, then, we still are from conceiving that not even the microstates to be studied do
‘exist’ out there, and sometimes not even the involved ‘systems’, in this sense that in general
one has to generate them in order to study them!
This situation entails a sort of consternation. It even produces a sort of religious admi-
ration for QMHD because the experiments on locality have confirmed the predictions of the
formalism 71.
But inside [IQM − QMHD] one understands that, and how, these attitudes stem from
the following circumstances.
* Notwithstanding that in general the mathematical writings from QMHD are in agree-
ment with the definitions from (2.I)1 these definitions are not spelled out inside QMHD, and
furthermore, in the case of one micro-state of two micro-systems, in the current language that
accompanies the use of the formalism one speaks of two or several ‘systems’ – never of one
micro-state of two micro-systems. Therefore the one-one indirect and non-explicated connec-
tion
G↔ |ψG(r, t)〉 (1”)
between G and a state-ket that would be denoted |ψG(r, t)〉 because the studied microstate
msG is generated by G – a connection that via (1) G ↔ msG is logically entailed inside
[IQM − QMHD] – is simply out of perceptibility inside QMHD even though it is generally
accepted that always « a state-ket represents the studied ‘system’ ».
* Going now to the roots, one finds that all the preceding examples illustrate how inside
QMHD unintelligibility is entailed by the fact that no clear and systematic distinction is made
between, on the one hand individual concepts (msG, or |uj(r, aj)〉) or physical entities (oper-
ations G, acts of measurement MesA, or specimens σ(msG) of a microstate msG), and on the
other hand the statistical descriptors like |ψ(r, t)〉.
71On the other hand it is true that it does seem amazing to find out to what a degree the mathematical
formalism, in contradistinction to the physicists, is observant of (compatible with) the involvement or not,
in a given state-ket-symbol, of an operation of generation G of a corresponding micro-state, and with the
significance of the involved state-ket from the viewpoint of the definitions (2.I)1; notwithstanding that inside
the formalism the concept ‘G’ is neither defined nor represented, and the definitions (2.I)1 are not stated, while
the specific meaning of an eigenket has not been recognized either. Indeed: (a) a spectral decomposition (14) is
usually conceived to involve an infinite number of terms, the coefficients from these terms are complex numbers
dependent on time, while the eigenfunctions – models of wave-movement – are correctly written as independent
on time; whereas (b) a superposition (15) of state-ket tied with a composed operation of generation is written as
a finite number of terms, the coefficients are usually constant real numbers, and the ket from the superposition
are dependent on time. Everything in the mathematical writings is fully concordant with the analyses made
here inside [IQM − QMHD]. This raises strongly a very interesting question concerning something that could
be called ’the semantic expressivity of mathematical internal syntactic coherence’.
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In these conditions, inside the minds used to QMHD like a New-York boy is used to
Manhattan, an explanation is badly needed indeed, why sometimes some of the two or several
state-ket that would be so ‘necessary’, nevertheless are stubbornly ‘absent’.
We close this point by the following convention:
Notational convention 1 . Inside [IQM − QMHD] any state-ket |ψ(r, t)〉 that corre-
sponds to a physically generated micro-state msG will be re-noted as |ψ(x, t)G〉, and the sort of
operation G that indexes it will be explicitly stated, and when necessary its specific structure
will be distinguished graphically.
So from now on (14) will be re-written as
|ψ(r, t)G〉 /A =
∑
jcj(t) |uj(r, aj)〉 , j = 1, . . . (14’)
and (15) will be re-written as
∣∣Ψ(r, t)G(G1,G2,...,Gk)〉 = λ1 |ΨG1(r, t)〉+ λ2 |ΨG2(r, t)〉+ · · ·+ λk |ΨGk(r, t)〉 (15’)
where, in the global symbol G(G1, G2, ..., Gk), the first operation of generation G is written
in bold font in order to express that it is the unique operation of generation that has been
fully accomplished, while the only a priori possible but not separately realized operations of
generation that in the second member are involved by the state-ket of virtual microstates-of-
reference, will be written in non-bold font.
These specifications will entail clarification 72. They also are an illustration of the gliding
character of the level where takes place the collision between a top-down and a bottom-up
approach and of the way in which the bottom-up approach incorporates progressively the pre-
ceding top-down approach in a new, improving elaboration.
(6.II).4 CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE QMHD THEORY
OF MEASUREMENTS
Here we definitely walk into Absurdland, so abruptly and totally that, by fear of being considered
subjective and malevolent, I do not dare to immediately make use of my own voice. So I first
offer an objective look at the conceptual situation by reproducing an extract from Wikipedia
that consists of a collection of views.
“The measurement problem in quantum mechanics is the problem of how (or whether)
wave-function collapse occurs. The inability to observe this process directly has given rise to different
interpretations of quantum mechanics, and poses a key set of questions that each interpretation must
answer. The wave-function in quantum mechanics evolves deterministically according to the Schrödinger
equation as a linear superposition of different states, but actual measurements always find the physical
system in a definite state. Any future evolution is based on the state the system was discovered to be
in when the measurement was made, meaning that the measurement "did something" to the system
that is not obviously a consequence of Schrödinger evolution.
To express matters differently (to paraphrase Steven Weinberg[1][2]), the Schrödinger wave
equation determines the wavefunction at any later time. If observers and their measuring apparatus
are themselves described by a deterministic wave function, why can we not predict precise results for
measurements, but only probabilities? As a general question: How can one establish a correspondence
between quantum and classical reality?[3].
Schrödinger’s cat
The best known example is the "paradox" of the Schrödinger’s cat. A mechanism is arranged to
kill a cat if a quantum event, such as the decay of a radioactive atom, occurs. Thus the fate of a large
scale object, the cat, is entangled with the fate of a quantum object, the atom. Prior to observation,
72The clarification will lead in the Part III to a suppression of the whole concept-and-writing (15’).
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according to the Schrödinger equation, the cat is apparently evolving into a linear combination of
states that can be characterized as an "alive cat" and states that can be characterized as a "dead
cat". Each of these possibilities is associated with a specific non-zero probability amplitude; the cat
seems to be in some kind of "combination" state called a "quantum superposition". However, a single,
particular observation of the cat does not measure the probabilities: it always finds either a living cat,
or a dead cat. After the measurement the cat is definitively alive or dead. The question is: How are the
probabilities converted into an actual, sharply well-defined outcome?
Interpretations (Main article: Interpretations of quantum mechanics)
Hugh Everett’s many-worlds interpretation attempts to solve the problem by suggesting there
is only one wave-function, the superposition of the entire universe, and it never collapses—so there is
no measurement problem. Instead, the act of measurement is simply an interaction between quantum
entities, e.g. observer, measuring instrument, electron/positron etc., which entangle to form a single
larger entity, for instance living cat/happy scientist. Everett also attempted to demonstrate the way that
in measurements the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics would appear; work later extended by
Bryce DeWitt.
De Broglie–Bohm theory tries to solve the measurement problem very differently: this in-
terpretation contains not only the wavefunction, but also the information about the position of the
particle(s). The role of the wave-function is to generate the velocity field for the particles. These veloc-
ities are such that the probability distribution for the particle remains consistent with the predictions
of the orthodox quantum mechanics. According to de Broglie–Bohm theory, interaction with the envi-
ronment during a measurement procedure separates the wave packets in configuration space which is
where apparent wave-function collapse comes from even though there is no actual collapse.
Erich Joos and Heinz-Dieter Zeh claim that the phenomenon of quantum decoherence,
which was put on firm ground in the 1980s, resolves the problem.[4] The idea is that the environment
causes the classical appearance of macroscopic objects. Zeh further claims that decoherence makes
it possible to identify the fuzzy boundary between the quantum microworld and the world where
the classical intuition is applicable.[5][6] Quantum decoherence was proposed in the context of the
many-worlds interpretation[citation needed], but it has also become an important part of some modern
updates of the Copenhagen interpretation based on consistent histories.[7][8] Quantum decoherence
does not describe the actual process of the wavefunction collapse, but it explains the conversion of the
quantum probabilities (that exhibit interference effects) to the ordinary classical probabilities. See, for
example, Zurek,[3] Zeh[5] and Schlosshauer.[9]
The present situation is slowly clarifying, as described in a recent paper by
Schlosshauer as follows:[10]
Several decoherence-unrelated proposals have been put forward in the past to elucidate the
meaning of probabilities and arrive at the Born rule ... It is fair to say that no decisive conclusion
appears to have been reached as to the success of these derivations. ...
As it is well known, [many papers byBohr insist upon] the fundamental role of classical concepts.
The experimental evidence for superpositions of macroscopically distinct states on increasingly large
length scales counters such a dictum. Superpositions appear to be novel and individually existing states,
often without any classical counterparts. Only the physical interactions between systems then determine
a particular decomposition into classical states from the view of each particular system. Thus classical
concepts are to be understood as locally emergent in a relative-state sense and should no longer claim
a fundamental role in the physical theory.
A fourth approach is given by objective collapse models. In such models, the Schrödinger
equation is modified and obtains nonlinear terms. These nonlinear modifications are of stochastic nature
and lead to a behaviour which for microscopic quantum objects, e.g. electrons or atoms, is unmeasurably
close to that given by the usual Schrödinger equation. For macroscopic objects, however, the nonlinear
modification becomes important and induces the collapse of the wavefunction. Objective collapse models
are effective theories. The stochastic modification is thought of to stem from some external non-quantum
field, but the nature of this field is unknown. One possible candidate is the gravitational interaction
as in the models of Diósi and Penrose. The main difference of objective collapse models compared
to the other approaches is that they make falsifiable predictions that differ from standard quantum
mechanics. Experiments are already getting close to the parameter regime where these predictions can
be tested.[11]
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An interesting solution to the measurement problem is also provided by the hidden-
measurements interpretation of quantum mechanics. The hypothesis at the basis of this approach
is that in a typical quantum measurement there is a condition of lack of knowledge about which in-
teraction between the measured entity and the measuring apparatus is actualized at each run of the
experiment. One can then show that the Born rule can be derived by considering a uniform average
over all these possible measurement-interactions. [12][13].”
(6.II).4.1 Refusal of von Neumann’s Representation of Quantum Measurements
I now dare to continue by my own summary of the situation. In what follows immediately I place
myself inside QMHD, not inside [IQM −QMHD]. So I just express first the current nowadays
language and reasoning about quantum measurements. The representation of measurements on
microsystems is that one proposed by von Neumann in 1932:
The Schrödinger equation of the problem endows us with the state-ket of the problem,
|ψ(r, t)〉. So this state-ket is given mathematically, we dispose of it from the start in consequence
of purely mathematical operations. We want now to represent the measurements. Therefore we
have to write the state-ket for the measurement-interaction. For this we proceed as follows:
Let t = t0 be the initial moment given in |ψ(x, t)〉. At a time t1 > t0 we want to measure the
observable A on the ‘system’ represented by |ψ(r, t)〉. We take now into account that for t ≥ t1
there is interaction between the studied system and the measurement-apparatus. "So", is it
said:
For t ≥ t1 the measurement-evolution must represent also the apparatus "because" the
apparatus is also constituted of microsystems.
So the measurement-evolution is to be represented by a state-ket of [(the studied system
S)+(the apparatus for measuring A)]. Let us then write, say, (S+app(A) and
∣∣ψS+app(A)(x, t)〉.
Since we measure the observable A, the expansion of
∣∣ψS+app(A)(r, t)〉 with respect to the basis
of A comes in. Accordingly to the well-known quantum theory of a ‘system composed of two
systems’ we write the tensor-product expansion:
∣∣ψS+app(A)(x, t)〉 = ∑
k
∑
j
cj(t)dk(t) |uj(r, aj)〉 |qk(r, ak)〉 , ∀j, ∀k (17)
where |qk(r, ak)〉, k = 1, 2, . . . are the eigenket of the observable called the ‘needle-position
of the app(A), that can be denoted χ(A), with eigenvalues, say (ν(ak), k = 1, 2 . . . , that
express, respectively, ‘the needle-positions of app(A) that correspond to the eigenvalues ak of
A’. Furthermore – by the definition of the concept of ‘apparatus for measuring A’ – the set
{cj(t)dk(t)} of the global, product-expansion coefficients (cj(t)dk(t)) from (17) reduces to a set
{αjj(t)} (with αjj = cjdj) of only the coefficients with non-crossed indexation, because the
needle position (ν(aj) of the app(A) is what – alone – indicates the obtained eigenvalue aj of
A 73. So in fact in this case we have only
|ψS+App(r, t)〉 =
∑
j
αjj(t) |uj(r, aj)〉 |vj(r, aj〉 , ∀j (17’)
The measurement evolution is produced accordingly to a measurement-Schrödinger equation
where the hamiltonian operator H(A) commutes with A. And it is posited that this evolution
finishes with a definite needle position χ(aj) that indicates one definite result aj74.
Now, the above-mentioned representation is considered to raise two ‘problems’.
- The reduction problem: what happened to all the terms from (17’) with index k 6= j
that accordingly to a linear formalism should subsist? Where have they disappeared?
73So no coding problem arises according to this ‘measurement-theory’: One is protected from this problem,
the apparatus will know where to settle its needle, since it is conceived for this aim.
74As far as I know, this has never been proved inside QMHD to be generally insured by the condition imposed
upon the measurement evolution.
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- The problem of ‘decoherence’: how can we prove that after the realization of the position
χ(aj) of the apparatus-needle that announces the result aj the measurement interaction really
ceases?75
Here finishes my own summary of the general framework accepted for the representation
of measurements. In what follows I go now back inside [IQM −QMHD] and I speak again for
myself and by use of the language introduced up to now in this work.
Bertrand Russell has written somewhere that aims are induced by temperament while
the choice of a method when an aim is given is induced by intelligence. With respect to the aim
to represent the measurements on microstates, von Neumann’s choice of a method is stunning.
If we followed his argument, in order to measure the position of a star by use of a telescope,
given that the telescope and the star are both made of microsystems, we should represent
[(the telescope)+(the star)+(the measurement interaction between these two entities)]; and we
should prove in terms of the theory thus conceived, that the star and the telescope do really
separate physically once the star’s position has been established. Such an argument manifests
luminously a total blindness with respect to the rather obvious fact that in science what decides
the optimality of a representation is the cognitive situation of the observer-conceptualiser with
respect to that on what he wants to obtain some knowledge, etc. The inner constitution of
that what has to be qualified, or of the instruments that are made use of, has nothing to
do with the criteria for generating the desired knowledge. Quite generally the functionality
of a construct is not in a one-to-one relation with its material (or abstract) structure (those
who have realized the aeroplanes have thoroughly understood that). Moreover, in the case of
microstates, most often what can be registered is just marks on a sensitive registering device
and/or durations determined by chronometers, not needle positions. From these data one has
to construct conceptually the researched ‘value’ of the measured ‘quantity’ and this quantity
in its turn is constructed beforehand on the basis of conceptual-mathematical operations. And
finally, von Neumann’s representation of measurements dodges the crucial coding problem. It
simply makes it disappear behind an amorphous heap of words and symbolic writings void of
definition, so of meaning. Indeed:
Von Neumann’s representation of measurements transgresses QMHD: ‘The observable’
χ(A) called the ‘needle-position of the app(A) is not a quantum mechanical observable, it
cannot be constructed formally in a definite way from one definite classical mechanical quantity,
and so its eigenfunctions cannot be calculated.
An apparatus that is made use of in a scientific description of something else than this
apparatus itself has to be introduced as a primary datum that stays outside the representation
of the act of measurement, if not, one enters indefinite regression76. This is a logical interdiction.
Etc.
So I declare without shades that I quite radically reject von Neumann’s framework for
representing quantum measurements.
(6.II).4.2 The Implicit Assumptions from the QMHD Theory of Measurements
We shall now concentrate on the essential features of the representation of quantum measure-
ments because: the core of the unintelligibility of QMHD is hidden there. The developments
from 6.II and the refusal of von Neumann’s ‘theory’ of quantum measurements leave us face
to face with the real deep problems of intelligibility. These problems must now be stated inde-
pendently of any superfluous representational clothing in order to have a chance to draw into
light the prime source of the vices that obstruct the tortuous channels toward intelligibility. To
guide toward this source I begin by a global sketch of the conceptual situation.
75The locality-problem incites to think that it might not do this, but so what?
76Wittgenstein has written somewhere: «There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre
long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris ». I dare to complete: At least
one class of things cannot be absorbed into the quantum mechanical representation of measurements: The class
of the measurement apparatuses.
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(6.II).4.2.1 Preliminary Questions and Putative Views
One constructs statistics of numbers (or of other sorts of ‘results’) in order to be able to predict
statistically on results of acts of examination indicated by the verbal label ‘measurements’.
Usually this construction itself is achieved by performing sets of individual measurements.
When this is the case let us speak of construction-measurements. And in order to be certain
that the construction of a predictive statistic has succeeded one verifies the statistic before
announcing it as useful for prediction. In this case let us speak of verification-measurements.
It seems natural to assume that factually the results of construction-measurements and of
verification-measurements identify when the measurements are the same, notwithstanding that
they are performed with different aims. So knowledge of the way of factually performing the
individual acts of measurement should be insured before trying to construct and to verify the
statistics that involve such measurements.
But where can one find inside QMHD a thorough definition of the way of performing
factually an individual act of measurement? Anywhere, strictly anywhere. Indeed:
In QMHD – via the Schrödinger equation – the representation of, directly, the predic-
tive statistics is generated mathematically. This circumvents the necessity to define individual
construction-measurements like in IQM. But the individual verification-measurements remain
unavoidably necessary. So the absence of any definition of the individual acts of measurement
is a striking gap, even if indeed it were necessary exclusively for verification of the statisti-
cal predictions. (For bound states, collective acts of verification-measurement can often suffice
(absorption or emission of radiation versus registration of the intensity of spectral lines of emis-
sion or of absorption of radiation)). But for free, unbound microstates, individually defined
verification-measurements are not avoidable.
Now, inside QMHD the process of verification of the statistical predictions asserted by
the state-ket of the studied microstate – considered globally – is represented mathematically
by the Schrödinger measurement-evolution of this state-ket. And it is admitted that such a
measurement evolution somehow involves the factual individual acts of measurement that should
verify the predictie statistic. Such a common formal location of two sorts of entities that belong
to two different levels of conceptualization, is immediately highly suspect. But furthermore, in
this suspect representation, the explicit definition of an individual act of measurement is just
supposed to be known and it is alluded to in mere words, without even being also defined, at
least in mere words: it is just pointed to with a verbal finger. And the end of such an undefined
act of measurement that cohabits with the statistic to the verification of which it participates, is
expressed formally via a sudden modification of the representation of the involved Schrödinger
ket of measurement-evolution: a modification that is not entailed by the mathematical formalism
but is posited separately 77.
Some authors have remarked that in the classical theory of probabilities ‘also’ one con-
siders a probabilistic distribution of the elementary events from a whole universe of possible
elementary elements, while every individual act from the process of verification of this dis-
tribution produces just one definite result. But it seems worth noting that in the theory of
probabilities the mathematical representation of the probabilistic predictive distribution is not
used itself for representing the individual and successive acts from the process of verification of
the predictive probabilistic distribution, and the distribution itself is not provisionally modified
by any individual act from the global process of verification of the probabilistic distribution,
and re-asserted afterward in connection with another act of verification. These coalescences
between a statistical-probabilistic descriptional element, and the representation of individual
operations for a progressive verification of a pre-existing probabilistic predictive distribution
are specific of the quantum representation of measurements.
We finally add that – according to IQM – any individual act of measurement is accom-
plished on one specimen of a microstate, and so it requires an immediately previous realization
of an operation of generation of that specimen, and furthermore it requires sine-qua-non an
operational definition that involves a factually realizable coding procedure; which requires in its
77This is not a joke. Since already a century this situation seems to many physicists very strange or even
scandalous; and it has led to a well-known very extravagant ‘interpretation’ by Everett that many physicists
finally do admit "because it does not involve any inconsistency" (which is to be read, in fact, as ‘mathematical
inconsistency’, any semantic constraint being expurgated.
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turn a general model of a microstate. Inside IQM – that has been concieved as only a reference-
and-imbedding structure of any theory of microstates – these requirements have been left blank,
to be specified in any given theory of microstates. But here we try precisely to draw from QMHD
a fully intelligible theory microstates. Now, it appears in (6II).2 that the formalism of QMHD
involves surreptitiously de Broglie’s model of a microstate. So it will have to be specified what
explicit sort of definition of an individual quantum measurements is entailed by this model for
each one of the various types of unbound microstates distinguished in the section (2.I)2, and
what corresponding coding-rule that definition can admit.
The problems sketched out above can be summarized as follows: It is generally agreed
that a statistical representation only mirrors the involved physical facts and operations. But
this does not exonerate from stipulating of what consists that what is mirrored, when precisely
that is studied.
(6.II).4.2.2 A Fundamental distinction:Individual physical wave-function versus abstract
statistically predictive ‘state’-function
Let us go back to the fact that the wave function initially introduced by Louis de Broglie was
conceived to represent a physical ‘corpuscular wave’ Φ(r, t) = a(r, t)e(i/~)β(r,t) assigned to any
micro-system but very rapidly afterward this initial concept has transmuted into a mathemat-
ical representation of predictive statistics of results of measurements performed on a given mi-
crostate. Thereby, in de Broglie’s mind, the content of the initial descriptor Φ became just more
‘complex’. The amplitude a(r, t) of the function Φ pointed now toward a statistical-probabilistic
prediction for results of repeated registrations of the position of the corpuscular-like singularity
posited to be involved by the amplitude of any specimen of the considered microstate, while the
phase β(r, t) from Φ was conceived to continue to point toward the physical individual wave
movement from the corpuscular wave of any one specimen of the studied microstate. But in
fact this violated one of the numerous semantic rules that work concerning the processes of
conceptualization, still very ill-known: When one applies arithmetic to a factual problem it is
explicitly interdicted – for semantic reasons – to add prunes with apples, notwithstanding that
inside arithmetic the operation ‘+’ is defined without restriction. Analogously, inside mathe-
matical physics works implicitly an interdiction to represent by one same function two features
that qualify physical entities of different semantic natures, so two different physical entities
78. So quantum mechanics has started directly with a violation of a hidden but basic semantic
rule. The spontaneous public reasoning, that feels the semantic rules, has tended to compensate
this violation by selecting only the statistical mathematical representation of a microstate. But
this contributed to simply abandon in the non-spelled-out the individual physical descriptive
elements.
Let us suppress the initial in-distinction mentioned above via the following second nota-
tional convention (to be added to the first one from (6II).3):
Notational convention 2 . The physical individual wave-like phenomenon introduced
in the domain of scientific conceptualization by one realization of the operation G of generation
of one specimen σ(msG,cw) of the studied microstate msG,mw – in the sense of (1’) and (14) –
will be systematically denoted by an individual wave-function assigned to each one specimen
σ(msG,cw) of the studied microstate msG,mw, that is denoted ΦG,cw(r, t)79 (in short ΦG). The
mathematical form is posited here to include the representation of also the ‘corpuscular singu-
larity(ies)’ from the amplitude. While the state-function from the QMHD-state-ket |ΨG(r, t)〉
associated with msG will represent exclusively a mathematical tool for predictive statistics of
results of measurements on individual specimens σ(msG,cw).
The distinction introduced above does not in the least interdict any possible degree of
similitude between the global mathematical forms of ΦG,cw and |ΨG〉80.
78We mention that according to the method of relativized conceptualization (MRC in MMS [2002A], [2002B])
this, via a ‘principle of separation’, violates the generalization of the one-one relation (1) posited in Part I.
79We maintain the notation Φ.
80For an unbound microstate there certainly exists a strong similitude between the mathematical function
ΦG,cw(r, t) appropriate for representing σ(msG,cw), and the state-function ψG(r, t) = a(r, t)e(i/~)ϕ(r,t) from
the state-ket of msG. But in consequence of the predictive task assigned to ψG(r, t) = a(r, t)e(i/~)ϕ(r,t) – also
certainly – there is no identity between these descriptors (this is now clear by definition of the amplitude function
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On the ground lighted by all the preliminary considerations from (6.II).4.2.1 and the
distinction from (6.II).4.2.2 we shall now start a more detailed examination of the nowadays
"theory of quantum measurements".
(6.II).4.3 THE CODING RULE IMPLIED BY THE QMHD-FORMALISM
Since we refuse von Neumann’s representation of quantum measurements we go back to the
initial representation of these, i.e. the measuring-apparatus is not represented. But we conserve
the Hilbert-Dirac bra-ket representation. The other notations as well as the point of view remain
those from the association [IQM −QMHD] enriched with the new contents already gained in
the chapters 5.II and 6.II (so not those from the current QMHD alone). Armed in this way, the
main purpose in this section is the following one: Identify how – inside the current QMHD –
the observable result of one physical measurement-evolution of the one specimen of the studied
microstate that accordingly to [IQM − QMHD] is involved in one act of measurement, is
supposed to be translatable in terms of one definite eigenvalue of the measured quantity.
We suppose that via the Schrödinger equation of the problem acted by an initial
evolution-hamiltonian operator H it has been possible to identify the state-ket |ψG,H(r, t)〉
of the microstate msG to be studied, where t ≥ t0 and t0 is the initial moment. If at a time
t1 ≥ t0 one wants to measure the observable A on a specimen of msG, the QMHD-procedure
is as follows ((5.II)1). Write the expansion (15’) of |ψG,H(r, t)〉 on the basis {|u(r, aj)〉 , ∀j}, of
eigenket of A for just the moment t1:
|ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A =
∑
j
cj(aj , t1) |u(r, aj)〉 , ∀j (18)
The statistical prediction concerning the outcome of an A-measurement on the microstate
represented by |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 is given by the set of numbers {|cj(aj , t1)|2 ,∀j}A.
As for the verification of this prediction one proceeds accordingly to the following al-
gorithm: From t1 on the action of the evolution-hamiltonian operator H that worked during
the time-interval ( t1 − t0) is stopped and the state-ket |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 is subjected to a new sort
of evolution represented by an A-measurement-evolution of an A-measurement-evolution-ket∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉. This evolution is performed accordingly to the Schrödinger equation
acted by an A-measurement-hamiltonian H(A) that commutes with A. One A-measurement-
evolution takes a time ( t1 ≤ t ≤ tf ) where tf imarks the end of the considered A-measurement-
evolution. The measurement-evolution-ket
∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 is made use of exclusively
via its expansion (18) with respect to A (so in an A-Dirac-representation) where the expansion
coefficients are the same as in (18). One writes :∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A = ∑
j
cj(t1) |u(r, aj)〉 , ∀j (19)
So the new evolution (19) of the initial expansion |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A but with ( t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )
is supposed not to change the expansion coefficients from (18); while the eigenket |u(r, aj)〉
are time-independent. It follows that in the A-Dirac-representation (19) of one act of A-
measurement the mathematical effect of the evolution can only consist in the way in which the
as yet non-squared complex coefficients cj(t1) change. But these are only mathematical changes.
Whereas we, in order to understand what coding rule is supposed to work, have to specify what
is conceived to change physically during ( tf − t1), and how. This purpose is likely to lead us to
the space-time representation of the measurement-evolution-ket
∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A.
Let us make a break at this point in order to bring in guiding data.
a(r, t); but even the phase ϕ(r, t) from ψG(r, t) might indicate only some sort of mean-phase with respect to
the unknown individual phase functions β(r, t) that are involved in the set of specimens {σ(msG,cw)} of the
studied microstate msG,cw (cf. (14)). Anyhow, for now the fact is that in general we do not know what equation
can yield as solutions the functional representations of the individual specimens σ(msG,cw); and even though
de Broglie has asserted such an equation and has characterized it in detail (de Broglie [[1956],[1957]), nothing
insures a priori that the Schrödinger equation of the same problem would be generally adequate.
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Remember Gottfiried’s presentation of quantum measurements (1966) and de Broglie’s
analyses ([1957]); and also Bohm’s analysis (1951) of the Stern-Gerlach method for spin mea-
surements. And quite especially, remember the method time-of- flight for measuring the mo-
mentum observable P . This last method has been thoroughly studied by Park and Margenau
([1968]) and when it is examined closely it appears quite clearly that what is supposed to go
on from a physical viewpoint during the process involved in (19) is such that:
For any given index j, a measurement-evolution (19) represents globally the emergence via
sufficiently many repetitions of an act of P-measurement, of a statistical correlation between:
- On the one hand, a more or less extended space-time domain (∆r.∆t)j,A] that codes
for one eigenvalue ‘pj ’ of P .
- And on the other hand, the number of times – posited to determine the probability for
registering the result pj – that the group of all the observable marks registered during one act of
P-measurement is located anywhere inside (∆r.∆t)j,P (whereby the correlation is statistical).
The method ‘time of flight’ has been formulated exhaustively and it is paradigmatic.
Therefore I summarize it below, in [IQM −QMHD]-terms.
Let δE(G) be the space-domain covered by one realization of the operation G via an
apparatus A(G) for generating specimens σ(msG,cw)n, n = 1, 2, ..., N , of the microstate msG
to be studied. Place a very extended detection-screen S sufficiently far from the space-domain
δE(G) for permitting to assimilate δE(G) to only a point denotedO relatively to the distanceOS
between δE(G) and S measured on an axis Ox that starts at δE(G) ≈ O and is perpendicular
on the plane of S. We act as follows:
(a) We effectively carry out with A(G) an operation (G)n and we denote by tno the time
when (G)n ends, indicated by a system of two interconnected chronometers, one of which is
connected to the generation-apparatus A(G) and the other one is connected to the screen S
(the index ‘n’ individualizes the considered realization (G)n of G. The time tn0 indicates the
beginning of the n-th act of measurement. The duration δt(G) of the operation of generation
G does not come in, alone will matter the time elapsed between the moment tnowhen the
operation of generation G ends and the time tn when an impact is recorded anywhere on S.
(b) If between δE(G) ≈ O and the screen S there pre-exist macroscopic fields or material
obstacles, at t0 the fields are extinct and/or the ‘obstacles’ are removed by a convenient device.
(c) After some time an impact is produced on a spot of the screen S, that we indicate by
P (xn, yn, zn) where the coordinates are written with respect to a Cartesian system of reference
where one of the axes is Ox and (Oy, Oz) are in the plane of S. When the impact-point
P (xn, yn, zn) emerges on S the system of chronometers indicates the time tnand “the ‘time of
flight’ ∆tn = tn − tn0" 81 (that has been automatically calculated in the system).
(d) Let dn designate the vector-value of the distance between δE(G) ≈ O and
P (xn, yn, zn). The square of the absolute value of this distance is |dn|2 = d2xn + d2yn + d2zn
where dxn ,dyn , dzn are calculated with respect to the specified Cartesian referential.
(e) The vector-eigenvalue pn of the quantum mechanical momentum-operator P and its
absolute value |pn|, are then calculated according to the formulas pn = M(dn/∆t0) = Mv and
pn = M
√
d2xn + d
2
yn + d
2
zn/∆t0, where M is the ‘mass’ associated with the involved specimen
σ(msG,cw)n of msG such as this mass is defined in classical mechanics and in atomic physics82,
and v means ‘velocity’. This completes the considered act of momentum-measurement.
Now we note what follows. The global apparatus is made up of: a generation apparatus
A(G); a system of two chronometers; the suppressor of external fields and/or obstacles; the
screen S. The observable physical marks produced during the considered act of measurement,
are: the point-like mark P, the position of the needle of one chronometer at the beginning of
the act of measurement, and the position of the needle of the other chronometer at the end of
this act. The observable manifestations enumerated above are not themselves numerical values,
nor do they ‘possess’ any quale of which the direct perception is necessarily associated in the
observer’s mind with the involved specimen of the studied microstate. They are only perceptible
81‘Flight’ of what? Obviously a model is involved. Probably the model of a classical ‘mobile’.
82So indeed here the classical model of ‘mobile’ is involved. For the mass in de Broglie’s sense has a different
definition, and this might come out one day to be very important. But probably the de Broglie-Bohm approach
(Bohm [1952]), de Broglie [1956]) was not yet much known in 1968.
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physical facts – say µ1n, µ2n, and µ3n, respectively – registered on ‘recorders’ of the utilized
global apparatus.
The meanings associated with the recorded marks as well as the numerical values asso-
ciated with these are defined:
- With respect to permanent reference elements.
- By the way of conceiving what is called ’an act of measurement of, specifically, the
eigenvalue pn of the momentum-observable P ’. This, in agreement with IQM, presupposes a
general model of a microstate with respect to which this way of conceiving the measurement
procedure makes sense and can be conceptually integrated in the previously achieved structure
of scientific knowledge. And it seems utterly clear that in this case:
- The general concepts of ‘momentum-value p’ and of ‘mass M ’ that are involved in the
time-of-flight method, such as it is nowadays formulated, are founded on the classical model
of a ’mobile’. This indicates that in the required conditions (in particular the extinction of all
the exterior fields) the method works for a classical model even though in fact a specimen of a
microstate is involved. The method as a whole seems ‘reasonable’ precisely because, and only
because it is designed so as to change during one act of momentum-measurement certain features
of the posited classical mobile – namely its position – but in a way that does not alter that what
has to be measured for the involved specimen of such a mobile – namely the momentum-value
pn of the momentum observable P at the beginning of the considered act of measurement.
Indeed the procedure would be totally arbitrary in the absence of this assumption.
- The vector-value dn calculated from the observable marks µ1n, µ2n, and µ3n, has
an origin that is permitted to vary inside some non-negligible space-domain ∆r (because
the origin of the ‘flight’ of the posited ‘mobile’ simply cannot be defined strictly when the
mobile indicates a physical entity that is a specimen σ(msG,cw)n of a microstate msG).
The method time of flight is the only one that seems to be regarded as ‘legal’ for measuring
the momentum observable accordingly to nowadays QMHD. This is so because it is considered
implicitly to realize progressively, wile time passes, the inner structure of an eigenstate of
the momentum observable, namely the plane-wave structure required by the expansions (19)∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /P written for the observable P . So the measurement-evolution (19)
that is thus implied by the time-of-flight method, quite obviously does entail a coding rule, via
a statistical correlation. Indeed: Let us denote by µpj ≡ {(µk, k = 1, 2, 3)j}pj , j = 1, 2, . . . , JP,
the group of all the observable marks produced by any one act of P-measurement. On the
basis of this view and via a reasoning drawn from the classical mechanics, it is possible for any
a corresponding space-time domain (∆r.∆t)j such that the whole group of marks {(µk, k =
1, 2, 3)j}P that is registered anywhere inside (∆r.∆t)j) be tied with the eigenvalue pj of P . So
that one can write:
[registration of the marks {(µk, k = 1, 2, 3)j}P anywhere inside (∆r.∆t)j means
the result ‘pj’]
(20)
Which, as announced, is a statistical correlation that acts like a coding rule for P-
measurements, in the sense defined in (1.I).2.
So it seems likely that – on the basis of the method time-of-flight and comforted by the
analyses of the Stern-Gerlach method for spin-measurements that leads to a similar conclusion
– de Broglie, Bohm, Park and Margenau have admitted more or less implicitly that any act of
quantum measurement involves a coding rule of the general form (20). We denote this view by
BBGPM.
In the present context the conclusion (20) is very interesting because it immediately
suggests the following new considerations.
- As far as I know no general proof of the coding rule (20) has been worked out inside
QMHD. So it seems likely that such a proof is not possible. But for our re-constructive purpose
this is not a crucial circumstance. Indeed, more or less explicitly, Park and Margenau have
proved inside QMHD the correlation (20) for the particular case of the momentum observable
P . Moreover for the basic position observable R a correlation of the same form is tautologically
realized. And the QMHD ‘postulate of representation’ of an observable A(R,P) permits to
form A by a simple calculus from the pair (R,P) of the two basic observables, so that also the
eigenvalues aj of A can be constructed via definite algorithms from the eigenvalues of R and
P . So inside QMHD (20) can be generalized to any observable A, in some specifiable conditions.
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- But the method time-of-flight involves the classical ‘mobile’-model of a microstate;
whereas inside [IQM −QMHD] the modelling postulate MP(msG,cw) from (6.II).2 introduces
the G-(corpuscular-wave)-model of a microstate defined by (1’) for any specimen σ(msG,cw) of
the studied microstate msG.
This means that inside [IQM −QMHD] the way of conceiving what can adequately be
called ‘an act of measurement of the observable A’, might in general change with respect
to the way of conceiving this inside QMHD.
Nevertheless it remains quite conceivable a priori that – at least in certain restrictive
classical-like conditions that remain to be identified – the form (20) of a coding rule might
subsist and be coherently inserted in [IQM −QMHD], in agreement with the G-(corpuscular-
wave)-model posited for a microstate.
In short: With respect to our general goal of reconstructing quantum mechanics by a
bottom-up process that includes IQM and offers an entirely intelligible representation of the
quantum measurements – the coding rule (20) has for the moment the role of just a possibly
fertile starting point. And with respect to our present local purpose of elucidating the hidden
structure of the QMHD-representation of the quantum measurements as it now stands, it seems
necessary to immediately understand intuitively – just to thoroughly understand – on what
grounds deeper than merely the above-mentioned algorithmic constructability of a one-to-one
coding-rule with form (20) – BBGPM could have been led to suppose implicitly a coding rule
of this form for any observable A. So we concentrate now upon discerning such grounds.
The method time-of-flight has been found to stem from an undeclared and hazy classical
assumption of a ‘trajectory’ of a classical ‘mobile’. This suggests that the conditions in which
a correlation of the type (20) can be accepted inside [IQM −QMHD] might be revealed by the
organization of a comparability as strong as possible between the QMHD-representation (19),
with the space-time behaviour of a classical ‘mobile’. So let us effectively try to do this.
The A-measurement-evolution-ket
∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A from (19) is a statistical
descriptor. In (6.II).4.2.2 we have introduced a radical distinction between a statistical state-ket
|ψG(r, t)〉 that is a mathematical tool for statistical predictions, and an individual physical wave-
function ΦG,cw(r, t) (unknown in general). According to the modelling postulate MP (msG,cw)
from (6.II).2 the function ΦG,cw is the mathematical representation of the physical fragment
of corpuscular wave from the specimen σ(msG,cw) that is generated by one realization of the
operation G of generation of the studied microstate msG. Now, the corpuscular wave ΦG,cw of
a specimen σ(msG,cw) of msG is conceived in the modelling postulate MP (msG,cw) to be able
to produce observable marks only via the singularity from the physical corpuscular wave from
σ(msG,cw) that "glides" inside its corpuscular wave "like a small classical mobile" (de Broglie).
This permits to also associate a ‘trajectory’ to each specimen of any microstate, namely that
of its singularity. So, we ask:
If in the method time of flight – and in the other methods of measurement from QMHD –
the G-corpuscular-wave–model is substituted to the classical-mobile-model, does the assumption
of a correlation of type (20) still subsist, and in what conditions? Though in the present state
we do not dispose of means for establishing an answer by strict deduction, we can already
explicate hints for conceiving just an intuitive perception of an answer. In what follows we take
into account the classical mechanics, the current QMHD, and the de Broglie-Bohm model of a
microstate.
To stay in agreement with the essence of the method ‘time of flight’ we consider the
most simple case of an unbound microstate msG of one microsystem and with non-composed
operation G of generation. The last restriction is necessary in order to eliminate a priori the
possibility of the ‘inner’ quantum-fields, in the sense of the de Broglie model of a microstate83.
Indeed such fields cannot be controlled by the human observer-conceptor nor, in particular can
they be suppressed, while during the measurement-process they can change that what has to
be measured, namely the eigenvalue ajof A. But this has to be excluded in a measurement that
involves a coding correlation of the form (20) (cf. the comments on the method time-of-flight)).
83‘External’ and ‘internal’ are here qualifications of the singularity from the amplitude of the corpuscular-wave
ΦG, cw of σ(msG, c)) ; indeed the wave ΦG, cw itself is conceived to possibly be unlimited in space (cf. (6.II).2).
86 Mioara Mugur Schachter
Moreover we admit that the external fields and ‘obstacles’ are all suppressed. But in order to
be able to consider the conditions of possibility of (20) for any observable A (not only P), here
– in contradistinction to the method time-of-flight – we do admit the macroscopic ‘external’
fields involved by the measurement-hamiltonian H(A) from (19) that can be manipulated and
controlled by the human observer-conceptor which then permits to control also the trajectory
of the singularity from the physical wave ΦG,cw of the involved specimen σ(msG,cw) so as to
bring it into touch with the domain (∆r.∆t)j that codes for a definite eigenvalue aj of A. In
this way are eliminated from the start all the possible sources of uncontrolled instability of the
dynamics of the singularity involved by the specimen σ(msG,cw) of msG,cw.
In such protected conditions the (unique) singularity from the specimen σ(msG,cw) of
the studied microstate msG should behave exactly like a classical mobile placed in the same
external macroscopic conditions.
Notwithstanding all these precautions there persists a problem in the way of a clear com-
parability with classical mechanics. The formalism from QMHD does not distinguish between
statistical descriptions and individual descriptions (the last ones are not even specified). Correl-
atively, in (19) the measurement-evolution-hamiltonian H(A) conserves only the mean value of
the eigenvalues of A. Whereas a coding relation of the form (20) for the result of one individual
act of measurement on a microstate of one micro-system is quite essentially required to specify
just one definite eigenvalue aj of A (accordingly also to the general concept of coding relation
introduced in (1.I).2). So in order to be able to obtain the sharpest possible comparability of
(19) with a measurement-evolution of a classical mobile, we should focus as strongly as possible
the representation from (19) upon one eigenvalue aj . Let us then make use of the legal limit of
the concept ‘
∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A’ by considering only one term from the sum (19):
cj ′(t1) = 0 pour ∀j′ 6= j, |cj(t1)| = 1, cj(t1) = 1.eiα(r,t1)∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A = (1.eiα(r,t1) |u(r, aj)〉)/A (21)
where α(x, t) is an arbitrary phase-function. This – strictly speaking – does not lead outside
QMHD; but it places just upon its frontier. So in (21) the representation (19) becomes ‘tangen-
tial’ to QMHD.
According to QMHD the unique eigenvalue aj that is involved in (21) coincides with the
mean value of the possible eigenvalues, so it is itself conserved by the measurement-
evolution generated by H(A).
Thereby we have extorted an individual qualification from the statistical formalism of QMHD.
However what changes physically in time in (19) is not yet clear. So let us go over into
the ‘physical’-space R-representation of (21) where the considered measurement-evolution does
play out factually. Now: in the physical space the ket from (19)
∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A is
conceived as a ‘wave-packet ’ endowed with one maximum to which it is possible to associate
an ‘individual’ dynamic, like in the classical mechanics. But with the limit-form (21) of (19)
the corressponding R-representation does not entail any more any evolution; it simply stays
unchanged, it ceases to serve the very aim for which the R-representations have been defined
inside QMHD. While according to [IQM−QMHD] the R-localization of that what can produce
observable marks – namely the singularity from the amplitude of the corpuscular wave of the one
specimen σ(msG,cw) of the involved studied microstate – is on the contrary very localized in the
physical space, at any time. So, while the limiting form (21) itself of the A-Dirac-representation
(19) has permitted to obtain an individual insight by having started with a statistical descriptor,
this same limiting form (21) cuts off quite radically any comparability between the statistical
descriptions from QMHD and the individual description of a mobile in classical mechanics.
This brings strangely into evidence that – in general – it is impossible to pinpoint individual
mechanical qualifications via a wave-like statistical description of mechanical movement 84. It
also stresses that the difference between QMHD and the representation of the microstates that
can emerge here inside the framework [IQM −QMHD] is very deep.
84This illustrates into what conceptual-descriptional impossibilities and inadequacies is cornered an exclusively
statistical representation – realized before an individual representation because the approach has been developing
top-down – when, later, it is tried to confront this representation with the purpose to generate the individual
physical entities and features with which any statistical descriptions is necessarily tied. (We are in the domain
of applicability of the theorem of Ehrenfest).
Basic Clarifications: A General Model of a Microstate 87
Notwithstanding this loss in the R-representation of (21), of conceptual mechanical sig-
nificance, the hints entailed by the preceding considerations suffice already for having perceived
directly, intuitively, analogically, that it is possible, and in what a sense, to connect the QMHD
representation (19) of the A-measurement-evolution-ket
∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A, with the
G-(corpuscular-wave)-model of a microstate.
Going back now in QMHD, let us note that the parameters that define a space-time
wave-packet are very adjustable. They permit to quite satisfactorily approach – via a statistical
representation – the two essential features to be researched for the coding-purpose, namely:
(a) Conservation of a mean value of the eigenvalue aj peaked around one value aj as
strongly as one wants.
(b) Choice of a definite direction and a convenient degree of stability for the dynamics
of the maximum of the wave-packet throughout the time interval ( t1 ≤ t ≤ tf ), via the control
of the ‘external’ fields involved by H(A) 85.
(c) The possibilities (a) and (b) permit to identify the optimal choices for the locations
of the registering devices (this is what permits the method ‘time-of-flight’). (Inside classical
mechanics it is obvious that: A mechanical displacement of a mobile throughout which the
value aj of a given mechanical quantity A keeps constant, leads the mobile into a predictable
spatial domain ∆rj if the displacement lasts sufficiently; and this domain can become as distant
as one wants with respect to any other domain ∆rj′ that corresponds to another value aj′ of A,
with j′ 6= j (the source-domain being the same). Which permits to mutually singularise these
spatial domains).
So the QMHD-parameters of the measurement-wave-packet (19)∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A assigned to each measurement evolution of the studied mi-
crostate can be adapted to the goal of insuring that the initial individual value aj of A
from the corresponding specimen of this microstate, stays constantly, with controllable
approximations, on the direction of displacement that reaches a more or less spatially extended
registering device where any impact means ‘aj’ 86.
Together, all the preceding considerations permit to understand inside [IQM−QMHD] on
what sort of grounds can take form the implicit presupposition that any quantum measurement
does admit a coding rule of the form (20); that it always can consist – wholly consist – of
exclusively an evolution of a form of the type (20). (And let us remark that – via the expansion-
postulate – this concept is quite essentially tied with the reference-concept of an eigenstate and
so with de Broglie’s model of a specimen of a microstate that has been introduced by a bottom-up
approach).
On the basis of the preceding investigation we admit – in agreement with BBGPM –
that:
The possibility of principle to realize coding-measurement-evolutions of the form (20)
subsists also inside [IQM − QMHD], so also with respect to the non-classical model
constructed here from de Broglie’s concept of corpuscular-wave, not exclusively with re-
spect to the Newtonian ‘mobile’-model of a microstate. And it subsists for any observable
A. But the reasons that ground this subsistence apply only to unbound microstates of
one microsystem and with simple operation of generation, i.e. to microstates that evolve
in the absence of quantum-fields that can work on the involved ‘singularity’. Which is a
very severe restriction.
85‘External’ in the sense of the note 83.
86What a prowess we have finally accomplished! The only way to find answer to a basic question of physics –
how to know the meaning, in conceptualized terms, of the observable result of an act of measurement – inside a
basic theory of physics called ‘quantum mechanics’, has been to do, what? (a) To laboriously unmask individual
intruders {|u(r, aj)〉, ∀j} surreptitiously injected into an exclusively potential statistic of numbers {|cj(aj , t1)|2 ,
∀j}A drawn from the set of all such statistics of which a QMHD -state-ket ΨG – by itself – does entirely consist.
(b) And therefrom, by use of faint reflections from these individual intruders |u(r, aj)〉, of aspects of individual
physical entities and features, to draw – at distance – a virtual trace on the level of the classical representation
of the dynamics of another sort of individual real physical entities reduced to something that can be imagined as
a ‘mobile’. (The convolutions from this last verbal expression only translate the intrication of the reasoning that
has knocked out the conclusion formulated above). This measures the distance introduced between meaning and
representation by the top-dawn constructed statistical formalism from QMHD.
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So we know from the start that we shall have to face the problem of defining also another coding
procedure, valid for microstates that do involve quantum fields.
(6.II).4.4 THE MAJOR CONFUSIONS FROM THE
QMHD-REPRESENTATION OF A MEASUREMENT-EVOLUTION
We shall now concentrate upon the significances involved by the mathematical expression of the
QMHD-representation of quantum measurements. What follows might sometimes seem repeti-
tive and trivial. But globally, we think, this feeling will fade out and leave place to a feeling of
elucidation.
(6.II).4.4.1 Preliminary Remarks
The very well known distinctions recalled below are important for the examination that follows
them.
- The evolving state-ket |ψG,H(r, t)〉 of the studied microstate msG is supposed for the
moment to be always specifiable directly in mathematical terms by use of the Schrödinger
equation of the problem. It works as a reservoir of all the potentially available predictive-
numbers that QMHDcan offer via algorithms concerning the studied microstate msG; namely
the probabilities of results of measurements of any observable A, performed on msG at any
time t after the moment when the initial form |ψG,H(r, t0)〉 of |ψG,H(r, t)〉 has been specified
and so the evolution of |ψG,H(r, t)〉 has begun, in the mathematical sense, i.e. the state-ket
can be calculated for any t ≥ t0. The descriptor |ψG,H(r, t)〉 has an only potential and purely
numerical content that remains to be partially worked out according to particular definite
predictive purposes.
- The expansion (18) |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A =
∑
jcj(aj , t1) |u(r, aj)〉 , ∀j,∀t1 of the state-ket
|ψG,H(r, t)〉 on the basis of eigenket {|u(r, aj〉 ,∀j}A of a given observableA, permits to explicate
from |ψG,H(r, t)〉, via Born’s postulate, for any moment t1 ≥ t0 and for any observable A, the
predictive probability law denoted (A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2,∀j}) on the emergence by measurement
of the eigenvalues aj of A. This permits to verify this law via a subsequent sufficiently long
succession of effective realizations of coding-measurement-evolutions for A. So one can re-write
the total predictive content of the state-ket |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 from (18) with also the alternative
form of the second member:
|ψG,H(r, t1)〉 ≈pred. {∀A, ∀t1, |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A} (22)
In (18) and so in (22) the particular amount of numerical predictive content from
|ψG,H(r, t)〉 that is tied with any given observable A and any given time t1, ceases to be
potential; it is explicated by already achieved calculi. Thereby, though they remain abstract,
the expressions (18) and (22) involve now also: the concept of eigenstate of an observable A
that plays the role of a sample of wave-movement around a singularity from a corpuscular wave
(6.II)1); so the equation A |uj(r, aj)〉 = aj |uj(r, aj)〉, ∀j that determines the eigenket in con-
nection with the algebra of observables defined inside QMHD; so de Broglie’s ‘corpuscular-wave’
model; and finally, Born’s postulate pi(aj) = |cj(aj , t1)|2. So the concept ‘ |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A’ from
(18) and (22) ceases to be a product of exclusively the Schrödinger equation, like |ψG,H(r, t1)〉,
and it ceases to possess a purely numerical content.
The concept (22) is the core of the QMHD-representation of quantum measure-
ments.
- Consider now the second member of the coding-measurement-evolution ket (19)∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A = ∑ jcj(t1) |u(r, aj)〉. It has the form of an expansion (18) of
the state-ket |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 with respect to A but that – from the time t1 on – continues its evo-
lution in new coding-conditions defined by a measurement-hamiltonian H(A) that commutes
with A. So the QMHD descriptor of any one coding-measurement-evolution is a statistical de-
scriptor. But as well-known this same descriptor is also posited to finish by a ‘reduction’ of its
statistical character that reveals the individual result aj that only one act of A-measurement
has actualized out from the whole spectrum {aj}, ∀j of a priori possible results aj .
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So, considered globally, the descriptor (19) exhibits – formally – an ambiguous character
in what concerns the level of conceptualization on which it is placed 87.
Let us also notice that:
The three descriptors |ψG,H(r, t)〉, |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A and
∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A des-
ignate meanings that are placed on different levels of conceptualization and that are of
different natures, in particular because they are tied with different purposes.
So we stay attentive to the levels of conceptualization and to the time parameters
that are involved, of which the current denotations do not specify the level of conceptu-
alization on which they are defined, which can lead to basic inadequacies.
(6.II).4.4.2 Critical Remarks and Questions
In what follows we adopt the point of view of [IQM −QMHD].
Consider the descriptor (19)
∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, (t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A = ∑ jcj(t1) |u(r, aj)〉,
∀j of coding-measurement-evolution. It is usually said that "at t1 the ‘system’ is
‘prepared’ for measurement and, correspondingly, is also ‘prepared’ the new ket∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, (t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A that represents the measurement-evolution". What hap-
pens factually during these ‘preparations’ is neither represented nor explicitly stated.
In particular it is not said how the ‘system’ is obtained , physically, operationally, in
order to ‘prepare’ it. Nor is it stated how is to be carried out the coding-measurement-
evolution itself (not its ket) for – specifically, a given observable A and a given sort
of microstate. It is only specified that the hamiltonian must commute with A, but on
the coding-process there are no other indications than the directly postulated assertion
that each act of A-measurement produces, for any ‘system’ (microstate), an eigenvalue
aj of A that is "indicated by the ‘needles’ of the registering devices" (just like in von
Neumann’s unacceptable representation).
In short: because in the nowadays quantum mechanics QMHD any explicitly de-
fined individual specification is lacking, everything there hovers calmly in the verbal-
mathematical sphere. No particular stress whatever is placed upon the fact that, in order
for ‘aj ’ to become known, and since obviously a statistic of abstract numbers cannot
trigger physical marks by interaction with physical registering devices, one should know
how the interaction must be in order that the needles inform us that they indicate one
definite aj and not another aj′ 6=aj , or something else. Let us register clearly, and stress
heavily this basic question that is so serenely treated as an utmost triviality.
The written expression of the descriptor (19)
∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, (t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A =∑
jcj(t1) |u(r, aj)〉 places it on the statistical level of conceptualization, as just a contin-
uation of the expansion (18) in new external conditions expressed by the measurement-
hamiltonian H(A) instead of the initially acting hamiltonian H . And just like in the
case of von Neumann’s unreasonable representation of quantum measurements, here also
is totally occulted the question of the procedure to follow in order to register observ-
able physical marks {µkA}j, k = 1, 2, ..., n, from which it be then possible to construct
the eigenvalue aj that is to be regarded as the result of the considered act of coding-
measurement-evolution; not something that is postulated to be ‘an’ eigenvalue aj, but the
eigenvalue aj that is the result of this act of measurement. Even the verbal expres-
sion ‘coding’-measurement-evolution has no equivalent inside the nowadays language of
quantum mechanics, while in (6.II).4.3 it appeared clearly that precisely the require-
ment of coding the registered observable marks in terms of one definite eigenvalue aj of
the observable A determines the whole definition of the physical content of ‘one act of
A-measurement’. It is added that when aj ‘is obtained’ this ‘fact’ is accompanied by a ‘re-
duction’ of the measurement-ket (19)
∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, (t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A = ∑ jcj(t1) |u(r, aj)〉
to only one of its terms. And these ‘facts’ – the postulated obtainment of aj and the reduc-
tion of (19) – are formal ‘facts’. The identification between mathematical writings and
physical facts is so deep in the minds and so perfect that what is formal finally banishes
what is factual. Indeed nothing is specified concerning what happens to the necessarily
87This is not identical to the famous reduction-problem that is formulated exclusively in relation with math-
ematical objections.
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involved specimen of the studied microstates while the formal progression symbolized
in (19) goes on. Namely that in general, while aj ‘is obtained’ – which means: while aj
is constructed from physical marks, from the mathematical representation of A, from a
model posited for σ(msG), and from the corresponding way of registering relevant phys-
ical marks {µkA}j – when all this has been done, then the physical state of the involved
specimen is destroyed, even if the involved system subsists. Which is one of the reasons
that led us to speak in terms of micro-states of micro-systems if one wants to stay clear,
not in terms of ‘systems’. All this, though well known, is only allusively mentioned from
time to time. Consequently, the necessity, in general, to generate another specimen of
the studied microstate before entering upon a new measurement-evolution, does not in
the least trouble the attention. So also the necessarily repeated physical operation of
generation G of a physical and individual specimen σ(msG), remains hidden in the void
of meaning of the verbal expressions ‘preparation of the system’ and ‘preparation of the
measurement-evolution-ket. In these conditions the unavoidable necessity to make use
of individual measurement-evolutions for verifying a statistical description, remains only
implicit. As for the possibility to make use of individual measurement evolution also for
constructing factually a statistical description – not only for verifying a mathematically
defined statistical description as it is done in QMHD – it does not even appear on the
far horizon. (And why should it, when the basic descriptor |ΨG,H(t)〉 is posited to be al-
ways available via exclusively mathematical means and to involve already any expansion
(18) |ΨG,H(r, t1)〉 /A, which, directly, generates mathematically the probability-law to
be verified?).
In short, the individual descriptors (G, Gt, msG, σ(msG), MesA, [G.MesA],
[Gt.MesA], etc.) that inside IQM are singularized and mutually distinguished, not only
are not represented in the mathematical formalism of QMHD, but moreover, in the verbal
expressions that accompany the mathematical QMHD-representations they act without
being defined, in a lacunar and chaotic way, intermittent and uncontrolled. And so a thick
conceptual mud has banked up. The Fig. 6 is strictly valid.
(6.II).4.4.3 The Reduction Problem
Consider now again the postulated ‘reduction’ of the descriptor (19)∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, (t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A = ∑ jcj(t1) |u(r, aj)〉, ∀j, at the final moment tf .
Some authors have asserted that from a general conceptual viewpoint this ‘reduction’
does not seem unacceptable when one thinks of the general formal representation of the
calculus of probabilities: Each one realization of the involved ‘experiment’ that generates
by repetition the whole universe U = {(ej , j = 1, 2, ..., J)} of possible elementary
outcomes ej , actualizes only one outcome from U. This can be verbally indicated in a
loose way by saying that "each realization of this experiment ‘reduces’ the permanent
and a priori global potentiality U to only one elementary event ej"; why not?
Well, because in the case of the QMHD-descriptor
∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, (t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A
it remains that the ‘reduction’ of the QMHD-descriptor
∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, (t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A
is not compatible with the mathematical rules imposed by a linear formalism, whereas
in the case of general probabilistic writings such an incompatibility is not imposed 88.
One can also go a little further and suggest that it might be found to be conceptually
inadequate to express, inside one same descriptor, one actual individual outcome of an
eigenvalue aj and also the representation of the whole a priori set of potential individual
outcomes. But even beyond this, what remains mysterious is:
Why should one desire that an individual procedure of measurement performed on an
individual physical specimen of a physical entity in order to verify via repetitions of this
88Moreover, such a mathematical representation might even suggest in certain minds that it is a ‘fact’ that the
statistic itself achieves the individual experiments, so that one only has to find out what goes on factually when
this happens? Who knows? Concerning QMHD anything succeeds to seem conceivable. Think of the current
face-value way of understanding Schrödinger’s ironical cat-example, or much better, of Everett’s infinity of
parallel universes that – without any irony in this case – are asserted to be ‘really’ generated by each ‘reduction’
of a mathematical writing on a sheet of paper: In such views the mixture between formal descriptors written on
paper or screens, and physical facts, reaches not only perfection, but also greatness.
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procedure a statistical prediction concerning this entity, be itself represented statisti-
cally? Why should one want to get entangled in such a circle?
When one stops a moment to consider the conceptual situation that has been brought
into evidence, all of a sudden a summarizing explanation – in IQM -terms – leaps to one’s eyes
as a trivial obviousness:
The QMHD-descriptor (19)
∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, (t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A = ∑ jcj(t1) |u(r, aj)〉, ∀j, of
a measurement-evolution, with the ‘reductions’ that it requires, is just an aborted attempt at
crowding inside a unique mathematical and statistical descriptor :
(a) On the one hand, the representation of all89the individual, physical, actual, and
successively realized coding-measurement-evolutions [Gt.MesA] defined in (3.I).4, each one of
which ends with the individual factual, actual registration of its own result that consists of a
group {µkA}j , k = 1, 2, ..., n, of physical marks that code in terms of one eigenvalue ‘aj ’.
And on the other hand also
(b) The globalized, unique, statistical, a-temporal, abstract assertion of the QMHD-
predictive distribution {|cj(t1)|2}, ∀j of pure numbers, each one of which is the cardinal and
also the posited probability of a corresponding class of outcomes of one a priori possible result
‘aj’.
All this, crowded inside one statistical descriptor!!!
But such an extraordinary attempt certainly involves confusions, and these certainly
entail various uncontrollable consequences. One such consequence is identified below.
The second member
∑
jcj(t1) |u(r, aj)〉 from (19) is connected to the statistical expansion
(18)
∣∣ΨG,H(A)(t1)〉 /A = ∑ jcj(aj , t1) |u(r, aj)〉, ∀j, as well as to the whole QMHD-chain of
statistical descriptors, via the equality sign ‘=’ and via the statistical time-parameter t1. Let
us denote this chain as (ch):
[|ψG(r, t0)〉 − |ψG,H(r, (t1 − t0)〉 − |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A−
∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A] (ch)
It includes the QMHD-state-ket |ψG,H(r, (t1 − t0)〉 and the representation (19)∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A of coding-measurement-evolutions. The chain (ch) is a whole that
contains the essence of the QMHD representational-operational algorithms.
On the other hand, inside IQM the individual coding-measurement-evolution MesA
from every individual and repeated realization of one given coding-measurement-succession
[Gt1 .MesA] is systematically connected to a previously realized operation of generation Gt1 .
The individual time-index ‘t1’ that specifies this connection in (13”) has been denoted by us
inside IQM by the same symbol ’t1’. Of course, the choice of a symbol is not a fact, it is
purely conventional, the meaning of a symbol is determined by its definition. But precisely
this permitted and entailed our choice: The symbol ‘t1’ possesses the same definition inside
IQM and inside QMHD, namely it marks the beginning of a measurement-evolution, in (ch)
just like in (13”) [Gt1 .MesA] (with Gt1 ≡ [G0.(t1 − t0)] and also Gt1 = F (G0, EC, (t1 − t0))
where G0 ↔ (msG ≡ {σ(msG)} according to (1)). Indeed, accordingly to the extension (13”)
of the concept (1) of an operation of generation, each realization of Gt1 introduces one speci-
men σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG, i.e. a physical entity able to produce a group of
physical observable marks that, in adequate conditions, can code for a definite eigenvalue aj ;
and in its turn the operation Gt1 involves by definition the generation of a specimen σ(msG)
at a time denoted t0 6= t1 that labels the moment when has finished the operation G0 from
Gt1 – not Gt1 itself – because by constructionGt1 involves the possibility of an evolution of the
specimen σ(msG) during a time-interval (t1 − t0), before the beginning of the measurement-
evolution MesA. Just such is the case also in QMHD for the connection between the initial
state-ket |ΨG(r, t0)〉 and the measurement state-ket
∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A (the expan-
sion |ΨG,H(r, t1)〉 /A inserted in (ch) between |ΨG(r, t0)〉 and
∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A is
exclusively algorithmic, it does not point toward any physical operation). So the whole statisti-
cal chain (ch) is subtended by any one individual coding-measurement-succession [Gt1 .MesA].
But the individual IQM -concepts (1) G0 and its extension (13”) Gt1 simply do not exist
inside QMHD. These initialising individual concepts remained undone by the top-down process
89I do not say ‘any’, I deliberately say ‘all’, because of the statistical character of (19).
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of generation of QMHD. This process encountered first the problem to represent the microstates
on a statistical level of conceptualization, it dealt with this problem and produced a solution,
and then the elaboration downward stopped, only the statistical algorithms proliferated. More-
over, the fact that the state-ket |ΨG,H(t)〉 is conceived to be obtained by abstract operations
from the general solution of the Schrödinger equation of the problem by ‘giving’ its initial math-
ematical form |ΨG,H(t0)〉, renders the QMHD-representations strictly independent, formally, of
the individual IQM - concepts G0 and Gt1 . So:
Inside QMHD there is no indication whatever of where and how a physical specimen
σ(msG) of the studied microstate is generated and loaded factually inside the one indi-
vidual thread of factual coding-measurement-succession [Gt1 .MesA].
In these conditions the two concepts of a QMHD statistical chain (ch) and an individ-
ual factual coding-measurement-succession [Gt1 .MesA] are radically disconnected from one
another. But let us examine here their relation, via the following figure 7.
Fig.7. The correspondences on a meta-temporal dimension between statistical QMHD times
and IQM individual times
The formal QMHD chain (ch) concerning a given problem is placed on a level of statistical
conceptualization. Once it has been made available by mathematical means – before any factual
operations of verification of its assertions – this formal chain keeps unchanged.
Each thread of an individual, physical coding-measurement-succession [Gt1 .MesA] is
represented on an individual level of conceptualization of the microstates and is achieved in
order to contribute – by many repetitions of it – to the verification of the predictions from
(ch). Each one realization of a succession [Gt1 .MesA] runs beneath the whole statistical chain
(ch) and along it, in its own specific, factual and individual temporal universe, carrying each
time one physical specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate, from the moment t
(i)
0 when this
specimen has been factually delivered by the corresponding realization of the operation G0
from G
t
(i)
1
= F (G0, EC, (t
(i)
1 − t(i)0 )), to the final moment moment t(i)f when it triggers its own
contribution of observable marks that codes for one given eigenvalue aj . For, quite obviously :
It is the one specimen σ(msG) carried by each one individual coding-measurement-
evolution [Gt1 .MesA] that triggers upon physical devices one group of physical observ-
able marks {µkAj}j, k = 1, 2, ..., n, that can be translated into one eigenvalue aj and is
conserved for contributing later to the final estimation of the degree of factual verification
of the statistical prediction asserted by the element |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A from (ch).
But from the point of view of QMHD the presence in (ch) of the considered one specimen
σ(msG) of the studied microstate, is a Deus ex machina, since the QMHD-formalism ignores it.
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Now, it seems already obvious that one common succession of the statistical time-
parameters from (ch) and the individual time-parameters involved by a coding-measurement-
succession [G
t
(i)
1
.MesA] cannot be conceived. However one can establish certain temporal cor-
respondences between the statistical chain (ch) and any one coding-measurement-succession
[G
t
(i)
1
.MesA]. Indeed: Consider a meta-temporal dimension of comparison between (13”) and
the chain (ch). Let us denote it mtdc. Let us project upon mtdc both the statistical times and
the individual times from the Fig.4. On mtdc nothing interdicts to just posit by definition the
correspondences t(i)0 ≈def t(s)0 , t(i)1 ≈def t(s)1 , and t(i)f ≈def t(s)f . The degree of arbitrary that
marks these correspondences is not uniform. QMHD does contain the non-formalized, the only
spoken concepts of ‘the time when a measurement begins’ and ‘the time when the measurement
finishes’ of which the statistical or individual status is left unspecified. But the concept of ‘the
time when the involved specimen of the studied microstate begins to exist’ is not even only
verbally contained by QMHD. So in the correspondence denoted in the Fig.4 by t
(i)
0 ≈def t(s)0
the second time involved, t(s)0 , is entirely absent in QMHD. So the denotation ‘t
(s)
0 ’ – insofar
as it stems from the statistical chain (ch) – is a purely conventional insertion with respect to
QMHD, its significance in connection with the operation of generation (1) G (renoted ‘G0’ in
(13”)) stems exclusively from IQM.
Nevertheless onmtdc, in the conventional sense specified above, it has been finally possible
to achieve one common meta-succession of the statistical times and the individual times from
the Fig.4. This will now permit to genuinely understand the source of the ‘reduction problem.
The operational-conceptual process exposed in IQM by which a statistical representation
of the studied microstate emerges by repeated realizations of a very long sequence of repeti-
tions of factual successions [Gt1 .MesA] is such that the individual physical content from one
realization of the succession [Gt1 .MesA] is entirely eliminated as soon as its own input in the
statistical representation (ch) is achieved and inscribed: Thereby it has been transformed in just
a humble contribution of one unity to the emerging so the changing ‘verification-cardinal’, say
ver. |cj(t1)|2 of the stable cardinal |cj(t1)|2 asserted in the element |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A from (ch)
for the class of outcomes of the given eigenvalue aj of A. If at the end of a sequence of a very
big number N of repetitions of a succession [Gt1 .MesA], all the final ‘verification-cardinals’
ver. |cj(t1)|2– with any j – are sufficiently equal to those from the element
∣∣∣ψG,H(r, t(s)1 )〉 /A
from (ch), then the verification of the QMHD prediction concerning A has succeeded. But this
can happen only long after the individual and repeated times t(i)0 , t
(i)
1 and t
(i)
f . It is clear that
these individual times are all essentially disconnected from the statistical times t(s)0 , t
(s)
1 and
t
(s)
f , respectively.
But when – in the botched statistical representation of these various individual and sta-
tistical times that, all, are implicitly involved by the QMHD representation of the quantum
measurements – the last momentt(s)f is finally reached and an individual outcome aj is explic-
itly asserted, this, I dare think, brings forth in the minds at least a vague and mixed conceptual
uneasiness; possibly a weak disagreement concerning the in-distinction between statistical fea-
tures and individual ones; and, may be, a glimmer of wonder on where some representation of
an agent of interaction with the apparatus has entered the formalism; a wonder associated with
some resurgence of the entirely forgotten common-sense necessity of some individual material
entity able to bring into physical being the asserted observable effects. And so, to face at least
this last necessity when exclusively a purely statistical formalism was available, the ‘reduction’
of the measurement-ket
∣∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t(s)1 ≤ t ≤ t(s)f )〉 /A has been postulated.
Which then has been felt to be scandalous from a mathematical point of view !!!!
While the physical point of view seems to have never been declaredly required, nor
a conceptual one, notwithstanding that this whole saga happens inside a theory of physical
entities.
So a fortiori no physical-and-conceptual explanation has been identified.
That is how the general mixture between vague and lacunar individual concepts and
statistical mathematical representations that flaws the whole QMHD-formalism, finally came
to an outburst in the last link from (ch); because there – inside one same descriptor – while
the time-parameters t(s)1 and t
(s)
f do possess a verbal significance that focuses attention upon
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meanings, furthermore, the formal representation has to be dashed explicitly onto the individual
level in order to generate some minimal intelligibility. And this has been done by a verbal diktat
that violates the rules of the utilized mathematical language, which consensually is sacrilege.
From a purely conceptual viewpoint all this brings forth strikingly that:
A unique absolute well ordered temporal succession of time parameters some of which
characterize a statistic to be verified, and others characterize individual measurement-
evolutions tied with this purposes, is an impossible concept90.
The ‘reduction’ problem, when it is transposed in conceptual terms, brings into full light
this gross, utterly trivial fact that at the public time when one given individual succession
[Gt.MesA] in the sense of IQM is repeated for verifying a statistic, that statistic has already
been entirely established before both mathematically and factually, while in order to verify it
one has to construct another statistic that is not yet there, and to construct it factually. So
conceiving in an ordered succession, on one same temporal dimension (regarded as an effective
temporal dimension, not an only imagined meta-dimension), time parameters that label a repre-
sentation of physical individual entities and operations, and time parameters that label merely
abstract predictive numbers that qualify these entities and operations in statistical-probabilistic
terms, is just non-sense.
On the basis of the preceding examination we refuse, not only von Neumann’s repre-
sentation of quantum measurements, but also the essence itself of the QMHD-representation of
quantum-measurements.
(6.II).4.5 Conclusion on (6.II).4
The analyses from (6.II).4 entail that:
QMHD is devoid of an acceptable representation of measurements.
How has it been possible for such a situation to establish itself in the most fundamental
among the nowadays theories of physical domains of reality? How has it been possible that so
well known and trivial considerations as those brought forth above, have stayed inactive such a
very long time? Only history can offer an explanation. This explanation has been already stated
and even repeated many times. It lies in the fact that the representation of quantum measure-
ments is likely to have emerged under the pressure of the fact that the QMHD-formalism, such
as it has been formulated in its first phase by a purely mathematical top-down approach, of-
fered mathematically pre-organized boxes for lodging in them exclusively what seemed useful
for prediction. The content in terms of individual physical operations repeated upon individual
physical entities, though it is by definition involved by the concept of a ‘statistic’, remained
entirely non-described by this purely mathematical top-down construction of the predictive
statistics from QMHD. So the question of the physical individual constructability of the predic-
tive statistics from QMHD did not even arise. Correlatively, the very distinction between the
concept of a predictive statistic of abstract numbers, and its individual, physical genesis, that
is involved by definition, faded out in the minds: these two fundamentally different concepts –
one with a conceptual status of ‘cause’ and the other one with a conceptual status of ‘effect’
tended to identify on a fictitious common statistical level of conceptualization.
While on the other hand the factual verification of a predictive statistic consists necessar-
ily of individual physical operations repeated upon individual physical entities, by definition. So
subsequently, the void of a bottom-up organization of also the individual level of representation
of the microstates confined the expressivity – and the thought – on exclusively the statistical
level, the first one that had been encountered in the historical development of the quantum
theory (and mainly for bound microstates). The minds remained imprisoned in a statistical
conceptual fortress that floated on a morass of vague and chaotic individual concepts; as it
still does nowadays. There was no organized individual conceptual level of conceptualization on
which to leap down and break free. What was lying deeper than the constructed statistics was
not visible in the undone beneath them.
90As soon as it is stated this seems trivial; but in fact it certainly is not for if it were the reduction problem
would not have subsisted.
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IQM with its bottom-up approach that starts from local zeros of knowledge and generates
intelligibility while it constructs representations, was not even conceivable at that initial time.
This, probably, was why de Broglie’s physical and individual concept of a corpuscular-like wave
has been hauled upside into the emergent statistical formalism, disguised in two ill-understood
mathematical concepts, the concept of eigenstate of an observable, and the concept of a physical
wave-function; that in its turn – under the protection of the void of any conceptual control –
immediately moved, first into the statistical descriptor called a wave-packet, and then into the
still more abstract concept of a state-ket.
It seems likely that this chaotic genesis has contributed to the reasons why the individual
features that irrepressibly impose themselves to the minds when one deals with measurements,
have been stuffed together with statistical features into the one common statistical descriptor∣∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t(s)1 ≤ t ≤ t(s)f )〉 /A devoid of inner semantic consistency: This however offered at
least a way of speaking. And so, in spite of all the confusions and inadequacies that somehow
– from the very start – must have acted in the minds as a resistance, the incoherent descriptor
(19) continues to be taught up to this very day, even though it has been criticized so persistently
and so variously 91. Think of Schrödinger’s cat that has been written in order to criticize the
emerging representation of quantum measurements and nevertheless it entered the minds as an
illustration of the strange behaviour of the microstates.
On the other hand the mathematical formalism of QMHD itself, precisely by the reduction
problem, rejects the in-distinction between an individual level of conceptualization and the
statistical one. It is perceived irrepressibly that both these levels are involved, that they are
distinct and that this should be expressed formally in some well-constructed way.
Notwithstanding the situation brought forth above, QMHD has worked and it continues
to work. This theory has achieved remarkable successes and it still could achieve other successes
even if it is left just such as it now stands. Indeed the curious omnipresent genius of human
mind invents local and individual more or less implicit understandings that permit to act
adequately there and when one actually does want to act. General methods for thinking well
are massively left to the theorists. And it seems that for the experimenters it suffices to believe
that a quantum theory of measurements exists in order to measure adequately and to make
progress. This teaches humility to those who try to construct theories. This also proves that a
fully satisfactory theory of quantum measurements is possible since no doubt it is quite often
‘applied’ without being known.
So, practically, there is no urgency.
But conceptually there is urgency. Indeed, what value of principle – as a theory – does a
representation of non-perceptible microstates possess, if it predicts via purely mathematically
constructed predictions and does not state in a clear and generally valid way how to conceive-
and-perform measurements for verifying the predictions?
91Somebody has asserted that "only a new construction can ruin a previously installed construction".
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CONCLUSION ON THE PART II
We have first identified in 5.II the void, inside QMHD of an individual conceptualization of the
microstates, which has led to a first clear perception of the concept of (top-down)(bottom-up)
collision between the approach from QMHD and the approach from IQM.
Then, inside 6.II we have brought forth that an eigenket |u( r ,aj,)> of a quantum me-
chanical observable A has the meaning of a definite mathematically expressed model of wave-
movement around the singularity in the amplitude of de Broglie’s general corpuscular-wave
model of a microstate; namely, a wave-movement that keeps constant the corresponding eigen-
value aj while the singularity "glides inside its wave". This has triggered a succession of con-
structive steps that, inside [IQM−QMHD], have led to the definition of a new ‘G-corpuscular-
wave model’ of a microstate denoted msG,cw and has been associated to a modelling postulate
MP (msG,cw); these concepts translate de Broglie’s general model of an individual specimen of a
microstate – an ideal model – in operational terms that permit to incorporate it to the physically
operational and consensual approach that we try to develop here. Correlatively, the mentioned
incorporation transforms the initial, purely methodological relation (1) G↔ (msG = {σ(msG)}
between an operation G of generation and a corresponding microstate msG, into a new relation
(1’) that qualifies the inner structure assigned to the IQM -concept ‘msG’. Thereby the provi-
sional framework [IQM − QMHD] has been thoroughly connected with the de Broglie model
of a microstate in an operational and inter-subjective way.
We have then brought into evidence the general power of clarification entailed by a
systematic specification of the existence – or not – of a connection between a ket from a
mathematical QMHD-expression, with a physical operation of generation G of a microstate,
and a fortiori with the character of this operation of generation (simple or composed). This led
to a useful new notation of the various sorts of ket.
Finally we have examined the quantum theory of measurements from QMHD. We have
refused von Neumann’s representation; we have identified the coding rule that is implicitly
assumed inside QMHD and we have explicated that it is likely to be devoid of a general validity.
Then we have examined the essence itself of the QMHD-representation of quantum mea-
surements and we have brought into evidence that – and why – it is not acceptable.
Thereby the preliminary global critical examination of QMHD by reference to IQM has
come to its end. We can now enter upon an attempt at constructing a second quantum me-
chanics.
PART III
THE PRINCIPLES OF
A SECOND QUANTUM MECHANICS
Rooted Operationally
into the Microphysical Factuality
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“It would seem that we have followed as far as possible the path of logical devel-
opment of the ideas of quantum mechanics as they are at present understood. The
difficulties, being of a profound character, can be removed only by some drastic
change in the foundations of the theory, probably a change as drastic as the pas-
sage from Bohr’s orbit theory to the present quantum mechanics.”
P.A.M. Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics, Oxford at the Clarendon
Press, 4th edition 1958 (1st edition 1930).
The third part of this work is resolutely constructive. On the new basis offered by the
clarifications, the improvements and the purges from Part II we shall now delineate the essential
features – only these – of a mathematical Hilbert-Dirac representation of the quantum predic-
tions and of the verification of these. The utilized approach is operationally rooted directly into
the physical factuality and therefrom it is constructed bottom-up.
The framework The whole representation is rigorously inserted in IQM that – accordingly
to the aim for which it has been constructed in the Part I – acts as a structure of insertion and
reference.
The framework [IQM − QMHD] that has been introduced in the chapter (6.II).2 by
simply juxtaposing IQM and QMHD is conserved. The conjugate use of both these structures
has initiated already in 6.II the emergence of a common language and system of notations that
manifest the growth of a new whole. This growth will continue throughout the Part III. And so
at the end of the Part III the framework [IQM −QMHD] will have ceased to have the nature
of a scaffold. It will have been organically incorporated to the conceptual substance of a second
quantum mechanics, QM2.
QM2 is not conceived as a new "interpretation" of the nowadays quantum mechanics; nor
as an achieved new theory of microstates; nor as a didactic itemization of something that
already exists. It is a first outline of a fundamentally new representation of microstates
required to be general, scientific, and fully intelligible.
In the chapter 7.III we construct a new representation of the quantum-measurements.
- We first delineate inside [IQM − QMHD] the basic conditions of inner consistency between
IQM and QMHD with respect to predictions on results of measurements on microstates and
to verification of these. Thereby come forth the contours of the researched new representa-
tion of microstates where is fully compensated the radical void of an individual and factual
conceptualization of the microstates.
- Then we identify the main features of the inner structure of the researched representation.
Gleason’s theorem on a Hilbert-space representation of probabilities of any nature plays a key-
role for these inner features: it separates clearly the representational tools from the considered
semantic contents.
- Under the guidance of the mentioned general specifications, we then effectively construct
an intelligible factual-mathematical representation of quantum measurements performed on
unbound microstates with non-composed operation of generation, that do not involve quantum
fields and, consequently, exhibit certain a quasi-classical dynamical features.
But this representation is found to raise questions for the case of unbound microstates
with composed operation of generation that can involve quantum fields and therefore their
dynamic is much more deeply non-classical than that of the unbound microstates with non-
composed operation of generation. The mentioned questions lead to a Hilbert-space represen-
tation of the state-ket of unbound microstates with non-composed operation of generation that
is different from that from QMHD.
- Finally the predictive capacities of the QMHD-formalism are examined globally and critically.
Their domain of efficiency and the possibility to control their degree of rigor, are delimited and
compared with those of the factual-mathematical method of establishing and verifying quantum
predictions established in this work. Finally, via comparison and composition, a general new
representation of quantum measurements is sketched out that not only is wholly intelligible,
but furthermore purifies the unacceptable QMHD representation of measurements, deepens it,
and extends its domain of application.
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In the chapter 8.III, around the core constituted by the new representations of the quan-
tum measurements constructed in the chapter 7.III, are very succinctly sketched out the big
lines of a ‘second quantum mechanics’, QM2.
In the chapter 9.III this second quantum mechanics is briefly examined from its outside
and some general conclusions are drawn concerning the construction of scientific knowledge.
Note . Though according to the nowadays formalism the spectra are in general continuous
and infinite, in what follows we continue to indicate them by finite writings, in agreement with
the a priori general requirement of effectiveness announced in the General Introduction. If the
representation of microstates proposed here is accepted, this requirement of finite discreteness
will have to be brought to explicit coherence with all the mathematical writings, via a systematic
explicit inclusion of units of measurement in the definitions of the involved qualifying quantities
as well as via other overtly declared assumptions or representational choices.
(7.III) A FACTUALLY ROOTED
HILBERT-DIRAC REPRESENTATION OF
QUANTUM PREDICTIONS AND OF THE
VERIFICATION OF THESE
To reach the point that you do not know you must
take the way that you do not know.
San Juan de la Cruz
(7.III).1 THE SEMANTIC SELF-CONSISTENCY OF
[IQM −QMHD] AND ORGANIZATION OF A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON THE REPRESENTATION OF
QUANTUM-MEASUREMENTS92
This short chapter is entirely devoted to the inner consistency of what has been constructed
before and what we want to construct from here on. This, I feel, is important because inner
coherence, if it is achieved, often, via some unexplained way, in a mysterious way entails truth.
(7.III).1.1 Apparent Absence of Unity inside [IQM −QMHD] on the Statistical
Predictions and their Verification
Inside QMHD the predictions on results of quantum measurements are obtained exclusively
by mathematical operations. For didactical idealizations this is not disturbing. But when real
physical situations are considered that are not heavily restricted a priori, in general it is much
more difficult than it is announced on the roofs to work out mathematically verifiable predic-
tions (think of Schrödinger’s treatment for solving the ‘simplest’ real case of the one electron
from an atom of hydrogen). Moreover, in order to dispose of the state-ket |ψG,H(r, t)〉 of the
problem – that is the source of the whole predictive QMHD algorithm – one has to ‘give’ the
initial conditions via the initial state-ket |ψG,H(r, t0)〉, which often might be impossible without
admitting basic approximations (like the Laplace principle of an initial uniform distribution of
the probabilities of the elementary events, so of the initial distribution of ‘presence’ in space)
92Note: Though according to the nowadays QMHD-formalism the spectra are in general continuous and
infinite, in what follows we continue to represent them always by finite writings, in agreement with the general a
priori requirement of effectiveness announced in the General Introduction. When QM2 will have been outlined,
the requirement of finite discreteness will have to be brought to explicit coherence with all the mathematical
writings, via a systematic use of units of measurement in the definitions of the involved qualifying quantities as
well as via other overtly declared assumptions or representational choices.
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93, etc.). And when the acting hamiltonian cannot be considered to be stationary, or when it
simply is not known because unknown quantum fields are acting, then not even the writing of
the Schrödinger equation of the problem itself is impossible. While when this equation can be
written, nearly always the mathematical generation of a general solution involves already quite
a number of various approximations of which the factual effects cannot be imagined a priori;
so a fortiori they cannot be controlled mathematically.
So the formal constructability of the quantum mechanical predictions is far from being
insured inside [IQM −QMHD].
Furthermore in (6.II)4 it appeared that inside QMHD – if the predictions are presupposed
to have been acceptably determined in a purely mathematically way – the verification of these
predictions is not treated in a way that can be accepted from a conceptual and mathematical
point of view.
While for physical entities like microstates that cannot be directly perceived by the
human observer-conceptor, the specification of predictions and of the verification of these is
equivalent to the very possibility of a scientific representation.
As for the individual entities, concepts and operations that QMHD does quite fundamen-
tally involve, it has appeared in (5.II).2 that they are not represented formally, nor only defined
with mere current words, though in the QMHD representation of the quantum measurements
one is brought by postulation on the individual level of conceptualization when a result ‘aj’
of one act of measurement has to be taken into account, that itself is also individual by mere
postulation.
On the other hand, inside IQM the predictions are constructed only factually and then
they can be verified only by repeating the construction (cf. 3.I).5).
So when the fundamental question of prediction and verification of prediction is con-
sidered, it seems at a first view that inside the framework [IQM − QMHD] even the slightest
degree of unity between the IQM conditions and the QMHD representations is lacking. But this
is only an appearance, and a very misleading one. Just below will hatch out a deep unity that
– remarkably – has silently emerged inside [IQM −QMHD] concerning predictive probabilities
and the verification of these.
(7.III).1.2 The Conditions of Inner Semantic Self-Consistency of the
Framework [IQM −QMHD]
IQM has been constructed like a reference-and-immersion-structure for understanding any given
theory of the microstates, for estimating its adequacy, and for improving it. As such IQM has
been deliberately endowed with the maximal generality compatible with its required status.
This led to leave undefined the model of a microstate. And in consequence of the absence of
a definite model the content of a measurement operation ‘MesA’ remained equally unspecified
inside IQM, as well as the ‘external conditions’ EC from the generalized definition (13”) Gt =
F (G0, EC, (t− t0)) of an operation of generation of a specimen of the studied microstate. This
permitted throughout the Part I and the Part II of this work, to leave still undefined the
conditions of a full comparability between the semantic contents of QMHD and IQM.
But in the chapter 6.II we have realized several basic semantic elucidations and this
has changed the conceptual situation. Let us enumerate them again for self-sufficiency of the
chapter 7.III:
- In (6.II).1 we have identified the meaning of the concept of eigenket of a quantum
mechanical observable.
- In (6.II).2 we have identified the model of a microstate that works inside QMHD and
we have stressed the clarifying role, inside the QMHD writings, of the existence – or not – of
a direct connection with the involved operation of generation G of specimens of the studied
microstate.
93Imagine that one wants to study the state of an electron-microstate just after it has encountered, say, some
irregular material structure with partially crystalized or amorphous zones.
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- In (6.II).4.3 we have brought into evidence the implicit existence, inside QMHD, of a
general type (20) of concept of coding-measurement-evolution that seems to be valid indeed for
an unbound microstate without quantum fields.
- In (6.II).4.4.3 we have shown that the QMHD representation of one act of measurement,∣∣ΨG,H(A)(r, t1)〉 /A = ∑ jcj(t1) |u(r, aj)〉, ∀j, attempts to express the second factorMesA from
an IQM individual coding-measurement-succession [Gt.MesA] by use of a statistical descriptor
that occults the originating first factor Gt (cf. the Fig. 4 and the corresponding comments)
and asserts a final fall on the individual level of conceptualization that is unacceptable both
mathematically and conceptually.
In (6.II).4.4 we have reached the negative general conclusion that QMHD is devoid of
an acceptable representation of quantum measurements.
The semantic progresses listed above entail furthermore a positive conclusion that has
taken form silently and that concerns specifically the general question of prediction and verifi-
cation of results of quantum measurements. We explicate it below.
To begin with, suppose optimistically that we are in a physical situation that has
permitted to write the Schrödinger equation of the considered problem, to solve it, to
write down the initial state-ket |ΨG,H(t0)〉, and so, to identify the state-ket of the stud-
ied microstate, |ψG,H( r ,t)>, with t≥to. Consider now an expansion (18) |ΨG,H(r, t1)〉 /A =∑
jcj(aj , t1) |u(r, aj)〉, ∀j, of |ΨG,H(r, t1)〉 at a given moment t1, and the predictive probabil-
ity law (A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2, ∀j}) defined by this expansion inside QMHD. The examination from
(6.II).4.4.3 of the QMHD representation of the quantum measurements induces the following
remark:
In general the statistical prediction (A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2, ∀j}) from an expansion (18) cannot
be verified experimentally otherwise than via a very big number of repetitions of whole
individual coding-measurement-succession [Gt1 .MesA], in the sense defined in IQM.
And in order for this to be possible, inside [IQM−QMHD] the merely general structural
definitions imposed by IQM and the clarifications from 6.II have to be now completed by
specifying more in an organized way the conditions of semantic compatibility between IQM
and QMHD:
(a) We make use of the model msG,cw of a microstate, such as this model is ex-
pressed by the modelling postulate MP (msG,cw), and by (1’) G↔ msG,cw and (14) msG,cw ≡
{σ(msG,cw)}
(b) We posit that in (13”) Gt = F (G0, EC, (t−t0)) (with G0 ↔ msG0 and [G0.(t−t0)] ≡
G) the external conditions ‘EC ’ are those expressed in QMHD by the hamiltonian operator H
that in the Schrödinger equation of evolution of the problem acts abstractly upon the state-ket
|ΨG,H(t)〉, (t0 ≤ t ≤ t1) thus determining it. This permits to also write
Gt1 = F (G0, H, (t1 − t0)) (13” ’)
where ‘F ’ means ‘a functional of’ and H includes what is currently called ‘obstacles’ (walls,
barriers, wells).
(c) When inside the succession of operations [Gt1(t1− t0).MesA(tf − t1)] the actMesA
of A-coding-measurement begins at a time t1, H is replaced by a measurement-hamiltonian
H(A) that commutes with A; and then, throughout the duration (tf1 − t1) of MesA, the
measurement hamiltonian H(A) acts upon the (unknown) individual physical wave-function
Φ(r, t) = ae(i/~)ϕ(r,t) of the specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG that is involved, ac-
cordingly to the distinction introduced in (6.II).4.2.2 between a state ket and a wave-function94.
(d) The act of coding-measurement-evolution MesA from the succession [Gt1 .MesA],
and its formal representation, must be explicitly defined in a manner consistent with the mod-
elling postulateMP (msG,cw) accordingly to (a); with the type of microstate that is considered
94This condition brings forth the general ambiguity, inside QMHD, of the significance of a solution of the
Schrödinger equation, namely whether this solution points toward a physical wave-phenomenon or a statistical
descriptor. Anyhow the condition (13” ’) holds also for the indirect acts of measurement on a bound microstate
from an atomic or molecular structure where one specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate, with its physical
wave, subsists for an arbitrarily long time and meanwhile interacts from time to time for measurements with
test-particles or other devices (Zeeman or Stark effects, etc.); so that in this case H as well as H(A) act on a
physical wave, while the solution
∣∣ΨG,H(t1)〉 of the equation permits to calculate statistical predictions.
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(in the sense of the definitions from (2.I).1); with the mathematical language chosen for con-
structing the representations.
The specifications (a),(b),(c),(d) define the a priori conditions of semantic self-
consistency of the framework [IQM −QMHD]. Inside [IQM −QMHD] they apply a posteriori
to IQM also. All these specifications must be added to those made in (6.II)4.4.3 (that are
illustrated in the Fig.4 in what concerns time parameters versus level of conceptualization).
Throughout what follows the inner semantic self-consistency of [IQM −QMHD] is pre-
supposed. On this basis we shall now bring into evidence the unity, inside [IQM − QMHD],
with respect to statistical predictions on results of quantum measurements and verification of
these.
(7.III).1.3 Basic Assertions on the Prediction-Verification Unity Inside
[IQM −QMHD]
Consider the factually constructed IQM -descriptor (9) (D/A)(msGt1) ≡ {(, δ,N0) −
pi(aj , t1)}Gt1 , ∀j. We formulate the following ‘assertion’ Ass.1 supported by an ‘argument’
Arg(Ass.1)95:
Ass.1. If the IQM description (9) (D/A)(msGt1) ≡ {(, δ,N0) − pi(aj , t1)}Gt1 has
been constructed by use of coding-measurement-successions [Gt.MesA] of which the
content has been specified accordingly to the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d) of seman-
tic self-consistency of [IQM − QMHD], then the statistical predictive QMHD-law
(A, {|cj(aj , t1)2, ∀j}) defined by the expansion (18) can be found to be verified experi-
mentally only if it identifies in content – inside the limits permitted by the parameters
(, δ,N0) – with the statistical assertions of which the factual description (9) consists.
Arg(Ass.1)
Obvious: Since inside IQM the description (D/A)(msGt1) is constructed factually, in
order to verify this description, inside IQM one is obliged to just repeat its construction. No
other way is conceivable there. This means that the experimental verification of (D/A)(msGt1 )
is certain a priori, by construction 96. So if a very big number of repetitions of the succession of
operations [Gt1 .MesA] accomplished for verifying the QMHD prediction (A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2}), ∀j
are realized in the same way – permitted by the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d) – as the successions
of operations [Gt1 .MesA] by which the IQM description (D/A)(msGt1 ) has been constructed,
then these successions of operations effectively reconstruct (D/A)(msGt1 ) while they verify
(A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2 , ∀j}). 
In other words, the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d) of semantic self-consistency of [IQM −
QMHD] entail the following unifying identifications:
- Under the constraint of these conditions the predictive content of the IQM description (9)
(D/A)(msGt1) ≡ {(, δ,N0) − pi(aj , t1)}Gt1 , ∀t1, ∀j, – a ‘factual probability law’ – identi-
fies with the predictive content denoted {A, |cj(aj , t1)|2,∀j} of the QMHD expansion (18)
|ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A}; only the notations differ.
- Under the constraint of these conditions the IQM ‘complete’ description (9”) DM (msG) ≡
{[(, δ,N0) − pit1(G, aj)}, (Mpic(G))XY ],∀A,∀AB}, ∀j has the same predictive content as
the QMHD representation (22) |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 ≈pred.{|ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A}, ∀A,∀t1 of the state-ket
|ψG,H(t1)〉.
At a first sight it might seem that the pair (Ass.1, Arg(Ass.1)) expresses a circularity
or at least a triviality. But in fact this is not at all the case because the identifications stated
above under the sole constraint of the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d), stem from the specification, in
rigorously defined and structured terms, of the factual-operational source – on the individual
level of conceptualization – of the statistical-probabilistic and mathematical, purely numerical
95Throughout what follows we speak in terms of ‘assertions’ and ‘arguments’ because we are not yet inside a
formally closed structure where can be given ‘proofs’ in the strict sense.
96In so far, of course, that (D/A)(msGt1 ) has been considered to have been accomplished only when a
convenient choice in (9) of the set of parameters (, δ,N0) has stabilized the quasi-identical recurrence of
(D/A)(msGt1 ) when one reconstructs it inside the correspondingly admitted fluctuations.
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contents of the two basic QMHD descriptors |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 and {|ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A}. So the en-
larged and common framework [IQM−QMHD] that acts in the pair (Ass.1, Arg(Ass.1)) offers
there quite non-trivial ‘vertical’ specifications that inside QMHD alone are entirely lacking (cf.
Fig.4 and the comments). Via the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d) this pair knits together the physical,
factual genesis of a QMHD predictive statistical law (A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2,∀j}), with this law itself,
so with the Hilbert-Dirac mathematical formalism. Thereby any mathematical law appears now
as the result of thoroughly defined and structured individual physical operations 97.
Inside the common framework [IQM −QMHD] the pair (Ass.1, Arg(Ass.1)) fills entirely
the void of formalized organization of the individual-factual level of conceptualization that
flaws QMHD (Fig.6) and it does this by specifying the contents of the conceptual places de-
liberately left void inside IQM – model of a ‘microstate’, ‘coding-measurement-successions’
– that offer from now on a defined way to control any QMHD predictive statistical law
(A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2, ∀j}). The force and fertility of this pair will appear below. It is a first massive
manifestation of the process of fusion of IQM and QMHD.
(7.III).1.4 An Immediate Consequence of the Assertion Ass.1: Possibility of
Principle to Circumvent the Schrödinger Equation or Complete its Performance
As soon as the assertion Ass.1 is really understood it immediately points further toward a
very remarkable possibility: The QMHD-predictive mathematical representations should be,
not only verifiable by a long set of repetition of coding-measurement-successions [Gt.MesA]
that are specified accordingly to the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d), but also constructible in this
same way.
Indeed, since the results that are obtained by a long set of repetitions of coding-
measurement-successions [Gt.MesA] realized accordingly to the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d),
do verify the prediction (A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2, ∀j}) entailed by the QMHD expansion (18)
|ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A =
∑
jcj(aj , t1) |u(r, aj)〉 only if they re-construct its predictive content, these
results also construct the content of (18) exactly in so far that it is factually true. So:
Whenever this is convenient, it should be possible to circumvent the use of the Schrödinger
equation of evolution for generating the state-ket of the studied microstate.
The problem to be solved for attaining this purpose is purely representational. Namely
one has to find the means – inside [IQM − QMHD] – to express the content of (18) in the
same mathematical form of Hilbert-space expression as in (18), in order to conserve access to
Hilbert-space calculi, like inside QMHD. The solution might consist of just dropping the results
of a long set of factually realized repetitions of a coding-measurement-successions [Gt.MesA],
into the pre-imposed Hilbert-Dirac mathematical form of a corresponding expansion (18). In-
deed the Schrödinger equation of evolution itself is not a necessary element of a Hilbert-Dirac
representation of the predictions on results of quantum measurements. And a factual generation
of a Hilbert-space representation of these predictions would simply suppress all the restrictions
of a purely mathematical nature that the Schrödinger equation carries with it and imposes not
only upon the very possibility to obtain these predictions directly by calculus, but also upon
the contents of the predictions, in consequence of often necessary idealizing approximations. So
if a factual generation of (18) were realizable, this would be entirely free (18) of any purely
syntactical restriction that does not concern specifically the physical and conceptual nature of
the knowledge that is researched: this knowledge would be obtained just as free of restrictions
as it is inside IQM.
On the other hand, once the predictions have been factually generated for a given time-
value t1 and expressed in the mathematical form of an expansion (18) of a state-ket this, in
particular, would permit to establish factually also the initial state-ket of the problem, when
it has been possible to write down the Schrödinger equation of the problem; so this equation
could be used exclusively for calculating by its use the predictions for subsequent times. Which
97Inside IQM the statistical writings (10) (D/A)(G,msG,A) and DMec(G,msG, VMec) stress precisely the
organic unity, in the case of microstates, between the statistical predictive knowledge that, once established, can
be considered and made use of separately, and on the other hand the conceptual-physical-operational genesis of
this knowledge – respectively (G,msG,A) and (G,msG, VMec) – via repeated actions of the human observer-
conceptor, wherefrom the intelligibility stems. But there this is done in only general and qualitative terms.
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would simplify the mathematical tasks, extend the domain of effective utility of the Schrödinger
equation, and clean the results of any effect of approximations.
So all of a sudden the two distinct representations IQM and QMHD, far from being
unrelated inside [IQM −QMHD] concerning prediction and verification, quite on the contrary
appear now to be soldered to one another in this respect, under a vast new horizon.
(7.III).1.5 Requirement of a Normal Relation Between a Predictive Statistics
and the Individual Measurements that Verify it
In (6.II).4.4 we have analysed why and how the reduction problem has emerged, and it appeared
that the main cause has been the absence, inside QMHD, of an organized level of individual
conceptualization where to lodge the representations of individual physical entities and opera-
tions. But inside [IQM −QMHD] the infra-quantum mechanics offers now an organized level of
individual conceptualization; and moreover it specifies the whole essence of the connection be-
tween the individual level of conceptualization, and the statistical level. So nothing withstands
any more an adequate, a ‘normal’ relation between a predictive statistics and the measurements
that verify the predictive statistic. Of course, to specify such a normal relation more than it
is already very well known, can only consist of sheer triviality from A to Z. But given the
so astonishingly long-lasting reduction-problem it seems necessary to nevertheless state these
trivialities explicitly.
- We require that any statistical prediction on results of measurements on microstates be
available before the verification-measurements begin. We state this common-sense requirement
no matter how the predictive statistic has been constructed – mathematically or factually –
and how it is expressed – as (A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2, ∀j}), or as a description (9) (D/A)(msGt1) ≡
{(, δ,N0)− pi(aj , t1)}Gt1 .
If the statistical-probabilistic prediction is constructed factually as in the case of (9)
(D/A)(msGt1) ≡ {(, δ,N0) − pi(aj , t1)}Gt1 the formulated requirement means that before
any action of verification begins, a sequence of many repetitions of an individual coding-
measurement-succession [Gt1 .MesA] that is not itself expressed statistically, has been repeated
by adjusting the parameters (, δ,N0) from (9) until the result exhibits the desired degree of
stability of the normed cardinals of the various classes of registered results aj (the pi(aj , t1),
∀j), inside the limits determined by the acting parameters (, δ,N0); the involved predictive
statistic is available only once this has been done98. Now:
- A factually constructed predictive statistical-probabilistic prediction (9) is verified by
its re-construction (IQM and Ass.1 ).
- An only calculated mathematically expressed statistical-probabilistic prediction
(A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2, ∀j}) is verified iff the stable factually generated (, δ,N0)-probabilistic
distribution obtained as required in IQM for (9) and accordingly to the conditions of
compatibility (a),(b),(c),(d) from (7.III).1.2 – is (, δ,N0)-identical to the prediction
(A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2, ∀j})99.
Inside [IQM −QMHD] it is possible to represent graphically the prediction-verification
relation in the same way as the Fig.4, but with a modified meaning for the last link from the
statistical level:
On the statistical level of conceptualization is placed the whole abstract statistical
QMHD-chain (expressed in Hilbert-space terms but generated either mathematically of fac-
tually)
[|ψG(t0)〉 − |ψG,H(t1 − t0)〉 − |ψG,H(t1)〉 /A−
∣∣ψG,H(A)(r, t1 ≤ t ≤ tf )〉 /A] (ch’)
where the time-parameters are all purely statistical (the element |ψG,H(t1)〉 /A indicates an
only algorithmic a-temporal link, like on the Figure 4). As for the last link, it represents now
exclusively a new phase of evolution of the statistical state-ket |ψG,H(t1 − t0)〉, accomplished
98In the top-down approach from QMHD this constructive phase is absorbed in the abstract construction of
the state-ket via calculus, i.e. in the construction of the Schrödinger equation of the problem, of its solution,
and of the determination of the initial state-ket |ΨG,H(A)(r, to >.
99No doubt that any experimentalist conceives and works precisely in this common-sense way.
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during the new time-interval (tf − t1) by a measurement-hamiltonian H(A) that in general is
different from H .
While on the individual level of conceptualization – during an individual time-interval
(tf − t0) correlated with the statistical times on a meta-time-level-of comparison, like in
the Fig.4 – each one individual coding-measurement succession re-written more explicitly as
[Gt1 .MesA] → aj , creates, beneath the stable formal statistical chain (ch’), one whole thread
of operational evolution that begins with an operation of generation (13”) and is closed by the
registration of its own result aj .
In this way no mixture is made between individual time parameters and statistical
time parameters: When the individual successions [Gt1 .MesA] → aj are repeatedly per-
formed the expression of the expansion |ψG,H(t1)〉 /A and of the corresponding predictive law
(A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2, ∀j}) are already just history, just a pre-constructed reference that waits to be
made use of later 100. And when finally – a posteriori – the verifying confrontation has to be
done globally, nothing withstands it any more because at that time the mathematically (or fac-
tually) established statistical-probabilistic prediction (A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2, ∀j}) and the factually
constructed verifying statistical-probabilistic distribution (9) of the results aj of the repeated
coding measuring successions ([Gt1 .MesA]→ aj), are conceptually homogeneous.
No scandalous reduction is necessary any more. Everything is plainly ‘normal’, and is
intelligible.
(7.III).1.6 Global Formulation of the Purpose Formed in (7.III).1
In consequence of the inclusion of the general reference-and-embedding structure IQM, the
framework [IQM − QMHD], such as it has been specified in (7.III).1, offers the possibility of
a radically bottom-up conceptualization of the microstates. Such an approach, while it gener-
ates representation generates also the corresponding intelligibility. The imprisonment into an
exclusively top-down approach that initially permits only a directly mathematical definition
of the statistical-probabilistic predictions is overcome. The preliminary results obtained above
suggest that finally it should be possible to construct a very monolithic and intelligible new
Hilbert-space representation of the microstates. A representation where the expansion (18)
|ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A, ∀A, can be determined factually for any time t1; so – in particular – also for
the initial time t0: |ψG,H(r, t0)〉 /A.
When the Schrödinger equation of the problem can be written, this would permit to
instil in it initial data that carry certain factual truth precisely because they consist of factual
data instead of a mathematical representation of factual data; while for any time t1 > t0 the
equation would continue to be very useful for calculating the expansion (18) that is entailed by
the factually constructed initial expansion, which would be economical.
Moreover the equation would also be useful in a new way, namely as a generator of
elements of reference or comparison.
While when the Schrödinger equation of the problem cannot be written or when it is
difficult to be solved, the factual generation of the needed expansions (18) for any time could
suffice for coming in possession of predictive and verifiable knowledge.
In this sense, a factual-mathematical duplication-and-extension of the core (22) of the
QMHD prediction-verification algorithm would emerge, freed from any a priori restriction of
possibility or of strict factual adequacy entailed by purely mathematical constraints. The lim-
itations that stem from the nowadays use of the Schrödinger equation as the unique possible
source of knowledge on microstates, would dissolve. Only the conceptual-semantic restrictions
from IQM would remain active. But such restrictions are knowledge themselves. (7.III).1.6.
Our further purpose is to achieve this.
100It is not any more an on-going process, like in (19), that, while it is statistical i.e. abstract and carries in it
also all the seeds ‘cj(t1)’ of the statistical predictive law (A, {|cj(aj , t1)|2, ∀j}), nevertheless is also posited to
generate actual verifying individual and physical data (as it is supposed in (19).
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(7.III).2 CONSTRUCTION OF A FACTUAL-MATHEMATICAL
[IQM −QMHD] REPRESENTATION OF THE UNBOUND
MICROSTATES
Initially in Dirac’s Hilbert-space reformulation of the wave-mechanics the
projections(Pr.j |ψG) = c(aj , t1) of the state-ket |ψG(r, t1)〉 of the studied microstate on
a basis defined in its Hilbert space were considered as just one among the descriptive
elements involved by construction in the concept of a Hilbert-space. But since 1954 Gleason’s
theorem has introduced a fundamental and general connection between these projections
Pr.j |ψG = cj(aj , t1) and the general concept of probability.
(7.III).2.1 Gleason’s Theorem
We quote Gleason’s formulation:
« Let µ be a measure on the closed subspaces of a separable (real or complex) Hilbert-
space H dimension at least three. There exists a positive semi-definite operator T
of the trace class such that for all closed sub-spaces A of H
µ(A) = trace(TPA)
where PA is the orthogonal projection of H onto A. »
This formulation includes the case of probability measures and it applies to both ‘pure
states’ involving only one definite state-ket and to mixtures of pure states. Here we consider
only probability measures ‘pi’ and pure states with state-ket |ψG〉. So in our context Gleason’s
theorem Gt. becomes.
Gt. Suppose that the Hilbert space H associated to the studied microstate possesses a
dimension of at least 3. Let {|uj(r, aj)〉}, ∀j, be the basis in H defined by the observable
A and let us denote by {(ψG, aj)}, ∀j, the set of events each one of which consists
of the registration of an eigenvalue aj of A as result of a measurement of A on a
specimen σ(msG,cw) of a microstate msG that is represented by the state-ket |ψG〉. For
any probability law {pi(ψG, aj)}, ∀j
pi(ψG, aj) ≡Gt |Pr.j |ψG〉|2 = |c(aj)|2 , ∀j (23)
where pi(ψG, aj) is just a more explicit re-notation of ‘pi(aj)’ and Pr.j |ψG〉 is the projec-
tion c(aj) of |ψG〉 on the eigenket |uj〉 from {|uj(r, aj)〉} (the symbol ‘≡Gt’ is to be read
‘identical according to Gleason’s theorem’).
The identity (23) can be understood as a translation from the language of the general
theory of probabilities into the language of Hilbert-space representations of the microstates101.
This is important. Indeed:
Gt does not require |ψG〉 to have been determined by use of the Schrödinger equation of
the problem.
Then suppose that it is possible to associate to the set of eigenvalues {aj} of A, a factual
(, δ,N0) probability law {pi(aj , t1)}Gt1 . This law can be asserted on the one-dimensional closed
sub-spaces from the basis{|uj(r, aj)〉} of A; while a corresponding expansion with respect to A
of a state-ket
∣∣ψGt1 〉 is constructed, where the expansion coefficients c(aj) satisfy the equality
|c(aj , t1)|2 = pi(aj , t1) and involve conveniently determined imaginary factors. In this way the
factual (, δ,N0) probability law {pi(aj , t1)} acquires a Hilbert-space representation for which
(23) holds 102.
101Pitowsky (2008) has drawn this essence in connection with ‘quantum logic’. He also asserts that for him
"Hilbert spaces are a new theory of probabilities". For the present author the probability trees of a transferred
description in the sense of IQM are a new theory of probabilities, probabilities of facts, not of mathematical
elements.
102What about Born’s postulate? Gleason’s theorem asserts the same mathematical form as Born’s probability
postulate pi(ψG, aj) = [|Pr.j | |ψG〉|2 ≡ c2j ] (cf. (5.II).1)). However there is no conceptual identity between
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(7.III).2.2 Factual-formal Construction for Microstates ms(unbound, 1)g(n−c) of
a Hilbert-Space Representation
The condition of semantic consistency (d) from (7.III).1.2 requires to specify consistently the
concept MesA of coding-measurement-evolution to be posited inside [IQM − QMHD] for the
considered sort of microstate, in the sense of the definitions from (2.I).1. We can already achieve
this for the basic case of measurements on unbound microstates with non-composed operation
of generation. The case of the other types of microstates will be considered later.
The analyses from (7.III).1 have suggested that the sort of measurement-evolution that
is presupposed inside QMHD by the BBGPM approach can – in coherence with the Hilbert-
Dirac representation – be conceived to perform implicitly a coding-measurement-evolution of the
general form (20). But it also has appeared there that the mentioned supposition has a restricted
validity, in this sense that it can be ‘understood’ only in the absence of quantum fields. (Why
this is so will appear later). So – founded upon the analysis of the method ‘time-of-flight’ for
measuring the basic momentum observable and by reference also to the Stern-Gerlach procedure
for spin- measurements – we have admitted the efficiency of the coding-measurement-evolution
(20) in the absence of quantum fields, so for free microstates with non-composed operation
of generation. Such microstates will be denoted ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c). For these we postulate
below explicitly and in strict [IQM −QMHD]-terms, the coding-measurement-evolution of the
general type (20) required by the condition (d) of inner consistency that is compatible with the
other conditions, (a),(b),(c).
(7.III).2.2.1 The Coding-Postulate for Unbound Microstates Generation ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c)
with Non-Composed Operation of Generation
In IQM it has been much stressed that inside a theory of microstates each act of measurement
must incorporate an effectively realizable coding-procedure founded on the characteristics of:
• A definite general model of a microstate.
• The particular sort of microstate that is considered.
• The measured quantity.
In (6.II).1 it has been found that inside QMHD works implicitly de Broglie’s general
‘corpuscular-wave’ model. In (6.II).2, via the modelling postulate MP (msG,cw), this gen-
eral model has been brought to consistency with the general IQM concept (1) of an opera-
tion of generation G of a specimen σ(msGt) of the studied microstate. So here the coding-
measurement-evolution admitted in [IQM − QMHD] for the particular sort of microstate
denoted ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c), will have to be specified in consistency with the modelling
MP (msG,cw) and with the observable A to be measured; and furthermore it must obey all the
conditions of semantic consistency formulated in (7.III).1.2.
Consider a coding-measurement-succession [Gt1 .MesA].
According to the conditions of semantic consistency we have that in (13”) [G0.(t− t0)] ≡
Gt, with [Gt = F (G0, EC, (t − t0)), G0 ↔ msG0 , and the external conditions ‘EC ’ during
(t1 − t0) are those expressed in QMHD by the hamiltonian operator H from the Schrödinger
equation of the problem. So Gt1 has to be written as (13” ’) Gt1 = F (G0, H, (t1 − t0)) where ‘F
’means ‘a functional of’.
According to the modelling postulate MP (msG,cw) the operation Gt1 introduces via
G ≡ G0 a specimen σ(msG0) of the initial state of the studied micro-state msGt1 that is
represented by an unknown physical individual wave-function ΦG,cw(r, t) = a(r, t)e(i/~)β(r,t)
(in short Φ(r, t), cf.(6.II).4.2.2 ). So until the moment t1 when the act MesA of measurement-
evolution begins, the evolution of σ(msG0) is represented by the action upon the individual
physical wave function Φ(r, t) = a(r, t)e(i/~)β(r,t), of the exterior fields from the hamiltonian H
that determines also the evolution of the statistical QMHD descriptor |ψG,H(t1 − t0)〉.
Gleason’s theorem and Born’s postulate. Indeed: Born’s postulate (like any postulate) involves by definition
assertions of facts (there exists a probability law {pi(ψG, aj)}; the state-ket |ψG(r, t)〉 of the studied microstate
is known; etc. While Gleason’s theorem is strictly void of any assertion of facts (it has the quite general status of
a purely logical implication ’if-then’ : if a measure µ....... then ..... Furthermore it is more general and it entails
Born’s postulate.
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In (6.II).4.3 we have admitted the BBGPM implication that a measurement hamiltonian
operator H(A) that commutes with the measured observable A – if it works on σ(msGt1 )
after t1and in the absence of quantum fields – installs for the corpuscular wave-function
Φ(r, t) = a(r, t)e(i/~)β(r,t) of σ(msGt1 ), with t ≥ t1, a structure of wave-movement represented
by an eigenket of A. While correlatively, for the corpuscular-like singularity in the amplitude
of Φ(r, t) = a(r, t)e(i/~)β(r,t) it generates a dynamic that leads it into a space-domain ∆rj (or
a space-time domain (∆r∆t)j) that is in a one-one relation with a given eigenvalue aj of A.
Which leads finally to the following [IQM −QMHD] version of a coding-postulate of the
general form (20):
P(cod)G(n−c). A coding-measurement-evolution MesA from a succession
[Gt1 .MesA] performed upon a microstate ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c), admits the general rep-
resentation:
[(Gt1 → σΦ).MesA(σΦ)] −→
H(A)
(marks registered in (∆r∆t)j > ‘aj ’) (20’)
(with σΦ an abbreviation for σ(msG) and with Gt1 ≡ [G0.(t1 − t0)] a functional
F (G0, H, (t1 − t0)).
If in particular it is supposed that the coding-measurement-evolution MesA is performed
by starting it at the time t0 when the initial operation of generation G0 finishes, then we make
use of the corresponding particular form of P(cod)G(n−c):
[(G0 → σΦ).MesA(σΦ)] −→
H(A)
(marks registered in (∆r∆t)j > ‘aj ’)103 (20”)
The postulate P(cod)G(n−c) concerns an individual specimen of the studied microstate.
Inside [IQM−QMHD] it ‘explains’ the non-analysed QMHD-postulation of ‘emer-
gence’ of an eigenvalue aj of A when A is measured.
In what follows (20’) is constantly presupposed.
(7.III).2.2.2 The Construction
We go back to he concept (22)
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t1)〉 ≈pred.{∀A,∀t1, ∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t1)〉 /A} that has been
noted to be the core of the QMHD-representation of prediction and verification. We make the
following assertion Ass.2 :
Ass.2. Inside [IQM − QMHD] and via Gleason’s theorem104 it is possible to generate
for a microstate of the type ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c) a formal-factual equivalent of the
Hilbert-Dirac expression (22) that: (a) is independent of the Schrödinger equation of
the problem; and (b) constitutes an extension of the semantic contents of (22) that, by
construction, offers for any observable A and any factual situation, predictive probability
laws that are a priori certainly true inside the limits of a chosen and arbitrarily small
(, δ,N0) imprecision (in the sense of the IQM -description (9”).
Arg(Ass.2)
Consider the state-ket |ψG1,H(r, t)〉 of a microstate msGt1 of the type
ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c).
- The assertion Ass.1 and the corresponding argument have established that, if the prob-
abilistic predictions (in the sense defined in (3.I).1) of any given QMHD-state-ket |ψGt,H(r, t)〉
were available and were verified by the repeated realization of coding-measurement-successions
[Gt.MesA], ∀A, ∀t that satisfy the conditions of inner consistency (a),(b),(c),(d) defined in
(7.III).1.2, then these predictions would necessarily be those that are realized in, and predicted
by the (, δ,N0)-probability law from the description
(DM (msG))t ≡ [(, δ,N0)− {pi(Gt, aj)}, (Mpic(Gt))AB ], ∀A, ∀AB, ∀j, ∀t (9”)
that is constructed factually inside IQM by use of the same set of coding-measurement-
successions.
104We stress that the use of Born’s postulate would have strictly the same effects.
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- So, in so far that the state-ket
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉 can be made available, Gt and the Ass.1
entail that – with (, δ,N0) imprecision – we must have the identity:
|cj(aj , t)|2 ≡G,Ass.1,(,δ,N0) pi(Gt, aj),∀j, ∀A, ∀t (23)
where: |cj(aj , t)|2 is the Gleason predictive probability of the outcome aj according to the
QMHD expansion
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉 /A of ψGt,H(r, t); pi(Gt, aj) is the probability of aj according
to the factually constructed IQM description (9”); the symbol ‘≡G,Ass.1,(,δ,N0)’ is to be read
‘(, δ,N0)-identical according to Gleason’s theorem and Ass.1 ’.
On the basis of (23) we shall now construct inside [IQM − QMHD] a Hilbert-vector
representation of the QMHD-form
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉 /A for the IQM -description (9”) (DM (msG))t,
via the following factual -formal procedure:
1. First we construct factually for the studied microstate msGt1 , the probabilities
(, δ,N0) − {pi(Gt, aj)}, ∀A, ∀t, from (9”), accordingly to IQM and by use of (13”) and of
coding-measurement-successions [Gt.MesA] that obey the postulate P(codG(n−c)) as well as
all the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d) of semantic compatibility defined in (7.III).1.2.
This exhausts the first purely factual phase of the construction.
2. Then, for a given observable A,we write down the general graphic form – just a
form, still void of any numerical specification – of the QMHD-expansion with respect to A of
the state-ket |ψGt,H(r, t1)〉 considered in (22):
|ψGt,H(r, t)〉 /A =
∑
j
eiα(A,j)cj(aj , t) |uj(r, aj)〉 , ∀j, ∀t (18)
where, deliberately, the expansion coefficients are written explicitly ascj(aj , t) =
eiα(A,j) |cj(aj , t)|. We now reproduce this void form in order to insert in it factual data and we
stress this purpose by adding ‘memento-indexes’ as follows:
|ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff /A =
∑
j
eiα(A,j) |cj(aj , t)fact.| |uj(r, aj)〉 , ∀j, ∀t (24)
where ’ff ’ is to be read ‘factual-formal’, ‘fact.’ is to be read ‘factual’. So for each coefficient of
which the numerical value has to be determined factually we have:
cj(aj , t)fact. = e
iα(A,j) |cj(aj , t)fact.| ,. ∀j, ∀t (25)
In (25) the coefficients cj(aj , t)fact. are posited to possess exclusively the general geometrical
meaning assigned to them by definition, namely that of the the projections of |ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff onto
the directions introduced in the Hilbert-space H of |ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff by the eigenket {|uj(r, aj)〉}
of A.
The expressions (24), (25) have been introduced as void molds. We will now endow them
with numerical, structural and semantic contents.
The factual probabilities pi(Gt, aj) from the IQM description (9”) have been previously
(, δ,N0)-specified by factual individual measurements. Let us now imagine that it has been
possible to write the Schrödinger equation of the problem and to solve it so that the considered
state-ket |ψGt,H(r, t)〉 and its expansion (18) are known. In this case we would have the equality
(23). On this basis, in our case we posit – by constructive definition, not as postulation of a
‘truth’ – the equality
|cj(aj , t)fact.|2 =constr,(,δ,N0) pi(Gt, aj) (26)
where the symbol ‘ =constr,(,δ,N0)’ is to be read ‘ is equal by construction and with (, δ,N0)-
precision ‘.
Let us immediately stop and note explicitly that in its semantic content the first member
from (26), |cj(aj , t)fact.|2, is quite essentially different from the first member |cj(aj , t)|2 of
(23): In (23) the QMHD-quantity from the first member pre-possesses a definite numerical
value established independently of the quantity from the second member, via calculi involving
the hypothesized Schrödinger equation of the problem; and according to Gleason’s theorem this
pre-defined value possess the nature of a predictive probability, i.e. though this value is not yet
verified, it is already determined and is asserted to be factually true. While in (26) the first
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member is not conceived to pre-possess a definite numerical value; it has just been written in
the form of a coefficient from the expansion of a Hilbert-Dirac state-ket and it is constructed by
(26) (from right to left) to possess the semantic nature as well as the value of the probability
from the second member of which the nature of a probability, and the numerical value of this
probability are already factually known, because they have been previously constructed factually
as, respectively, a factual probability and its directly registered value105.
We can now re-write (24) with the following ‘factual -mathematical’ form of the right-
hand member: ∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉ff /A = ∑
j
eiα(A,j)
√
pi(Gt, aj) |uj(r, aj)〉], ∀j, ∀t (27)
where the imaginary factors are isolated in brackets to express that they are still non-specified
numerically.
The same procedure is valid for the spectral decomposition of
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t1)〉ff with
respect to any other dynamical observable.
This settles for any observable the question of the absolute numerical values of the ex-
pansion coefficients from (24), (25).
Consider now the imaginary factors eiα(A,j) from (24), (25).
In eiα(A,j) the observable A is a variable. When one passes from A to another given
observable B the QMHD concept of a state-ket
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉 involves conditions of mutual
consistency between the expansion-coefficients of
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉 with respect to A and the
expansion-coefficients of
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉 with respect to B . These conditions are taken into ac-
count in Dirac’s theory of transformations and they can be specified via a trivial lemma L(Ass.2)
established inside QMHD for a state-ket
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉:
L(Ass.2). If in (25) an arbitrary set {eiα(A,j)} of complex factors is introduced for the
observable A, then Dirac’s theory of transformations determines consistently with this initial
choice, all the complex factors to be introduced in all the other expansions of
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉
corresponding to any other given dynamical observable B , that does not commute with A, so
[A,B] 6= 0.
Proof of L(Ass.2). Consider the expansion
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉 /B = ∑
k
eiγ(B,k) |dk(t, bk)| |vk(r, bk)〉 , k = 1, 2 . . . ,K, ∀t (18’)
of
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉 on the basis {|vk(r, bk)〉} of eigenket introduced in H by a given observable
B , [A,B] 6= 0 that does not commute with A, where the numbers eiγ(B,k) |dk(t, bk)| are the
expansion coefficients. For any given value of the index k we have inside QMHD that
〈vk(r, bk)|ψG,H(r, t)〉 = eiγ(B,k) |dk(t, bk)| =
∑
j
τkj(A,B)cj(t, aj), ∀j,∀t (28)
where τkj(A,B) = 〈vk|uj)〉, ∀j. So for any complex factor of given index k we have a separate
condition
eiγ(B,k) =
〈vk|ψG(t)〉
|dk(t, bk)| =
∑
j
τkj(A,B)cj(t, aj)
 / |dk(t, bk)| , ∀A,B, ∀t (29)
where ‘/’ is to be read: divided by).
So the lemma is proved for a QMHD state-ket
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉 if the condition (29) is
fulfilled.
105This is nearly in opposition with the contents assigned to the first member in (23), a procedural and semantic
opposition that reflects our general distinction between the top-down approach where the first member from
(23) has been produced via a Schrödinger equation, and the bottom-up approach where the second member
from (26) is constructed by factual individual measurement-successions [Gt1 .MesA].
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We now impose the condition (29) for also the formal-factual state-ket |ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff
from (27). So in (27) the Hilbert-Dirac representation of any expansion of the factual-formal
state-ket
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉ff is now achieved; all the contents of the representational elements are
now fully specified, semantically as well as structurally and numerically.
So we finally write:
|ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff /A ≡
∑
j
eiα(A,j)
√
pi(Gt, aj) |uj(r, aj)〉 , ∀j,∀t (27’)
And this in its turn permits to write for the factual-formal construct |ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff itself
the synthetic integrated form:∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉ff ≈ pred.{∀A,∀t, ∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉ff /A} (30)
like in (22) for a QMHD state-ket.
In the equivalence (30), in consequence of the fact that no Schrödinger equation has been
made use of, the factual-formal state-ket
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉ff is not endowed with an own explicit
integrated functional expression; such as it has emerged, it has to be regarded as just defined
by the second member of the equivalence (30). But (27’) specifies explicitly – and directly –
all the first order probability laws involved in (30), from all the probability spaces that crown
the branches of the probability-tree T (G,∀A) of the studied microstate (IQM, Fig.2). And
furthermore – via the imaginary factors eiα(A,j) from the expansion-coefficients and the lemma
L(Ass.2) – (27’) is likely to specify also the [IQM − QMHD] mathematical realization of the
general syntactic structures (11) and (11’) of the meta-probabilistic correlations (Mpic(Gt1)AB,
∀AB defined in IQM 106. Anyhow (23) can be written for this case as
pi(ψG(ajt)) ≡Gt (
∣∣∣Pr.j |ψGt〉ff ∣∣∣2 = pi(Gt, aj)) (23’)
And – insofar that also the QMHD expression of the IQM meta-correlations
(Mpic(Gt))AB have been specified in |ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff by the condition (29) – the formal-
factual relation (30) has emerged as a full correspondent of the QMHD equivalence (22)
|ψGt,H(r, t)〉 ≈ {|ψGt,H(r, t)〉 /A}. And this correspondent has been constructed without mak-
ing use of the Schrödinger equation of the problem.
So the point (a) from Ass.2 is established.
We consider now the point (b) from Ass.2.
A QMHD state-ket |ψGt,H(r, t)〉 obtained via the Schrödinger equation of the problem is
in general marked by purely mathematical constraints – approximations, or just guesses, etc.
106We believe that the imaginary factors eiα(A,j) determine the QMHD mathematical expression of the IQM
meta-probabilistic correlations (Mpic(Gt1 ))AB from a probability-tree and from (9”). Consider the IQM descrip-
tor (11) p(bk) = Fbk,A{p(Gt, aj)}, ∀k, ∀j, ∀(A,B) that denotes meta-probabilistic correlations (Mpc(Gt))AB
between whole probability laws that crown two distinct branches of a given probability-tree. Inside QMHD the
Dirac transformation from the Hilbert-space representation of the state-ket |ψG(t)〉 of the studied microstate
with respect to the eigenvalues aj of an observable A, to the representation of |ψGt (t)〉 with respect to the eigen-
values bk of another observable B that does not commute with A, is defined by dk(t, bk) =
∑
j τkj(A,B)cj(t,A),
∀j, ∀k, ∀t. Of course, the aim of Dirac’s QMHD calculus of transformations is entirely ignorant of the
IQM operational-semantic categorization of the set of all the considered pairs of observable events {(aj , bk)},
∀(A,B), ∀t tied with the studied microstates, inside a tree-like probabilistic whole founded upon the operation
of generation G or Gt that corresponds to the state-ket |ψG(t)〉 of the studied microstate. This is so because the
individual operations G or Gt – like also any corresponding coding-measurement-evolution – are not represented
inside QMHD. So inside QMHD Dirac’s calculus of transformation from one ‘representation’ of |ψG(t)〉 with
respect to an observable A, to another observable B, is asserted as just a mathematical algorithm devoid of
any more general meaning. Nevertheless the isomorphism between the writings (11),(11’) and those from Dirac’s
theory of transformations suggests that these formulas point toward the possibility of a much more general
calculus, of ‘semantic proximities’, that remains to be exploited: For instance, the scalar product of two dis-
tinct state-ket of two different microstates but expressed inside one same representation, might be used as a
measure of a concept of ‘degree of angular proximity’ inside this representation, so relatively to qualifications
by the observable that determines the representation (MMS [1993]); while a Dirac transformation leads from
one semantic universe to another one that is disjoint from the first. It seems rather clear that inside QMHD
the imaginary factors from the expansion coefficients determine phase-relations between different terms in one
expansion and furthermore they define the meta-probabilistic correlations (Mpc(Gt))AB.
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– and these – in the absence of any defined individual genesis of the statistical predictions –
might induce in the consequences of the mathematical constraints, unknown and uncontrollable
deviations from the factual truth. Whereas in both members of (30) all the involved numerical
values
√
pi(Gt, aj) from the predictive probability laws imported from (27’) have been defined
by factual individual operations. With chosen and arbitrarily small (, δ,N0)-uncertainties, the
semantic contents involved in (30) are by construction in conformity with the factual truth of
the asserted predictions and with the verification of these (as is the case inside IQM for the
description (9”)). Indeed:
- In what concerns the factual truth of the predictions, the argument Arg(Ass.2) insures it a
priori by construction.
- In what concerns the verification of the predictions, it follows from the assertion Ass.1.
It follows that the predictions drawn from the formal-factual state-ket |ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff –
that are factually true by construction – are in general different from those that are drawn from
the corresponding QMHD state-ket
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉. So the [IQM − QMHD] equivalent (30) of
the QMHD relation (22) extends the QMHD-domain of possibility of predictions on microstates
by its independence of an equation of evolution, while – by construction – the predictive content
from (30) emerges factually true and already verified :∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉ff 6=pred. ∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉
[|ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff ≈ pred.{∀A,∀t,
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉ff /A}]verif . (31)
Which establishes the point (b) from Ass.2.
The assertion Ass.2 itself is now fully established. 
Throughout what follows the equivalence from (31) is posited to entail the possibility to
construct for the first member
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉ff an integrated mathematical expression of the form∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t)〉ff = a(r, t)e(i/~)ϕ(r,t) (since in the lemma L(Ass.2) the initial choice of imaginary
phase-factors has been arbitrary, there should exist an infinite family of such possibilities).
(7.III).2.3 Hilbert-Space Representation of Predicion-Verification for
Microstates ms(unbound, 1)cg(q−f)
We consider now microstates of one microsystem but with a composed operation of generation
(cf. the definitions from (2.I).1). Such a microstate incorporates a phenomenon of ‘corpuscular
interference’, so a non-null quantum potential wherefrom quantum fields can emerge. So we de-
note it ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) (the index ‘cG(q−f)’ is to be understood as: ‘composed operation
G of generation involving possibility of quantum fields’).
Thereby we quit the first, superficial stratum of QMHD that deals with the quasi-classical
behaviours of microstates ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c). The microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) con-
stitute a key-category in the endeavour toward an intelligible consensual predictive and veri-
fiable conceptualization of microstates and micro-phenomena. Though they are still unbound
states, so essentially endowed with unstable characters, the inside of the specimens of a mi-
crostate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) – and in particular the dynamic of the singularity from the
physical wave of the specimens – cannot any more be conceived to be transparent to the ex-
terior context as it is presupposed by the coding postulate (20’). With respect to microstates
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) the concepts of ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ (Atmanspacher&Dalenoort [1994])
acquire full power, and this, in the processes of conceptualization, plays an outstanding role107.
In this work the opposition outside-inside displaces us from the frontier between classical
physics and quantum physics, into the depth of the ‘quantic’ stratum of physical substance.
It draws us deep into the unlimited and as yet a-conceptual physical ‘Universal Substance’ in
the sense of Spinoza (Natura Naturans). Only here does acquire full contour and full size the
question how something of which the concept and the name have been formed in the minds, but
that is as yet un-known in its strict specificity, can be ‘separated’ from the whole where it belongs
in a sense that permit to assert that it has become ‘the entity to be studied’ consensually, and
how that can be effectively ‘studied’, which means qualified.
107Intimately tied with the opposition ‘open’-’closed’ that lies on the ground of the concept of ‘formal system’.
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In the Part I of this work we have dealt already precisely with this question, but only
with respect to the general concept of ‘microstate’ and only in principle.
In (7.III).2.2 we have then specified an effective answer for the particular category of
microstates ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c), by use of a definite model of a specimen of microstate, of a
definite coding-measurement-evolution, and an accepted Hilbert-space representation.
It will now appear below that the coding-measurement-evolutions that inside QMHD act
in a hidden way but with presupposed generality and that inside the framework [IQM−QMHD]
have been explicitly posited for microstates ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c), cease to be efficient in this
framework for microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f); and that furthermore the QMHD Hilbert-
space representation of the microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) is not satisfactory in this same
framework.
Of course one can decide a priori that a problem that does not stem inside QMHD and
does not obtain solution inside QMHD is not a real problem. Here however, empowered by the
explicit preliminary construction of the structure of reference-and-immersion, we have placed
ourselves overtly inside a framework that is different from QMHD. And in this framework
we shall have to identify coding-measurement-evolutions that are specifically adapted to the
category of microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) and to propose a corresponding new Hilbert-
space representation.
(7.III).2.3.1 Critique of the QMHD Hilbert-Space Representation of a State-Ket∣∣ΨG(G1,G2)(r, t)〉 and of the Predictive Probabilities on the Results of
Momentum-Measurements Entailed by it
For simplicity we consider a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) of type (15’) with only two
components in the operation of generation, for instance a young-interference msG12 generated
by an operation of generation G(G1, G2). The QMHD Hilbert space-representation of the state-
ket of such a microstate is∣∣ΨG(G1,G2)(r, t)〉 = λ1 |ΨG1(r, t)〉+ λ2 |ΨG2(r, t)〉 (15”)
The eigenfunctions of the momentum-observable P are plane wave-functions
a exp(i/~)pjr. Let pj,12 designate the eigenvalue of index j of P that is tied with the plane-
wave eigenfunction a exp(i/~)pjr. The expansion
∣∣ΨG(G1,G2)(r, t)〉 /P where ∣∣ΨG(G1,G2)(r, t)〉
is defined by (15”) yields for the predictive probability pi12(pj,12) of the outcome pj,12 the
representation
pi12(pj,12) = |λ1cj1 + λ2cj2 |2 = |λ1cj1 |2 + |λ2cj2 |2 + λ1cj1(λ2cj2)∗ + (λ1cj1)∗λ2cj2) (32)
i.e. pi12(pj,12) = pi1(pj,1) + pi2(pj,2) + F (pi1(pj,1), pi2(pj,2)) with pj,1 and pj,2 the eigenvalues
introduced by, respectively, the expansions |ΨG1(r, t)〉 /P and |ΨG2(r, t)〉 /P.
We assert that inside [IQM −QMHD] the representation (15”) is inadequate from con-
ceptual points of view; and – much more importantly – the verifiability of the predictions
derived from (15”) concerning the results of measurement-successions [G(G1, G2).MesP] for
the momentum observable P , raises questions.
Conceptual inadequacy of (15”) with respect to [IQM − QMHD]. The additive
representation (15”) of the state-ket
∣∣ΨG(G1,G2)(r, t)〉 of a microstate msG12 – though mathe-
matically it is permitted in a vector-space – suggests semantic features that are misleading from
the standpoint of [IQM − QMHD]: The state-ket |ΨG1(r, t)〉 and |ΨG2(r, t)〉from the second
member from (15”) concern the microstates msG1 and msG2 . But according to [IQM−QMHD]
these microstates are not physically realized and in this sense they do not ‘exist’. By the basic
methodological decision MDI from I.1 we have posited a one-to-one relation (1) G ↔ msG
between any given operation of generation G and its result denoted msG. And in the case
considered in (15”) the unique operation of generation that is conceived to have been physi-
cally realized is G(G1, G2). So exclusively the microstate msG12 represented by the state-ket∣∣ΨG(G1,G2)(r, t)〉 is realized,. Full stop. The microstates ‘msG1 ’ and ‘msG2 ’ have not been in-
dividualized by G(G1, G2)108 because G1 and G2 have not been fully and separately realized.
108This is not visible inside QMHD where the whole notion of an individual operation of generation of the
studied microstates remains hidden.
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They have only contributed to the global limiting conditions by which G(G1, G2) defines the
inner ‘interference’ structure of the microstate msG12109. This however is just a clarification,
not a problem.
Non-verifiability via (20’) – according to [IQM −QMHD] – of the predictions
(32). Nothing hinders to suppose that in QMHD the contents of the second member from (15”)
have been defined with a purely algorithmic purpose, namely for calculating the probabilities of
outcomes of measurements on the unique generated and studied microstatemsG12 . If this view is
adopted then, in so far that the algorithm is found to lead to factually true predictions, this can
be considered to suffice for choosing the representation (15”) of the state-ket
∣∣ΨG(G1,G2)(r, t)〉.
So let us focus on verifiability.
In (6.II).1 we have brought forth that the eigenfunctions of a QMHD observable-operator
represent the wave-movement in the neighbourhood of the singularity from the physical individ-
ual ‘corpuscular-like-wave’ of the considered specimen of the studied microstate.
In the case of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c) the QMHD plane-wave eigenfunctions
of the observable P are concordant with this significance/
But does this concordance hold for also a microstatems(unbound, 1)G(n−c)with composed
operation of generation this ceases to be so. To fix the ideas we imagine a Young-interference
represented by (15”).
1. It is currently conceived – even if a-verbally and implicitly – that in an interference
state that what admits mechanical qualifications (the ’particle’) follows an interference line
of maximum presence-probability determined by the descriptive elements that generate the
phenomenon of interference (holes, divisor of the front of the wave, etc.). In the terms of
[IQM −QMHD] now, these descriptive elements are tied with the two operations of generation
G1 and G2 involved in the unique realized operationG(G1, G2), in the sense of the last definition
from (1.I)1; and that what is considered to have a ‘trajectory’ along a maximum of presence-
probability (the ’particle’) is the singularity from the amplitude of the individual physical wave
represented by the individual de Broglie wave-function ΦG(G1,G2)(r, t) = a(r, t)e
(i/~)β(r,t) of
the specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of msG12 that is involved in any one coding-measurement-succession
[G(G1, G2).MesP] (cf. (6.II).4.2.2 ). Now, each one of the two operations of generation G1
and G2 involved in the unique realized operation of generation G(G1, G2) can be considered to
induce into the movement of the unique involved singularity from ΦG(r, t) a directional trend of
movement,and accordingly to de Broglie’s guiding law these two distinct directional trends are
conceived to combine so as to determine for this singularity a trajectory along an interference-
line of a maximum of the presence-probability determined by the state-ket
∣∣ΨG(G1,G2)〉 that
corresponds to ΦG(G1,G2)(r, t). Insofar that this is correct:
The neighbourhood of the singularity from ΦG(G1,G2)(r, t) can never be conceived to
be populated by a form of wave-movement representable by only one plane wave,
not even approximately and at ideal infinity. Indeed in the case of a microstate
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) precisely this small neighbourhood is conceived as quite essentially
populated by a physical superposition of two wave-movements of distinct directions that
– together – determine the trajectory.
So in the context of [IQM−QMHD] the pattern of wave-movement around the singularity
with vector-momentum-value pj,12 that is tied with the probability-value pi12(pj,12), cannot be
conceived to be a plane-wave pattern, nor to evolve into such a pattern when time grows toward
the infinite.
2. While on the other hand one of the measuring-postulates of QMHD asserts that the
result of a measurement on a microstate always is an eigenvalue of the measured observable,
and an eigenvalue that emerges with the corresponding eigenstate (and even that immediately
after the end of the measurement the ‘system’ even remains in this eigenstate) 110.
3. The points 1 and 2 are not mutually consistent.
4. According to QMHD the procedure required by the coding-postulate (20’)
P (cod)G(n−c) in order to verify (32)-(32) would be that of ‘time of flight’ ((6.II).4.3 ): Suppress
109In QMHD as well as in the de Broglie representation, where the notion of operation G of generation of a
microstate is absent, these statistical physical effects of the operation of generation are hidden in the abstract
mathematical concept of limiting conditions.
110Cf. this work (5.II).1 (measurement postulates); and also Cohen-Tannnoudji, C., Diu, B. et Laloë, F. [1973]).
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any external macroscopic field and let the specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of the studied microstate in-
troduced by the performed operation of generation G(G1, G2) evolve freely accordingly to (20),
(20’) until it reaches a space-time domain (∆x∆t)j where the ‘presence’ is characteristic of the
eigenvalue pj of P . On what a basis can this be insured? On the basis of the assumption that
in the absence of ‘exterior’ fields the corpuscular-like singularity from the amplitude of the in-
dividual physical wave of any involved specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of the studied microstate, will be
animated by a dynamic that can be assimilated to that of a classical mobile put in the same sit-
uation, which is a stable dynamic. But in the case of a microstate of typems(unbound, 1)cG(q−f)
even according to QMHD the microstate msG12 involves continuously a non-null quantum po-
tential wherefrom any fluctuation can produce an active quantum field that in general cannot
be predicted, nor specified or suppressed physically by the human observer. In such conditions
the coding-measurement-evolution supposed in (20’) cannot be conceived to insure dynamical
stability. And this state of facts escapes human control. (It is a problem of the ‘inside-outside’
of ‘the studied microstate’).
So inside [IQM−QMHD] the prediction (20’) entailed by the representation (15”) of the
state-ket of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f)cannot be securely accepted to be verifiable via
the use of the coding procedure (20’):
From the viewpoint of [IQM−QMHD], as long as another, appropriate coding-postulate
is not specified, the ‘prediction’ (32) amounts in fact to just a mathematical definition of
the predictive probabilities pi12(pj,12) that is postulated to be factually true but cannot be
verified to be such.
In such a situation, even if – notwithstanding the above listed points 1-4 – one continues,
by faithfulness to QMHD, to envisage that (32) might perhaps be factually true, the last point
4 that concerns only operational features, obliges by scientific honesty to at least conceive also
some effective coding-measurement-evolutions of a structure that they permit to ascertain the
factual truth of the prediction (32).
Conclusion on the critique. One could believe that this whole problem is a false
problem that stems from IQM while nothing imposes to accept IQM. One can hold that this
problem can be eliminated by just refusing the concept of a ‘composed operation of generation’
defined in (2.I)1 and by just accepting the direct postulation from QMHD, of the adequacy of
additive representations of state-ket like in (15”) and its consequence (20’) (via acceptance of
the implicit assumption of the general validity of (20’)), as it is so efficiently done since nearly
100 years.
But this is not the case. A rejection of the concept of composed operations of generation
would not in the least change the fact that the predictions (32) raise questions with respect
to other assertions – basic postulates of QMHD – nor the fact that the coding-measurement-
evolutions (20’) cannot be securely introduced and are not effective, while some effective coding
procedure is unavoidably necessary for achieving an act of quantum measurement.
Quite on the contrary, the fact that the concept of composed operation of generation
reveals the situation examined above is a strong confirmation of the basic relevance of this
concept.
If one wants a representation of the microstates that insures effectiveness and intelli-
gibility, it is imperative to deal overtly with the problem of a fully reliable coding procedure
for momentum-measurements on microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f). This aim leads us to the
works of Broglie and of Bohm, the only ones that have represented fully the microphysical situ-
ations that involve quantum potentials and quantum fields, which are the very core of quantum
physics.
(7.III).2.3.2 Louis de Broglie, David Bohm, and de Broglie’s Double-Solution Interpretation of
QMHD
What is at present called the ‘de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics’ has been
much developed in works by B. Hiley, P. Holland, D. Dürr, S. Goldstein, N. Zanghi, M. Towler,
W. Struyve, and many others111. But this vast and complex evolving domain of research is
exterior to the purpose of this work. In this work we make direct use of, exclusively:
111Cf. Wikipedia file:///Users/mms/Desktop/De%20Broglie–Bohm%20theory%20-%20Wikipedia.webarchive.
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- Louis de Broglie’s initial model of a micro-system, as introduced in his Thesis and
that has been identified in (6.II).1, (6.II).2, (6.II).4.2.2 to be basically incorporated in the
QMHD-formalism;
- Louis de Broglie’s ‘double-solution causal interpretation of quantum mechanics’ ([1956],
[1957]) that – in only very general terms – will now be connected to the present approach in
throughout the subsequent course of this work.
However de Broglie has constructed the double-solution interpretation of quantum me-
chanics only after having become acquainted with Bohm’s [1952] work, wherefrom he has drawn
basic features as well as moral support. This has to be acknowledged. Therefore here de Broglie’s
double solution interpretation will be denoted dBDS(B) (to be read: ‘ de Broglie’s double-
solution interpretation as conceived in relation with Bohm’s interpretation).
Via the ‘theorem of concordance of the phases’ cited in (6.II).1, Louis de Broglie’s model
entails the well-known ‘guiding law’ of the momentum by the phase-function of the physical
corpuscular-like wave assigned to any micro-system. So the guiding law also – alike to the
corpuscular-wave model of a specimen of a microstate and via this model – is implicitly om-
nipresent in the QMHD-formalism, carried by the equation for eigenfuntions and eigenvalues of
a quantum mechanical observable (cf. (6.II).1). And along this way the guiding-law is implicitly
but organically available inside the framework [IQM −QMHD].
We shall now try to deal with the problem of verifiability and of representation formulated
in (7.III).2.3.2 concerning the microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) by making explicit use of de
Broglie’s guiding law.
(7.III).2.3.3 On ‘Observables’ and ‘Beables’
It has become current to distinguish between ‘beable’ qualifications and QMHD ‘observables’.
The position-vector observable R is considered more or less implicitly to behave like a beable,
in this sense that the registration of perceivable marks produced by specimen of the studied
microstate can be trivially considered to show where ‘the system’ was ‘really’ placed when
the mark emerged. But the case of R is regarded as a degenerate case. In general a QMHD
observable – the momentum observable included – is currently conceived to manifest eigenvalues
that are created by the measurement-interaction: What is observed and coded by an eigenvalue
of the measured quantity is conceived to be different from the initial beable value, to have been
created by the measurement-evolution out of this beable value112.
But the analyses from (6.II).3 and (6.II).4 – and particularly the method ‘time of flight’
for the case of the momentum observable P – have brought forth a view that seems to be
directly opposed to that recalled above:
A coding-measurement-evolution of the general form (20’) – that, implicitly, is conceived
inside QMHD to be applicable to any sort of microstate – in fact is expressly constructed such as
to conserve unchanged the initial ‘beable’ value of the measured quantity and to draw it into the
realm of consensual knowledge via perceivable marks that permit to identify it on the basis of
theoretical arguments. This is the very essence of the criterion for deciding whether a given pro-
cedure can, or not, be consider to act as a ‘measurement’ of a given quantity. And precisely this
ceases to be controllable for momentum measurements on microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f).
But why, exactly, does it cease?
Certainly one of the causes is that in the case of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f)
– in contradistinction to what happens with microstates ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c) – the dynam-
ics of that what, in a specimen of the studied microstate, does admit ’mechanical’ qualifi-
cations 113, can never be brought under the controllable dependence of exclusively the ‘ex-
terior’ context of that. According to [IQM − QMHD] this is so by the definition of the
operation that generates a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f), namely a composed operation
of generation G(G1, G2, ..., Gm, ..., GM ). The singularity of any specimen of a microstate
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) is genetically immersed in a quantum potential entailed by the physical
superposition of the mutually distinct directions of wave-movement instilled by the components
112I have myself held this view, and for a long time.
113In Bohmian mechanics, for instance, the spin quantity is considered not to be a ‘mechanical’ quantity; it is
regarded as a qualification of the wave movement.
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(G1, G2, ..., Gm, ..., GM ) of G. The mechanical displacements of this singularity are, both, de-
termined by this inner quantum potential and shielded by it from the outside of the whole
specimen, continuously, irrepressibly, and in a way that cannot be controlled because any inner
fluctuation can generate unpredictable quantum forces that in general add unknowable changes
to the initial value of the momentum that characterizes such a displacement. So the inside of
the specimens of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) is out of the human observer’s control.
No act of measurement tied with ‘extinction’ and control of the inner fields can be conceived,
that would – theoretically at least – preserve from changes the value of the measured quantity,
throughout the measurement-evolution. All that seems possible to be done in this respect is
to maintain as stable as possible the global immediate outside of any whole specimens of the
studied microstate.
But – also certainly – this is not the fundamental explanation of the resistance opposed
by [IQM−QMHD] to the application of the coding-postulate (20’) for verifying the predictions
(32) on the results of momentum-measurements drawn from the QMHD representation (15”) of
a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f). This resistance stems from a much more basic level that
manifests itself in the various critical remarks from (7.III).2.3.1, some of which concern the
contradiction – inner to QMHD – between the measurement-postulates 1 and 2 and the implicit
but clear assumption of the unrestricted validity of the coding-postulate (20’).
In short, the concepts of ‘beable’ and of ‘observable’ seem not to have touched as yet the
basic feature that opposes resistance when one wants to apply the coding postulate (20’) to the
case of momentum- measurement upon microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f). And:
The belief carried by these concepts, that in general a QMHD measurement-evolution
necessarily changes the value possessed by the measured quantity when the measurement-
evolution begins, might simply be false.
The essential difference targeted by the concepts of ‘observable’ or ‘beable’ does not
concern the value itself of the considered quantity; it seems likely to concern the way in which
it is possible to bring this value into consensual and verifiable knowledge. But how it concerns
this, though not yet fully clear, must be somehow connected with the measurement-postulates
1 and 2 from QMHD.
This problem does not touch the representation dBDS(B) that is a priori introduced
as only an interpretation of QMHD, while the QMHD predictions and their verification are
presupposed to be all factually true. But it does flaw QMHD itself that asserts true and verifi-
able predictions for any sort of microstate, while for microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f)– that
belong to the most specific core of nowadays fundamental microphysics – its predictions are
not verifiable114. And it quite essentially concerns [IQM − QMHD] where this flaw has to be
compensated. For as long as it is not the second quantum mechanics QM2 is not achieved.
Here we suspend the considerations on ‘beables’ and ‘observables’, hoping that af-
ter having conceived an adequate substitute to (20’) for momentum measurements on
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) we shall have become more able to genuinely conclude these consid-
erations also, constructively.
(7.III).2.3.4 Doubt on the Non-Measurability of the de Broglie Instantaneous Guided Value of
the Momentum
Since in the case of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) the stable conservation of the ini-
tial value of the momentum throughout a lasting momentum-measurement-evolution cannot
be insured until a final interaction that produces observable coding-marks115, one is led to
re-examine thoroughly the possibility of a kind of measurement-evolution that – itself – con-
sumes the instantaneous value of the momentum at the time when the measurement begins
in a process that codes for it: a ‘value-consuming’ measurement-evolution. This brings to the
dBDS(B) approach, the only one that penetrates explicitly into the ‘inside’ of the microstates
114This, I think, is intimately connected with the very fundamental exchange between Englert&alt. [1992],
Dürr&alt. [1993], Finkelstein [1995] and Hiley&alt. [2000], on which we come back at the end of this chapter.
115Which usually destroys the measured momentum-value, so also the corresponding eigenstate, contrarily
to the QMHD postulate that any act of measurement leaves the ‘system’ in the eigenstate of the obtained
eigenvalue. But it might be possible to realize conditions in which this final destruction is avoided.
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ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f); it touches the very source of the concepts of quantum potentials and
quantum fields which, inside [IQM−QMHD], are characterized by composed operations of gen-
eration G(G1, G2, ..., Gm, ..., GM ), m = 1, 2, ..,M116. More precisely, we consider de Broglie’s
well-known concept of ‘guiding relation’ that defines the momentum of the singularity from a
physical ‘corpuscular-like’ wave:
p(r, t) = −∇β(r, t) (33)
where p(r, t) is the ‘guided’ momentum of the corpuscular-like singularity at the time t
and β(r, t) is the phase-function at t from the physical individual wave-function ΦG(r, t) =
a(r, t)e(i/~)β(r,t) that represents the wave of each specimen σΦ(G) of the studied microstate (cf.
(6.II).2 and (7.III).1.2).
The guidance law (33) is asserted inside dBDS(B) deductively and with full generality,
both in the presence and the absence of quantum fields. But this law is quasi-unanimously
considered to be un-observable. Even de Broglie himself adhered to this view. It is believed that
as soon as one would try to register the guidance-trajectory in a specimen σΦ(G) of the studied
microstate, the beginning of the interaction would immediately destroy the inner structure of the
phase represented by the phase-function β( r ,t) and this would compromise any global relevance
of the data drawn from the interaction. This idea however seems to have been admitted only on
the basis of the powers of submission to the formalism of QMHD. And notwithstanding these
powers:
- trace-registrations are currently used in Wilson-chambers, since a long time;
- for photonic interference states a guided trace has already been experimentally regis-
tered (cf. A. Steinberg [2011]), which is a very strong indication that an experiment with heavy
microsystems could also succeed.
In fact, I think, nobody as yet has genuinely analysed and tested whether yes or not it is
possible to choose the values of the involved parameters such that to be able – in full agreement
with the theoretical dBDS(B) assumptions117 – to compute out of the registered data, the value
of the momentum at the moment when the trace registration began. So this has to be done.
But it has to be done without any use of the formalism of QMHD such as it now stands
because any such use is circular in consequence of the fact that QMHD involves a general
validity of the coding–postulate (20)-(20’) which is incompatible with measurability of guided
trajectories (33)118.
The time of idolatry with respect to the QMHD formalism and its explicit or implicit
diktats seem to revolve. History, once more, brings face-to-face with the as yet undone. This
116The dBDS(B) interpretation is devoid of any feature connectable with the
117It even seems that Louis de Broglie’s works [1924], [1956], [1957] are not yet available in English, which is
an aberration.
118I once accomplished a theoretical examination of the measurability of the guided momentum in an interfer-
ence state (MMS [1963]) and it led to a ‘proof’ that for a globally stable interference microstate (with non-null
quantum potential but with null permanent quantum fields) it is possible – in full compatibility with dBDS(B)
– to register data that do permit to calculate from them the corresponding momentum-value from (33) for
the time t when these registrations have begun. But in that proof the representation of the state-ket had the
form (15”) and so the predictive probabilities were represented accordingly to (32), even by de Broglie himself.
So in the present context the cited work ceases to be significant. Nevertheless it still does show that – with
the representation (15”) – nothing of logical or mathematical nature withstood the idea of principle that the
de Broglie momentum-value (33) for an unbounded interference-microstate can be determined experimentally,
while this idea was – and still is – unanimously banished. As for the examinations involved in the exchange
on " Surrealistic Bohmian Trajectories" quoted in the note 115, one of the involved works (Hiley&alt.) con-
siders Bohm’s approach alone, while the others mix Bohmian formalism with QMHD formalism. But all these
works: make full abstraction of de Broglie’s individual physical model as well as of de Broglie’s own approach
dBDS(B); they make exclusive use of statistical state-ket; they all accept QMHD just as it now stands – with
"collapsing" measurements included –; and they follow the purpose to show full agreement between Bohmian
Mechanics and QMHD. Thereby these works – though very interesting and likely to cooperate volens-nolens
toward a new microphysics – are all quite fundamentally different from the construction attempted here inside
[IQM − QMHD]. And inside [IQM − QMHD] – at the stage reached at this point of the development – we
are still devoid of any formal representation that permit to calculate something. So inside [IQM −QMHD] and
in the present stage, we are reduced to a purely experimental pioneering investigation. The situation will have
evolved toward the end of the chapter 7.III when we shall briefly return to the above-mentioned debate.
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conclusion, I think is backed by the Steinberg experiment quoted above as well as by recent
exchanges119 that will be considered later.
(7.III).2.3.5 Proposal of an Experiment Conceived Inside [IQM −QMHD]
Let us imagine the experiment represented in the figure 7 – denoted EXP – that involves a very
simplified interference-state generated by an operation of generation G(G1, G2).
Fig. 7. A microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) with operation of generation G(G1, G2)
On the above sketch Φ0 denotes the wave-function of a physical individual specimen of a
preliminary microstate msG0 . Out of Φ0 a divisor of front-wave splits Φ0 in two parts that are
approximately described by, respectively, two other waves ≈ Φ1 and ≈ Φ2 (≈: approximately)
tied in the sense defined at the end of (1.I).1.2 with the composing operations of generation
G1 and G2 that are somehow composed inside the unique fully realized operation G(G1, G2).
The directions of propagation of ≈ Φ1 and ≈ Φ2 make a mutual angle α, while with the axis 0z
they make angles θ of the same absolute value. The considered specimen of the microstate to
be studied msG(G1,G2) is realized only inside the space-time domain where the individual phys-
ical wave-movements denoted by ‘≈ Φ1’ and ‘≈ Φ2’ superpose physically into one individual
physical interference-wave-movement denoted by the wave-function Φ12 that takes its location
on a definite domain of what is called the ‘physical’ space-time, and ceases outside this domain,
while inside this domain and on the individual level of conceptualization it evolves.
We stress dramatically that writing ‘ [(≈ Φ1) + (≈ Φ2)] = Φ12’ would be factually
false because it would not express the unknown, innumerable, unconceivable, and so, non-
representable organic relations between what is denoted ≈ Φ1 and what is denoted ≈ Φ2 that are
conceived to have been created by the considered realization of the global operation of generation
119On " Surrealistic Bohmian Trajectories". One of the involved works (Hiley&alt.) considers Bohm’s approach
alone, while the others mix Bohmian formalism with QMHD formalism. But all these works: make full abstrac-
tion of de Broglie’s individual physical model as well as of de Broglie’s own approach dBDS(B); they make
exclusive use of statistical state-ket; they all accept QMHD just as it now stands – with "collapsing" measure-
ments (’reduction’) included –; and they follow the purpose to show full agreement between Bohmian
Mechanics and QMHD. Thereby these works – though very interesting and likely to cooperate volens-nolens
toward a new microphysics – are all quite fundamentally different from the construction attempted here inside
[IQM −QMHD].
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G(G1, G2); and this, on the statistical level, would falsely induce an a priori assumption of
probabilistic in-dependence that is likely to not be factually true. A space-time superposition
of two mentally separated physical phenomena is neither a mathematical ‘superposition’ nor
an arithmetical addition, because these filter out the unlimited unconceivable and unspeakable
singularity of any fragment of physical reality.
For each specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of msG(G1,G2) and with respect to the introduced refer-
ential, the dBDS(B) guidance relation (33) asserts that the corpuscular-like singularity in the
amplitude of the respective wave with wave-function Φ12(r, t) = a(r, t)e(i/~)ϕ(r,t) has a velocity
with components vx = v0 sin θ = const, vy = vz = 0. So the momentum-components are
px = Mvx = Mv0 sin θ, py = pz = 0 (34)
where M denotes the ‘quantum mass’ introduced by the involved microsystem in the sense of
dBDS(B) ([1956]).
So far no QMHD state-ket is defined as yet. But imagine now a big number of repetitions
of the operation of generation G(G1, G2) defined above. Each one of these repetitions involves
its own specimens σΦ0 and σΦ(G(G1,G2)), so its own individual physical waves described by
corresponding wave-functions Φ0, ≈ Φ1, ≈ Φ2 and Φ12(r, t) = a12(r, t)e(i/~)β12(r,t). The global
result of all these repetitions – placed on the statistical level of conceptualization and considered
mentally and retroactively – is what inside [IQM−QMHD] is called ‘the interference-microstate
msG12 to be studied’ and is represented by a state-ket. We can just denote this state-ket
by
∣∣∣ΨσΦ(G(G1,G2))(r, t)e(i/~)ϕ12(r,t)〉 but we do not know its Hilbert-space-representation inside
[IQM −QMHD] (the QMHD representation (15”) has been examined and found to be deficient
from the viewpoint of [IQM − QMHD]). However it is generally accepted on the basis of
factual data that the presence probability inside de space-time support of
∣∣∣ΨσΦ(G(G1,G2))(r, t)〉
consists of a pattern of fringes of high presence-probability (‘brilliant’ fringes), all parallel to the
0x axis and mutually separated by fringes of quasi-zero presence-probability (’dark fringes’).
Nonetheless we note that there is no way to directly observe these ‘fringes’, since they are
only a statistical concept totalized outside any individual observation-time while the individual
realizations of a de Broglie guided trajectory do not leave spontaneously a perceivable trace.
We now start describing the proposed experiment EXP.
The presupposed trajectory of the corpuscular-like singularity from any one physical
individual dBDS(B) wave-function Φ12 is posited to be parallel to 0x. Now, any experimental
intrusion in the inside of a a given specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of msG(G1,G2) is currently posited to
entail quantum-fields that destroy the physical phase relation from the wave of this specimen,
represented by the phase-function β12(r, t) from Φ12(r, t) = a12(r, t)e(i/~)β12(r,t). One of the
main purposes of EXP will be to figure out a system of parameters that – by trial and error
– permit to try to avoid this to happen, and to control whether yes or not this purpose has
been realized. Indeed, if the specimens of msG(G1,G2) that are made use of are deliberately
endowed by the experimenter with a kinetic energy that is sufficiently high with respect to the
medium value of the most likely spontaneous fluctuations of the dBDS(B) quantum potential,
this should suffice for limiting the effect of the quantum forces entailed by the fluctuations so
that, by their 0z component, these forces – at most – displace the involved singularity on another
‘brilliant fringe’, without suppressing the phase relation that determines the momentum-value
px from (34) (this amounts to requiring a kinetic energy significantly high with respect to the
ionizations that will have to be produced in order to reveal experimentally the trajectory of the
singularity).
The EXP can be structured as a sequence of distinct tests:
At a distance 0x1, near the entry into the zone of interference, is placed on 0x a very thin
layer L1 of sensitive substance permitting with maximal probability at most 2 successive initial
acts of ionization. At a second distance 0x2 placed near the end of the interference domain is
placed a thick layer L2 of photographic emulsion with high density of molecules. When the first
ionization occurs in L1 at a time t1a chronometer registers this time. As soon as the corpuscular
singularity reaches the second layer it produces there nearly certainly and practically on the
entry-edge, a third ionization that is recorded at a time t2. Then other ionizations follow until
the energy of the corpuscular-like energy is consumed.
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A big number of successions [G(G1, G2).‘Mes.p’] is realized (where; p denotes the de
Broglie guided momentum value from (33), not the quantum mechanical momentum-observable
P ; the marks ‘.’ that frame the notation Mes.p express that we do not yet know whether a
measurement of p will be realized).
We keep all the cases in which either one or two initial ionizations have been registered.
* When two first ionizations are available they permit to establish via the direction of the
small segment of line that unites them whether the perturbing quantum-force has effectively
displaced the corpuscular singularity on another fringe of high presence-probability, or not.
This permits to be aware of the existence of perturbing quantum fields and the strength of
their effects.
* The two ionizations at the two times t1, t2 registered respectively in L1 and L2 can
furthermore be regarded to define the direction of the momentum (34) and they yield a first
estimation of its value (a sort of time-of-flight method ‘internal’ to the involved specimen of the
studied microstate).
* The ending set of ionizations inside L2 permits to calculate the absolute value of the
momentum out of the energy consumed by one ionization and the number of ionizations.
* The statistic of the positions at the time t2 permits to know whether the position
distribution after the first one or two ionizations is still organized in maxima and minima
indicating interference fringes; so it verifies the conservation of the initial phase-relation.
* Since the first impact defines also the initial position r with respect to the referential,
considered globally the set of registrations specified above would violate Heisenberg’s principle
120.
This would establish that the validity of Heisenberg’s non-mathematical ‘principle’ in
fact is relative to the experimental procedure.
It would also establish that the concept of incompatible observables is tied with coding-
measurement-evolutions that freeze the eigenvalue to be identified, as required in (20’),
which can be realized only for microstates ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c); whereby it would de-
limit the domain of validity of the mathematical uncertainty theorem from QMHD.
* The statistic of the registered momentum-values would permit now confrontation with
the QMHD-prediction (32).
In the case examined here, if EXP shows that the guiding-trace (33) is measurable and
oriented along 0x, then the QMHD-prediction (32) is invalidated. Indeed, exactly insofar that
the two plane waves approximation is acceptably realized, the statistical QMHD-prediction
(32) drawn from the state-ket representation (15)” asserts for the studied microstate msG12
a spectrum of the two vector-values p1 and p2, and no vector-value along 0x 121 (indirect
Compton-measurements should lead to the same results).
These considerations establish the very particular stake of an experiment EXP.
The preceding indications might be generalizable to any microstate
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f).
Finally, let us stress that stricto-sensu QMHD concerns exclusively heavy microsystems.
So only a realization of EXP for systems with non-null rest-mass would possess a full signifi-
cance of principle. The best choice would be to work with a neutron-Young-state that would
introduce relatively high kinetic energies even for moderate velocities and would involve ex-
120Such a violation – of which the possibility has been very explicitly asserted for heavy microstates in MMS
[1964] – has been recently proven experimentally for photons (cf. Piacentini & altera [2015]).
121Let us notice that in the particular case from the figure the QMHD-prediction simply circumvents
momentum-measurements performed at times interior to the space-time domain from the evolution of the state-
ket where the physical interference phenomenon is realized. Indeed the QMHD-prediction would be verified for
pairs (r, t) that exceed the space-time domain covered by a physical phenomenon of interference. But an accept-
able theory of microstates should interdict such undeclared and arbitrary exclusions of space-time zones that
the equation of evolution assert to be populated by a studied microstate. But even if this last remark were con-
tested, the general situation stays unchanged because in a usual Young-interference with spherical waves, strictly
speaking, one never comes out of the space-time domain of physical superposition, while in a mathematical the-
ory of Physics the very principles of the processes of verification of the predictions on measurements cannot
be founded upon limit-approximations like in pure mathematics. Verifiability must be an effective possibility
involving exclusively effective physical operations. A mathematical theory of Physics is not pure mathematics.
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clusively quantum potentials and fields, thus avoiding any electromagnetic effect during the
ionizations.
(7.III).2.3.6 Extended Framework [IQM −QMHD − dBDS(B)] and a New Coding-Postulate
for the Momentum-Values of any Unbound Microstate
Here we shall not await the verdict of EXP for achieving the started construction of a global
outline of an acceptable representation of the microstates. We shall admit by hypothesis that
EXP has been performed and has established the possibility to observe experimentally instan-
taneous guided momentum-values (33). This, I think, is very likely to happen soon, in our
era of nanotechnologies. And an already pre-existing global outline of a view where such an
investigation possesses already its own conceptual place, can only increase this likelihood.
To achieve such an outline, from now on the framework [IQM −QMHD] is enlarged into
a new framework that includes dBDS(B) and is denoted [IQM −QMHD − dBDS(B)].
We first recall that the guidance law (33) is asserted inside dBDS(B) deductively and
with full generality, both in the presence and the absence of quantum fields. So inside [IQM −
QMHD−dBDS(B)] we formulate the following coding-postulate for momentum-measurements
on any sort of unbound microstate, without or with inner quantum potential, as well as with
one or with several micro-systems (in the sense of the definitions from (2.I)1).
We posit that:
P(cod)∀unb.ms. If the exterior global experimental context in which is immersed
the microstate to be studied, have been stabilized so that the relation (1) G ↔ msG is
insured, then the instantaneous momentum-value of any unbound microstate – whether
a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) or ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c) – can be determined by a
coding-measurement-succession that obeys the representation
[Gt.Mes(r,p)] −→
trace
(rk,pj)t, k = 1, 2, ..,K; j = 1, 2, .., J ; ∀msGt (35)
where: Gtis posited to generate at the time t – in the sense of (13”) – one unbound
individual physical specimen σ(Gt) of the studied microstate msGt , initially represented
by an unknown individual wave-function ΦGt ; Mes( r, p) denotes one full act of mea-
surement of the pair (r,p)t formed at the time t when the measurement begins, by [the
instantaneous values at t of the position r and the momentum p from (33), of the sin-
gularity from σ(Gt)] ; the sign ‘−→trace’ is to be read ‘ identified via a registration of the
trace in the sense of EXP ’ of the dBDS(B) guidance-trajectory of the singularity from
the specimen σΦ(Gt) during Mes( r, p); (rk,pj)t is the pair of values registered for the
pair (r,p)t of qualifying quantities.
The coding postulate (35) violates Heisenberg’s principle, the principle of complementar-
ity, as well as the Heisenberg theorem from QMHD 122.
The postulate P(cod)∀unb.ms is a new link in the chain of descriptional features from
the purely interpretive dBDS(B) approach that, inside the framework [IQM − QMHD], have
already been injected into the domain of ‘scientific’ knowledge, i.e. communicable, consensual,
observable and verifiable knowledge. This chain becomes now a genuine channel of adduction
into ‘scientificity’ of ‘descriptional prime-matter’ drawn from dBDS(B).
[MP (msG,cw), (1’) Gcw ↔ msG,cw, (14) msG,cw ≡ {σ(msG,cw)}, (35) P (cod)∀msG)]
(36)
The channel (36) might entail a radical transmutation of the relative status of the
dBDS(B)-conceptualization and that from QMHD, a genuine inversion of their relative con-
ceptual position. Indeed while QMHD is found to be devoid of verifiability for its predictions
122These ‘principles’ and this theorem – formulated in absolute terms – constitute together a knot of confusions
between individual temporal characters and statistical characters. This knot deserves a detailed analysis of the
type of that from (6.II.4.4.3) for the QMHD representation of quantum-measurements: Heisenberg’s ‘principle’
mixes present and future individual data, while the ‘principle’ of complementarity is in fact a consequence of
the QMHD Hilbert-space definitions of ket-states and of observable-operators.
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on momentum-measurements on unbound interference microstates, the present approach might
suppress this flaw by use of elements from the works of de Broglie and Bohm that are arbitrarily
considered to be purely interpretive.
(7.III).2.3.7 Identification of an Adequate Hilbert-Space Representation of an Interference
Microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f)
Rule seventeen
The proposed difficulty must be gone through be making abstraction of the fact that some of
the involved terms are known and other ones are unknown, by following in a genuine walk the
mutual dependences.
Rule nineteen
It is by this method that one must research all the dimensions (physical quantities) that are
expressed in two different ways, in terms either known or unknown, in order to browse directly
through the difficulty; for by these means we shall obtain just as many comparisons between
equal things.
Rule twenty
It is after having obtained the equations that we must achieve the omitted operations, without
ever making use of multiplication when division is necessary.
Descartes, The Rules for the direction of mind
(Regulae ad directionem ingenii), toward 1628 – 1629,
Letters to Elisabeth, Wikipedia (our translation from French)
Inside [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] we are still devoid of an acceptable Hilbert-space
formal representation for interference-microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f). So we cannot as yet
extend to microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) the relation (31) established for the microstates
ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c), hence for these we cannot as yet calculate and represent predictions.
Below we research a compensation of this lacuna. This, from a methodological viewpoint, will
be a noteworthy exploration.
On the relation between Φ(r, t) and |Ψ(r, t)〉. Since (6.II).4.2.2 we have constantly
distinguished between the individual wave-function denoted ΦG,(r, t) assigned to each one speci-
men σ(msG) of the studied microstatemsG, and the QMHD state-ket |ΨG(r, t)〉 associated with
msG. What is the relation between these two sorts of descriptors?
Consider the coding-postulate (35) that is defined for any sort of unbound microstate.
According to the framework [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] each one given realization of the
operation of generation G generates one physical individual specimen σΦ(G) of the studied
microstate msG, represented by a wave-function Φ(r, t).
But all this is only model conceived by human conceptors-observers and operations real-
ized by these. Observation can arise only when a whole sequence [Gt.Mes(r,p)] is realized.
And prediction-verification can arise only if many repetitions of this sequence are realized,
the respective results are observed and noted, and then – on the statistical level of conceptu-
alization – the whole set of obtained results is considered globally, mentally and retroactively,
and is represented by a well-defined state-ket |ΨG(r, t)〉 that permits the calculus of predictions
and verification of these. So – in basic agreement with the relations (1), (1’) – the physical and
individual descriptor Φ(r, t) has no access to the level of prediction-verification. Therefore its
mathematical structure can be constrained only a posteriori and statistically, via the QMHD
use of the tool for calculi |ΨG(r, t)〉. Nothing more can be done.
So we write now explicitly |ΨG(r, t)〉 =
∣∣aΨ(r, t)e(i/~)ϕ(r,t)〉 and Φ(r, t) =∣∣aΦ(r, t)e(i/~)β(r,t)〉 and we consider a set of many repetitions of a given succession
[Gt.Mes(rt,pt)] from (35). Let us focus upon the obtained set of pairs of results {(rk,pj)}t.
We introduce the following two rather straightforward posits.
(P1). Any probability of an observable outcome is operationally definable – so verifiable
– only by individual acts of measurement, and the square root of the ‘presence’-probability
pi(rk,t) (the relative frequency) found inside a whole rich set of individual results {(rk,pj)}t
from (35) for the outcome rk is identical to Born’s QMHD postulate of presence-probability
piΨ(rk, t) = |(aΨ(rk, t))|2 at the time t. On this basis we posit here (like in dBDS(B)) that
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|aΨ(r, t)|2 = |aΦ(r, t)|2 (normed to 1 and both members being expressed numerically in terms
of a same convenient unity of length).
- For the particular case of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f), the structure of the
wave-movement of the singularity from the wave of σΦ(G(G1,G2) can never be conceived to be
that of a plane wave. At the
(P2). Consider now the phase-functions ϕ(rk, t) from a state-ket Ψ(rk, t) =
aΨ(rk, t)e
(i/~)ϕ(rk,t) of a microstate msG and the physical individual phase-function β(r, t) from
the wave-function Φ(r, t) = aΦ(r, t)e(i/~)β(r,t) of a specimen σΦ(G) ofmsG: they are assigned the
same general functional structure. On this basis we posit that the numerical value of the phase
function ϕ(rk, t) is equal to themean of the numerical values at the space-time point (rk, t) of the
physical individual phase-functions β(r, t) from the wave-functions Φ(r, t) = aΦ(r, t)e(i/~)β(r,t)
of theset of the specimens σΦ(G) of the studied microstate msG that are generated succes-
sively by the set of repeated succession [Gt.Mes(rt,pt)] from (35) (this concept is absent in
dBDS(B)). 123 124.
Back to the notions of observables and beables discussed in (7.III).2.3.3.
Consider again the microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) (for simplicity we make us of the basic
case of an operation of generation G(G1, G2) with only two components G1 and G2 and we
write ΦG(G1,G2)(r, t) ≡ Φ12(r, t) and
∣∣ΨG(G1,G2)(r, t)〉 ≡ |Ψ12(r, t)〉). The examination of the
microstate msG12 represented in the Fig.7, associated with the tentative posit P2 advanced
above, focus attention upon the general fact that features of the phase-function β12(r, t) from
the wave-functions Φ12(r, t) = a12(Φ)(r, t)e(i/~)β12(r,t) that represent the individual physical
specimens σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of a microstatemsG(G1,G2) involved in any measurement onmsG(G1,G2)
and that play a determining role in each individual outcome, might have remained simply non-
represented inside QMHD because there – from the start – only some sort of means have
been deliberately researched. This has even certainly happened for momentum measurements
on microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f), along the following way. The QMHD representation of
quantum measurements has been constructed without any explicit recourse to de Broglie’s
Thesis. So, under the opaque cover of a total in-distinction between the individual and the
statistical (cf. (6.II).4.4.3 ) it certainly remained unnoticed that:
- Any act Mes.P of momentum-measurement is performed on only one specimen
σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of the studied microstate msG(G1,G2), never on ‘the microstate msG(G1,G2)’ itself
(cf. the basic relations (1), (1’)) that – itself – remained un-defined, in the strict sense, inside
QMHD).
- In each coding-measurement-succession [Gt.Mes(rt,pt)] from (35), the structure
of the phase β12(r, t) from the individual physical wave with wave-function Φ12(r, t) =
a12(Φ)(r, t)e
(i/~)β12(r,t) of the involved individual physical specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of the studied
microstate msG(G1,G2), plays a determining role in the emergence of the registered vector-value
pj .
- For the particular case of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f), the structure of the
wave-movement of the singularity from the wave of σΦ(G(G1,G2)) can never be conceived to be
that of a plane wave.
These lacunae explain how it has been possible to formulate the QMHD measurement-
postulates 1 and 2 according to which the result of any act of momentum measurement per-
formed on any sort of microstate yields an eigenvalue pj of the momentum-observable P that:
- emerges necessarily tied to one corresponding plane-wave eigenstate a.e(i/~)pj .r of P
(the measurement postulate 1);
123In consequence of this absence inside dBDS(B) ϕ(rk, t) and β(r, t) are posited to be equal.
124The two posits P1 and P2 might be found later to be insufficient for some reason, or even inadequate. Nev-
ertheless we do formulate them here in order to convey more specifically what sort of problems and possibilities
emerge when one wants to create a consistent connection between dBDS(B) and QMHD. This also permits
to better understand why the descriptors Φ12(r, t) and Ψ12(r, t) are currently just confounded, and not only
inside QMHD, but also in de Broglie’s Thesis (cf. (6.II).1) as well as throughout the whole Bohmian Mechan-
ics). Only in de Broglie’s final approach dBDS(B) [1956] are these two descriptors systematically distinguished
from one another (but the notion of repetition of coding-measurement-successions [G.MesA] is absent and so
the idea of mean value in P2 did not emerge:ϕand β are posited to be equal). And again, like in the case of
the QMHD representation of quantum measurements, we are in presence of the tendency to wipe away the
distinction (statistical, abstract)-(physical, individual) by a vertical projection onto one common fictitious level
of conceptualization.
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- subsists after the closure of the act of measurement together with its corresponding
one-plane-wave eigenstate (the measurement-postulate 2).
- is ‘created’ by the measurement process (i.e. obeys the dichotomy either a ‘beable’ or
an ‘observable’);
When in fact, as already asserted:
* The momentum-value pj that is registered can never be conceived to have been ‘created’
by the measurement process, neither for a microstatems(unbound, 1)G(n−c) subjected to coding-
measurement evolution that obey (20’), nor for a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) sujected to
coding-measurement evolution that obey (35). Indeed in both these cases the momentum-value
at the time t when an act of momentum-measurement begins, is also the finally registered value
pj :
* For the particular case of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c) subjected to momentum-
measurements that obey (20’), at the time t when a measurement-evolution begins the structure
of the wave-movement of the singularity from the wave of σΦ(G(G1,G2)) – in general – might not
be that of a plane wave; but when the exterior fields are all suppressed it can coherently be
posited that it immediately becomes a plane-wave structure – at least in the quasi point-like
neighbourhood of the singularity from the wave of σΦ(G) – in consequence of the immediate lack
of reasons that settles in for admitting any further influence on a subsequent purely inertial dy-
namics of the singularity from σΦ(G) (The Occam-razor argument). And for the same reason one
has to conceive that the wave-movement from the whole wave of σΦ(G) acquires progressively
a plane wave structure during the considered act of measurement, if it lasts enough. So the
momentum-value is conserved such as it was at the moment t when the considered act of mea-
surement has begun (accordingly to the very aim of (20’), that for a momentum-measurement
amounts to the method time-of-flight with coding procedure (20))125.
* At the moment t when a coding-measurement-evolution (35) begins, the singularity
from the wave of the involved specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of the studied microstate msG(G1,G2)
is already genetically immersed inside the quantum-potential produced by its operation of
generation G(G1, G2) (cf. (7.III).2.3.3 ). And the coding-measurement-evolution imposed upon
σΦ(G(G1,G2)) by (35) has to be conceived to consume, to destroy the momentum-value pj of
the singularity from the wave of σΦ(G(G1,G2)) at the time t when the coding-measurement-
evolution begins; but while it is consumed, this initial value pj is what is translated from the
data gathered via the posited coding-measurement-evolution. So in this case also pj is a ‘beable
observable’126.
In short, as already identified before,
The essential difference between the two cases considered above lies in the way in which
the momentum-vector-value pjof the singularity from the wave of σΦ(G(G1,G2)) at the time
t when the coding-measurement-evolution begins, is drawn into consensual knowledge,
i.e. whether the coding-measurement-evolution is of the type (20’) or of the type (35)127.
While:
In both cases the registered momentum-value pj is that one possessed by the singu-
larity from the involved specimen of the studied microstate when the considered act of
measurement began. So pj is precisely a ‘beable’ (an ’observable beable’, so to say).
All the critiques made in (7.III).2.3.1 and (7.III).2.3.3 on the representation (15”) and
its consequences emanated subconsciously from this hidden but precise, point-like conceptual
source 128. The preceding considerations finally do fully specify in what a sense the concepts of
125So in the case of a microstate So in the case of a microstatems(unbound, 1)G(n−c) it is at most the structure
of the wave-movement from the whole wave of a specimen σΦ(G) of the studied microstate msG – not the
registered momentum-value pj – that is created by the act of measurement. But this does not qualify a mechanical
observable, it qualifies a conceptual feature of the representation of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c).
126And let us add that in both cases, at the end of the considered measurement-evolution the involved specimen
of the studied microstate has ceased to belong (in the sense of (1)) to the studied micro-state.
127We note that in both cases, at the end of the coding-measurement-evolution the involved specimen of the
studied microstate has ceased to belong to studied microstate.
128This is remarkable. It is a strong retroactive confirmation of IQM with its basic specificities with respect
to QMHD: The definition (1) that introduces the concept of operation of generation G; a relation between
each G and one microstate and distinguishes from the start between this microstate itself and the whole set of
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‘beable’ and ‘observable’ are very confusing indeed and float above the basic distinction that
has generated them intuitively. This leads us to a modification of language:
From now on and inside the framework [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] the concept of
‘beable’ is banished and we shall speak of value-conserving coding-measurement-evolution (20’),
or value-destructive coding-measurement-evolution (35).
It is not useful to state in general terms in what sort of microstate the specimen of
the studied microstate involved in a given act of measurement remains when this act has
been accomplished: this can be varied from case to case accordingly to deliberate operational
choices of the conceptors-observers: All the innumerable QMHD considerations on ‘successive
measurements’ are devoid of general validity. Moreover they are much more speculative than
factually realizable. In general the effects of the final registration of the result contradict the
QMHD postulate 2 (while the postulate 1 is already incompatible with the critique of (15”) and
(32) and with the consequence (35) of this critique).
Finally we are now ready to enter upon the main problem of an acceptable Hilbert-space
of the microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f).
Hilbert-space representation of the microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f). We go
back to the connection with only one and plane-wave structure a. exp((i/~)pj .r) imposed by
the QMHD equation P |u(pj , r)〉 = pj |u(pj , r)〉 upon any registered momentum-value pj , in
this sense that inside the expansions with respect to P the basis of eigenfunctions that is
made use of, any eigenfunction consists of one plane wave; which in fact is factually inadequate
in the case of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) that is always generated by a composed
operation of generation. We want to elucidate this point in order to insure explicitly inside
[IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] a quite general applicability of a Hilbert-space representation of
predictive probabilities via the association
[(22) |ψGt1,H(r, t1)〉 ≈pred. {∀A, ∀t1,
∣∣ψGt1 ,H(r, t1)〉 /A} and Gleason’s theorem (23)]
This would entail the possibility to apply to also the microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f), the
whole essence of the treatment from (7.III).2.2 that, for the microstates ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c),
endows with an intelligible and coherent factual-formal Hilbert-space representation of the
predictions on the results of measurements.
We proceed in 4 steps.
1. Preliminary recall. According to [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] any one act of
momentum-measurement – whether involving a microstate ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c) or a mi-
crostate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) – is always performed upon one corresponding physical and
individual specimen σΦ(G) of the studied microstate msG, never upon this microstate itself
that by the basic definition (1) is a whole big set of such specimens. So any eigen-function
of a generally adequate momentum-operator characterizes the phase-function β(r, t) from the
physical and individual wave-function ΦG(r, t) = a(r, t)e(i/~)β(r,t) of the involved specimen
σΦ(G)of msG. Quite generally, the equation for eigen-functions and eigenvalues of any QMHD
‘observable’, combined with the postulates of representation’ and of measurement, concentrate
in them a cryptic expression of the whole summary rooting into the basic stratum of the physical
and individual operations, entities and phenomena that are involved in the QMHD statistical
prediction algorithms.
Inside QMHD the botched and blurred connection between the individual outputs pj of
measurements and the statistical level of QMHD-predictions on big sets of results of measure-
ments, is realized by the expansions |ψG(r, t)〉 /A, ∀A, from (22). And this is what yields then
access to Gleason’s Hilbert-space representation (32) of the probabilistic predictions.
But our critiques from (7.III).2.3.1 have identified that for microstates
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) and the basic momentum observable P , this QMHD path from the in-
dividual level of conceptualization to the statistical one, is blocked. Why? Because a microstate
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) is always generated by a composed operationG(G1, G2, ..., Gm, ..., GM ),
its specimens; the concept of composed operation of generation; the concept of coding-measurement-evolution;
etc. All this, that is absent in QMHD, permits once more basic elucidations, like in the case of the QMHD
representation of quantum-measurement. I do not speak of ‘truth’ in an absolute sense, which is mere illusion,
but of elucidations in the sense of construction of intelligibility by inner semantic-formal consistency of a
structure of representation.
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and the composing operations G1, G2, ..., Gm, ..., GM from the unique realized global operation
G entail more than only one direction of wave-movement at any possible space-time location
of the singularity from the physical individual wave ΦGt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM ) of which consists
any specimen σΦ(G) of the studied microstate that is involved in a measurement-evolution
MesP ; and this, in general, entails momentum vector-values of a singularity that is tied to
a non-null quantum potential, so not to one plane wave, which is not compatible with the
value-conserving coding-measurement-evolutions (20)-(20’) that, implicitly, are presupposed in
QMHD to be universally valid.
So in order to construct inside [IQM−QMHD−dBDS(B)] a general predictive algorithm
of the form ((22),(23)) that be applicable to also the microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f), the
QMHD equation P |u(pj , r)〉 = pj |u(pj , r)〉, ∀j, has to be generalized so as to make it compat-
ible with also the value-destructive coding-measurement-evolutions (35). This is our purpose
now 129.
2. A generalized equation for eigenvalues and eigenfunctions of the momentum-operator.
Let us denote the researched generalized momentum-operator as Pvc−vd (to be read ‘value-
conserving or value-destructive momentum-observable). We will compare the momentum-
measurements on a microstate ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c) with those on a microstate of type
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f). We recall that the relations (33) and the coding postulate (35)
are valid in both cases while the coding postulate (20’) is valid only for microstates
ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c). We also recall that the coding postulate (20’) has been rejected for
the microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) because it presupposes one-plane-wave-eigenfunctions
ΦGt = a(r, t)e
(i/~)pj .r(t) while a momentum-vector value pj registered in a microstate
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) does not satisfy this condition. So we focus upon the eigenfunctions
of the momentum-operator (not upon the registered momentum-values).
We consider a microstatemsGt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM ) of typems(unbound, 1)cG(q−f). A given
succession [Gt.MesPvc−vd] from (35) is related via (33) with the phase-function β(r, t) from
the wave-function ΦGt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM )(r, t) = a(r, t)e
(i/~)β(r,t) (in short ΦGt) of the involved
specimen σΦ(Gt). This phase-function β(r, t) can be conceived to stem from an inner structure
of the global wave-movement expressed by Φ(Gt) that involves more then only one plane-wave,
in the following sense: It seems necessary to conceive that (in general at least) at any space-
time point (r, t) where β(r, t) is defined, each component operation Gm from the operation
Gt(G1, G2, ..., Gm, ..., GM ) induces its own directional trend of wave-movement. Let us denote
by km(r, t) the unit-wave-vector of the wave-contribution stemming from the component Gm
from Gt. Since according to (1) Gt is considered to come out ‘the same’ each time that it is re-
produced, this local contribution, with its own km(r, t), is conceived by definition to be invariant
with respect to the repetitions of Gt. But in each one given succession [Gt.MesPvc−vd], inside
the one involved wave- function ΦGt , the wave-vector km(r, t) is in general a variable with
respect to passage from one space-time point (r, t) to another one, for any given m130.
We posit that, at the time t when the act of measurement begins (that indexes Gt), the
momentum vector-eigenvalue of Pvc−vd registered by any momentum-measurement-succession
[Gt.MesPvc−vd] – whether making use of the coding postulate (20’) or (35)131 – is :
129This is not a minor purpose. For in fact the case ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) is the rule and the case of a simple
operation of generation G is a rather rare exception. Indeed, even in textbook examples with potential-‘barriers’,
‘walls’, ‘wells’, harmonic oscillators we dwell with microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) that involve interference
and non-null quantum potentials. This remains non-singularized by the QMHD formalism where the concept of
a physical-conceptual operation of generation is absent and its physical-conceptual basic role is replaced by the
directly mathematical notion of ‘limiting conditions’ imposed upon the Schrödinger solution ‘of the problem’. In
these conditions one is led to wonder whether the QMHD predictions on the results of momentum measurements
have ever been seriously subjected to verification, and if this has been done, how the measurements have been
realized (if the ‘external fields’ are microscopic, or not accessible to manipulation, the method time-of flight
cannot be applied, while inside QMHD trace-registrations, in principle, are not ‘legal’ procedures for measuring
momentum).
130Moreover km(r, t) can be symbolically tied with a corresponding whole plane-wave a. exp [(i/~)(pjmkm).r]
– where pjm is the projection on km of pj at the time t – that acts like just a sample of arbitrary extension of
the direction of wave-movement instilled at (r, t) by Gm (cf. (6.II).1).
131We recall that inside [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] the guiding relation (33) can be conceived to be valid
consistently with the whole QMHD formalism, in consequence of the identification in (6.II).1 of the significance
of any eigenstate and of the fact that in dBDS(B) the guiding theorem is obtained for any sort of microstate,
with or without an inner quantum potential).
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pj(r, t) = −∇.β(r)t =
[∑
m
(pjmkm(r)
]
t
, m = 1, 2, ..,M (33’)
where: pjm is the projection of pj(r, t) on km(r) at the time t ; j = 1, 2, ..., J and J is a big finite
integer (the discrete character assumed for the succession of the values pj(r, t) being entailed
and determined by, and relative to, the choices of the involved units of measurement (in short
we write ∀j)).
So according to (33’) the ‘mechanical’ momentum vector-value pj(r, t) of the singularity
from each one wave-function of the one specimen σΦ(Gt) of the studied microstat msGt
involved in one measurement-succession [Gt.MesPvc−vd] – at the space-point r where it
happens to be – depends essentially on time as soon as m > 1.
The definition (33’) – just a definition, a posit – amounts to assert that the eigen-function
– an eigen-wave-function – that corresponds to pj(r, t) is:
∏
m
[a. exp ((i/~)(pjm .km(r))t.r)] = a. exp(i/~)
(∑
m
pjmkm(r)
)
t
.r, m = 1, 2, ..,M (37)
where M is a small integer.
From a purely mathematical point of view the signs pjm , m = 1, 2, ..,M , from (37) act as
just numerical coefficients. So indeed (37) defines pure wave-functions, there is nothing specifi-
cally mechanical in these as long as the definition (33’) is not added. The calculus
∑
m
(pjmkm(r))t
is deliberately left non-effectuated in (37) in order to keep explicitly expressed in mathemati-
cal terms the inner structure assigned by (33’) to the phase β(r, t) of the considered physical
wave ΦGt – namely the structure of a physical superposition of M plane-waves imparted to
this wave at any given point (r, t) by its operation of generation Gt(G1, G2, ..., Gm, ..., GM ))
(with m ≥ 1). So finally inside [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] the equation for eigenvalues and
eigenstates – eigen-waves, in fact – of the mechanical observable Pvc−vd has to be written as:
Pvc−vd
∏
m
a exp ((i/~)(pjm.km(r))t.r) =
[(∑
m
pjm.km(r)
)
t
∏
m
a. exp ((i/~)(pjm .km(r))t.r)
]
=
(∑
m
pjm.km(r)
)
t
.a. exp
(
(i/~)
(∑
m
pjmkm(r)
)
t
.r
)
, ∀j,m = 1, 2, ..,M
(38)
Now we have "both equations" required by Descartes to be kept separate – (33’) and (38)
– so according to the twentieth rule quoted above we can perform the addition from (33’) and
write a last unifying equation (!!) for eigen-states and eigenvalues of the generalized mechanical
momentum observable Pvc−vd, which yields
Pvc−vd
∏
m
a exp ((i/~)(pjm.km(r))t.r) = pj(r, t).a. exp
(
(i/~)
(∑
m
pjmkm(r)
)
t
.r
)
(38’)
For indeed, quite remarkably, the equation (38’) distinguishes between the mechanical
momentum-values pj(r, t) that appear only in the last version of the second member and the
wave-vector-values pjm.km(r))t.r. This brings into evidence that these two quantities are of
different conceptual-physical natures and can be combined numerically only because the corre-
sponding mathematical concepts have the same dimensional definition, which permits to write
the last form pj(r, t) of the global multiplicative coefficient from the second member. Which
in its turn removes the confusions entailed throughout QMHD by the heritage of de Broglie’s
initial notations that had mixed wave-qualifications and mechanical qualifications (deliberately
no doubt, in order to draw attention). In its turn, the distinction between the two last forms of
the second member from (38) constitutes an explicit connection with our critique in (7.III).2.3.1
of non-verifiability of the prediction from (15”)-(32).
Now, for a microstate ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c)we have: m = 1; so
Gt(G1, G2, ..., Gm, ..., GM ) ≡ Gt; k collinear with ∇.β(r); the index t can be dropped ;
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everything becomes time-independent and Pvc−vdreduces to Pvc ≡ P, so (38) becomes the
QMHD equation for eigenfunctions and eigenvalues of the momentum observable P and the
coding postulate (20’) can be utilized. While for m ≥ 2 exclusively the coding-postulate (35)
is valid: in this sense the researched ‘generalization’ of the QMHD equation is achieved.
But it is noteworthy that none among the above-listed specificities that define the dis-
tinction between the case m=1 and the case m ≥ 2 is of a decidedly mathematical nature (even
the explicit writing in (33’) of the time-parameter t is a conceptual choice).132
Which finally closes a rather complex loop.
3. The state-ket of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f). Instead of the criticized additive
QMHD-representation of type (15”), inside [IQM −QMHD − dBDS(B)] we can assign now to
a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) a one-term representation∣∣Ψ(r, t)Gt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM )(r, t)〉 (39)
The physical content of
∣∣Ψ(r, t)Gt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM )(r, t)〉 is determined by: the oper-
ation of generation Gt(G1, G2, ..., Gm, ..., GM ); the model MP (msGt,cw) of a microstate; the
individual wave-function ΦGt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM )(r, t) = a(r, t)e
(i/~)β(r,t)of any specimen σΦ(Gt)
of the studied microstate msGt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM ); the coding-postulate (35); the connection
between ΦG and |ΨG〉 posited by P1 and P2.
4. Hilbert-space representation of the predictions. Inside [IQM−QMHD−dBDS(B)] the
expansion with respect to Pvc−vd of a state-ket (39),
∣∣Ψ(r, t)Gt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM )(r, t)〉 /Pvc−vd,
is written by use of an ortho-normalized basis of wave-eigenket
{∣∣∣∣∣∏
m
a exp ((i/~(pjm.km(r))t.r)
〉}
≡
{∣∣∣∣∣a exp
(
(i/~)
∑
m
(pjm.km(r))t.r
)〉}
, (40)
∀j,m = 1, 2, ...,M133
constructed with eigenfunctions (37) (in short notation, say, {|u(r,pj ,M)〉}t).
Then Gleason’s theorem (23) permits to place the numbers
|cj(t)|2 =
∣∣Pr.j ∣∣Ψ(r, t)Gt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM )(r, t)〉∣∣2
from the expansion
∣∣Ψ(r, t)Gt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM )(r, t)〉 /Pvc−vd on the axes of the Hilbert-space
of
∣∣Ψ(r, t)Gt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM )(r, t)〉 endowed with the eigenket from the basis (1).
So (31) can now be extended step by step to the microstates
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f).
The purpose of this subsection is now fully realized.
132This lesson over centuries seems to me so noteworthy that I stress it by recalling the process that led to
(38) (after more than a whole year of incapacity, from my part, to solve the question, I had an accidental
insight that clarified the conceptual situation; I told this to a very learned friend, Carlos Lobo, and he showed
me the Descartes rules): Mathematically there is no imposed distinction between the non-effectuated form of
the sum
∑
m(pjmkm)t.r from the second member of (38), and its effectuated form pj .r. So one glides nearly
irrepressibly into the effectuated form. But on the other hand the effectuated form a. exp[(i/~)pjr] describes
one plane wave. Whereas physically, at the moment t when begins the act of measurement MesPvc−vd from
the succession [Gt.MesPvc−vd], the wave-function of a specimen of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) has,
at any space point r, the inner structure of an evolving superposition of M plane waves, not the stable form of
one plane-wave function, and this is why in general the vector-value pj(t) =
∑
m(pjmkm)t cannot be conserved
during a measurement evolution as it is required for applicability of the coding-postulate (20’). And precisely
this has led in this work to take into consideration value-destructive trace-registrations (33) and to posit the
coding-postulate (35). Which shows that the choice of the adequate coding-measurement-evolution depends
quintessentially on the inner structure imparted to a physical individual wave ΦGt of a physical individual
specimen σΦ(Gt) of the studied microstate msGt , by its operation of generation. So it is crucial indeed not to
glide too early into the effectuated form of the sum
∑
m(pjmkm)t(like when one wants to make the sum of several
apples with several prunes, one has to first have become able to speak of ‘fruit’). But such a warning cannot be
conceived inside the statistical algorithmic representations from QMHD where even the basic significance of the
mathematical concept of eigenfunction is entirely ignored. This illustrates the unpredictable specificities that,
inside Mathematical Physics, can – and must – distinguish a representation constantly guided by semantic-
mathematical criteria, from a representation guided by purely mathematical criteria. Mathematical Physics
cannot be reduced to Mathematics. And it is impressing to learn how explicitly Descartes was aware of this.
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(7.III).2.3.8 Conclusion on the [IQM −QMHD − dBDS(B)]-Representation of the Microstates
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f)
The main lines of the Hilbert-space representation inside [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)], of
the microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f), researched in the points (7.III).2.3, are now sketched
out. Of course many points remain to be worked out (for instance orthogonal bases (40) and
the Dirac-transformations). But the essence of the specific problems and of the corresponding
solutions is clarified. And on this basis, by use of:
- the coding postulate (35);
- the definition (33’);
- the equation (38);
- state-ket (39);
- expansions (22) with respect to Pvc−vd on bases (1);
- Gleason’s theorem (23),
the factual-formal representation of prediction-verification achieved in (7.III).2.2 for mi-
crostates ms(unbound, 1)G(q−f) can be transposed point by point to also the microstates
ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c); the proof of the assertion Ass.2 can be extended to the microstates
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f). Which leads to a representation (31) of the corresponding state-ket
(39). We have gained for also the microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) the desired general access
to the central predictive QMHD algorithm of form ((22)-(23)).
(7.III).2.4 The Case of One Unbound Micro-State of Two or More
Micro-Systems
Consider now the basic case of one micro-state of (only) two micro-systems that is involved in
Bell’s theorem on non-locality (cf. (3.I).1) (the generalization of the corresponding considera-
tions to more than two micro-systems is obvious). This case has released a revolution in the
Bohr orthodoxy (cf. the Appendix). I have exposed elsewhere (MMS [2013], Nov., v.3, French
text) what I call a ‘conceptual invalidation’ of Bell’s proof; namely the fact that the conclusion,
such as it is expressed verbally, does not follow from the mathematical proof. I had also con-
structed long before a counterexample to Bell’s formulation of the asserted conclusion (MMS
[1987]) that has been confirmed as ‘factually possible’ (Bordley [1989]). But these features are
not relevant in the present context. So here I confine to the following remarks.
According to the modelling postulate MP (msG,cw) from (6.II).2 every specimen σΦ(G)
of one micro-state of two micro-systems – as defined in (2.I)1 – involves two ‘corpuscular-like’
de Broglie singularities. The physical wave ΦG of one given specimen of such a microstate is
conceived by construction ((6.II).2) to be common to these two singularities (’systems’) because
only one operation of generation G has produced the specimen. This entails quite naturally that
the common wave denoted ΦG induces common features inside the wave-movement in which
the two singularities are involved 134. So the spins of the two involved singularities can be very
naturally conceived to stay permanently somehow related via the common wave-movement from
ΦG.
The QMHD tensor-product representation of one unbound micro-state of two or more
micro-systems can be regarded as a quite convenient transposition of the representation pro-
posed above (in (39) from (7.III).2.3.7 ) for one microstate of one microsystem with composed
operation of generation. Indeed the general though implicit criterion that manifests itself uni-
formly as the optimal choice of a Hilbert-space representation of any sort of micro-state, seems
to be that: Each one involved micro-system (singularity in a ‘corpuscular’-wave) introduces one
corresponding ‘physical’ space-time frame of representation (because human mind cannot con-
134Obviously this whole view is just a way of modelling a phenomenon and entities that are conceived to ‘exist’
and are denominated, but that cannot be directly perceived. But here the question is intimately linked with the
omnipresent and so often overseen fundamental distinction ‘inside-outside’ (cf. Atmanspacher, H. & Dalenoort,
G.J., [1994]) that underlies irrepressibly the whole human conceptualization and actions. This link is just a
psychological datum; we separate in wholes what we conceive to exist and each such whole has an inside and
an outside, we function in this way and not otherwise. It is vain to order to human thought not to conceive
models: it does this continuously, in a reflex way. But this way can stay ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ as long as it
is deliberately surveyed to be such, in the sense of logical coherence and factual consensual verifiability.
A Factually Rooted Hilbert-Dirac Representation 133
ceive a physical entity without assigning it a space-time support (MMS [2006]); while any other
qualification different from space-time location, introduces its own abstract semantic dimension
(momentum, etc.) on which is located the spectrum of ‘values’ to be taken into consideration on
this semantic dimension of qualification (defined in advance). So this procedure adjoins to the
physical space-time frames of representation, an abstract representation space of the qualifica-
tions of which the dimensionality is determined by the number of abstract semantic dimensions
that are deliberately introduced. This sort of complementation by an abstract configuration
spaces, of Descartes’s seminal basic procedure for representing positions and times relatively
to freely chosen reference-systems, is currently made use of since hundreds of years135. So in-
side the framework [IQM −QMHD − dBDS(B)] we conserve the QMHD representation of one
microstate with two or mores microsystems.
Concerning now specifically a Bell-experiment (cf. (3.I).2):
- Since the two involved micro-systems S1 and S2 are in one common micro-statemsG(2S)
(in the sense of (2.I).1) there is no reason whatever for posing a priori that the spin-values
registered for S1 and S2 by one measurement-succession [G(2S).Mes12(spin1.spin2)] should
come out to be non-correlated (the sign Mes(spin1.spin2) is the application to the considered
case, of the general notation Mes12(A1, B2) from (3.I).2); quite on the contrary, and all the
more so as in this case the considered sort of correlation is to be awaited to be stronger than the
generally present ‘meta’-correlations (11), (11’) from the probability-tree of any sort of unbound
microstate, because by conceptual-factual construction it stems from the interior of each
one individual event brought forth by each one complete measurement-succession from one
branch of the corresponding probability-tree while the correlations (11), (11’) involve globally
considered whole probability laws. This is a very unusual conceptual situation with respect to
the classical mechanical characterizations of ‘mobiles’136. The mechanics of microstates brings
in both the studied microstates considered globally, and their inner structure, because that
what admits mechanical qualifications is inside the whole called ‘a microstate’ (in the sense of
(1), (1’)).
- In such conditions, what is the point in hasting for changing the orientations of the
spin-measurement devices just at the last moment before the registration? The possible orienta-
tions of the registering devices can only determine by a predictive calculus what corresponding
category of spin-correlations a given choice of orientations would bring into the observable ac-
cordingly to QMHD. This high-pressure last-moment choice of orientations gains meaning only
with respect to:
- An a priori refusal of a conceptually admissible existence of any correlation because it
would ‘contradict’ Einstein’s principle of locality.
- The research of a factual estimation of the value of the velocity of transmission of ‘influences’
from the part of one of the two involved micro-systems, upon the other one, posited to have
been proved by Bell to be the unique and logically necessary explanation of the existence of any
correlation involved by the registered results.
But the second posit recalled above is false: Bell’s calculus and reasoning (MMS [2013])
concern exclusively the existence of a correlation accordingly to the formalism of QMHD. The
notion of an ‘influence’, and so also of a velocity of transmission of it, is founded directly and
exclusively on the supplementary assumption inserted independently and furtively, that the
two systems must have ‘separated’ when they have come ‘far enough’ from one another, which
amounts to wipe away the inside-outside specificities of the mechanics of microstates and to
treat them like classical ‘mobiles’.
This brings us to the central question:
What is the ground for imposing so dramatically an Einstein condition of locality that
has a well-defined significance and role only for macroscopic mobiles that are directly perceived
with definite global contours that individualize them mutually, by human observers imprisoned
135It is astonishing to observe what refusal and unending ‘problems’ this now so usual procedure entails when
it is applied to the representation space involved by the Schrödinger equation.
136In order to bring into explicit evidence the general peculiarities of such situation, a systematic preorgani-
zation of the involved concepts and language – like that from IQM – is a sine qua non pre-condition; if only
concepts and words from the current languages are made use of, one gets lost for speaking and reasoning in a
precise way.
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in differently moving inertial frames of reference wherefrom they communicate via light signals?
When two or more such observers do all survey such a mobile in such conditions, a scientific
representation does indeed require some rules of consensus concerning the identification of the
mobile and of its dynamic; some invariants are indeed necessary for generating consensual sig-
nificance for the assertion that these observers are all perceiving the ‘same’ mobile. But for
microstates, on which each human observer gathers a knowledge of the kind considered in mi-
crophysics, a knowledge constructed so very indirectly (think of IQM ) and in a so solitary way,
by each researcher isolated alone in his own Laboratory, without perceiving anything else than
cryptic marks on devices, out of which he draws some significance only by use of previously
elaborated conceptual-mathematical rules and treatments and of operational physical actions
decided on the basis of a model that involves unlimited waves, etc., etc., in such circumstances,
the a priori importation into fundamental microphysics of all the requirements of the macro-
scopic relativistic mechanics is very far from being an obvious necessity. It even is a highly
arbitrary constraint that manifests the impressive blinding force of the inertial urge to assert
the absolute general validity of anything that has been strikingly efficient inside some particular
context.
This, in its turn, brings forth the usefulness of a systematic epistemological-
methodological study of the problems of the type of those raised in IQM : What – specifically –
has to be required for a ‘scientific’ human representation of a given domain of physical reality?
And required on the basis of which epistemological-methodological basic principles? In what a
sense, and how, on the basis of which principles, considerations, factual possibilities, is it neces-
sary or useful in this or that definite sense, to insure global ‘unity’ between the various physical
theories? Is it conceivable to insure such a unity otherwise than by a common consensus on a
general methodology for generating scientific knowledge in general, that be then applicable by
particularizations to the processes of generation of knowledge concerning this or that definite
domain of what we call ‘reality’?
Coming back to Bell’s work, the so passionate and stubbornly resistant problems induced
by it seem to be entailed by a model of two solid balls that are receding from one another.
Of course all the preceding considerations also are founded upon models. But by now,
I think, it has become clear that without any model one cannot try to construct a theory of
microstates; one even cannot reason, prove, conceive, speak and write. And indeed the whole
non-locality problem concerns a model, a more or less hidden one that involves huge questions,
like the nature of space and time (physical? only psychical?) and the indefinitely multiform
separations in relative wholes with a relative pair of an inside and an outside, that the human
mind instils in what we call ‘physical reality’.
And Bell’s proof only eliminates the model implied by him.
But from the specific and humble point of view of the purpose of this chapter (7.III),
another conclusion is significant. Namely:
Nothing withstands the extension of the assertion Ass.2 and the equivalence (31) to the
microstates of one unbound micro-state of two or more micro-systems. The proof worked out in
(7.III).2.2 for microstates ms(unbound, 1)G(q−f) can be transposed point by point to also this
category of microstates.
Thereby the exploration begun in (7.III).2.1 is closed and we can formulate the following
conclusion.
(7.III).2.5 Final Conclusion on the Domain of Validity of the Assertion Ass.2
and the Equivalence (31)
The assertion Ass2 and the factual-formal equivalence (31) of prediction-verification are valid
for any un-bound microstate of one microsystem. This – in the framework [IQM −QMHD −
dBDS(B)] – achieves a unified and intelligible Hilbert-space representation of the quantum-
measurements on unbound microstates, and this representation is entirely duplicated by a fac-
tually generated Hilbert-space representation of all the predictive contents of QMHD concerning
unbound microstates.
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(7.III).2.6 Final Conclusion on the Domain of Validity of the Assertion Ass.2
and the Equivalence (31)
(7.III).2.6. The [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] optimizing utilization of Schrödinger’s equation
for unbound microstates, versus the equivalence (31)
Consider the general form of the equation
i~(d/dt) |ψG,H(r, t)〉 = H |ψG,H(r, t)〉
What does this equation assert and how does it act?
In essence, and in representational terms, it asserts this: "The formal change of the state-
ket |ψG,H(r, t)〉 that you study is equal with (identical to) the formal effect upon |ψG,H(r, t)〉
of the action of the hamiltonian operator of the problem, H = P2 + V (r). where P = (~/i)∇
and V (r). is a multiplicative operator. And the way in which H acts upon |ψG,H(r, t)〉 follows
from the definitions of the involved descriptional elements".
So, since |ψG,H(r, t)〉 is a function of only the variables r and t, the changes with time of
|ψG,H(r, t)〉 inside the domain of space delimited by the problem are necessarily generated all
via the changes of the position variable r entailed inside this domain, via H , upon the positions
r of the abstract points with respect to any presupposed space-time frame of reference.
Full stop.
All the other physical meanings as well as the numerical values involved by these, are first
determined by other definitions and posits and calculi that are independent of the Schrödinger
equation that, considered together, adjoin to the equation another – conceptual-formal – struc-
ture of reference; and their changes are then indirectly entailed by the independent changes of
the time parameter and the correlative changes of the position variable r produced directly and
exclusively by the equation.
Like in the case of any differential equation with variables (r, t) that is made use of in
a theory of physical matter, that whereof one wants to know how it changes – in this case the
descriptor |ψG,H(r, t)〉 – has to be adduced into the equation from the outside, at an ‘initial
moment’ of the process. After its adduction into the equation this is indeed changed by the
equation, indirectly, because the involved meanings and values qualify some material entity and
our human minds cannot conceive a material entity to ‘exist’ at any given time, without any
spatial support137. So the representation of each physical datum – ‘entity’ or ‘phenomenon’, as
well as any physical qualification of this datum – that has been specified outside the equation,
is deposited like on a small tray upon an initial representational support of abstract points
of relative positions r , which defines the initial state-ket |ψG,H(r, t0)〉. And immediately these
abstract position-supports are displaced like a host of tiny moving pavements, with velocities
determined in direction and value by the content of the acting hamiltonian operator H , while
carrying the data initially deposited on them.
The mathematical form of an expansion |ψG,H(r, t0)〉 /A from (22) of the initial state-
ket |ψG,H(r, t0)〉 with respect to only one observable A, restricts and explicates in advance of
what one wants to known how it changes. Therefore, on such an expanded form it becomes
directly visible that a given eigenket of A and the mathematical form (23) of the Hilbert-space
projection of |ψG,H(r, t0)〉 on the axis of that eigenket, are both given independently of the
Schrödinger equation, and that only the projection can change because it acts like a counter,
while the eigenket is independent of time by definition because it is introduced as a poster that
advertises the semantic a-temporal definition of what has to be deposited on that axis.
This view, when it is present, increases strongly the intelligibility: One understands im-
mediately that, in the case of such a Hilbert pre-structuration of the abstract space-platforms
on which are deposited the objects that are subjected to the changes operated by the equation
one is a priori interested in, exclusively, the cardinals |c(aj)|2 at each given time t, of the
classes of potential outcomes aj of, specifically, one act of A-measurement performed on the
studied microstate at that time t ; which by Gleason’s theorem (23) amounts to the probabili-
ties of these outcomes. So that – in what concerns the predictions on measurements performed
137Kant’s principle according to which ‘space’ and ‘time’ are a priori ‘forms’ of human intuition, where our
minds irrepressibly place any physical fact or event – so that any representation of these are tied with a space-
time support – is, I think a most basic epistemological datum.
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on a microstate, the output of the Schrödinger equation is required from the start in an only
probabilistic form, notwithstanding the individual and deterministic evolution of each position-
variable r . The questions that are asked from the equation are directly and exclusively of a
statistical-probabilistic nature and this is why the Hilbert-space formalism is specifically ap-
propriated138.
This being recalled let us bring into evidence the role of the availability of the formal-
factual equivalence (31) for an initial time t0.
Consider first a hamiltonian situation. It is often said that the initial state-ket
|ψG,H(r, t0)〉 is determined by imposing the limiting conditions upon the general solution of
the Schrödinger equation of the problem. But if, on the spatial domain globally delimited by
these conditions, the physical initial situation varies in space in a way that escapes mathemat-
ically specifiable knowledge (as nearly always is the case in a non-idealized factual situation),
the limiting conditions alone (not exhaustively the initial conditions) might not suffice for a
satisfactory degree of specification of the statistical contents of the initial state-ket. Moreover
when the problem involves a non-stationary hamiltonian it seems very questionable whether the
corresponding deterministic Schrödinger equation can produce a representation of the individ-
ual evolutions of the position-variable r that entails with an acceptable accuracy the researched
probabilistic predictions139.
In short, when the equation exists, the predictions in general can emerge flawed by
ignorance and approximation.
And how they are flawed, and to what a degree, can be known only a posteriori, by
verification-measurements that always are factual and emerge individually, just like in
(31). In this sense the formal-factual construction of (31)
[|ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff ≈pred. {∀A, ∀t, |ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff /A}]verif
cannot be economized.
Consider now a physical situation that is not hamiltonian. Then the Schrödinger equation
cannot be written.
In such conditions the equivalence (31) entails the possibility of principle of replacing the
equation.
So inside [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] the optimal composition of the use of the
Schrödinger equation and of that of the equivalence (31), is realized as follows:
- One can systematically begin by constructing any expansion
∣∣ψGt1,H(r, t0)〉ff /A from
(31), via individual measurements – like in IQM – and by following the factual-formal proce-
dure from (7.III).2.2.2. These expansions from (31) express the whole and certainly true initial
statistical situation that generates – factually – any statistical distribution that is factually true
at a subsequent time t > t0: the involved G0 or Gt embodies the limiting conditions that act
factually, while the factual -formal character of the whole constructive procedure entails max-
imal sensitivity with respect to the specificities of the whole factual ground encompassed by
the limiting conditions, which specificities can acquire a formal expression only if the limiting
conditions are furthermore completed by the construction for t = t0 of the whole factual-formal
state-ket
∣∣ψGt0 ,H(r, t)〉ff from (31).
Once the initial expansions (31) are thus determined :
- If the Schrödinger equation of the problem exists, one can continue by determining
mathematically by its use the state-ket entailed for any moment t > t0, when this seems eco-
nomical. This amounts to a possibility of systematic optimization of the use of the Schrödinger
138Individual predictive specifications would be in-compatible with the basic methodological decision (1): The
inescapable necessity to repeat the measurement-succession [G.Mes.A] if one wants to insure consensual verifi-
cation of any prediction, and the fact that such repetitions produce in general non-identical results, places from
the start the whole prediction-verification organization from [IQM−QMHD−dBDS(B)] on the statistical level
of representation, notwithstanding that the conceptualization is rooted in the individual level of representation.
139Given probabilistic predictions, can determine the class of individual evolutions that is compatible with
them; but when the predictions are not known, a fortiori one cannot determine what impact on these can be
entailed by the a priori ignorance of the individual evolutions of the space-variable r.
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equation when it is available and the solution seems to have been obtained in a fully reliable
way, i.e. is not flawed by approximations with non-specifiable consequences.
- One can also generate factually the integrated functional form |ψG0,H(r, t)〉ff =
a(r, t0)e
(i/~)ϕ(r,t) of the state-ket of the studied microstate, for any chosen moment t > t0
and compare it to that one determined by the equation.
This amounts to a possibility of systematic control of the results produced by the equation
and so, a possibility to bring forth by comparison the deviations from the factual truth that
might have been inserted by mathematical approximations and that are not specifiable a priori.
- When the Schrödinger equation of the problem cannot be written or cannot be solved,
(31) permits to radically replace it.
In short, inside [IQM −QMHD − dBDS(B)] the assertion Ass2 and the formal-factual
construct (31) that expresses it, endow the representation of prediction-verification for unbound
microstates with: the possibility to optimize the use of the equation of evolution; the possibility
to control the only mathematically established predictions; a degree of applicability of the
formalism that is enlarged with respect to that offered by QMHD.
(7.III).3 A NEW INSIGHT ENTAILED BY THE
CONSTRUCTION FROM (7.III).2
Besides its explicit conclusion, the constructive development from (7.III).2 entails a new view
that we explicate below.
(7.III).3.1 Inversion of the Hierarchy Between the Degrees of ‘Scientificity’ of
dBDS(B) and QMHD
Inversion. Both dBDS(B) and QMHD define any classical dynamical quantity A as a func-
tion A(r, p). On the other hand the coding-postulate (35) is posited to be valid for any sort
of unbound microstate. So – insofar that the guided momenta (33) can indeed be measured
accordingly to (35) – any unbound microstate can be subjected to simultaneous position-and -
momentum measurements. So the registration of observable marks specific to a given QMHD
observable A ceases to be a necessity. Indeed:
Inside [IQM −QMHD−dBDS(B)] the notion of mutually incompatible observables – as
defined on the individual level of conceptualization at the point 3 from 2.I).2 – does not any
more come in with necessity: The probability-trees with mutually incompatible branches can be
avoided and replaced by one-trunk probability-trees that are graphically similar to that from the
Fig.3 in (3.I).1 but have a different content because the physical-operational acts of measurement
Mes(r,p) are achieved accordingly to (35) and the values of any dynamical quantity A are just
calculated after the performance of these physical-operational acts of measurement, from the
obtained pairs of results (r,p); so that the trunk is common to all the classical mechanical
quantities A(r,p) and it is topped by a crown of only conceptually worked out probability
spaces mutually connected by a meta-statistical level of correlations.
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Fig. 3’. One-trunk probability-tree tied with the Coding-Postulate (35), constructible for any
sort of unbound microstate and any pair ((A(r,p), B(r,p)) of qualifying quantities
In this way there appears a quite general stratum of physical operations and of corre-
sponding representations that incorporates a thicker stratum of the microphysical reality than
that where evolve the quasi-classical microstates ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c) for which the coding-
postulate (20’) is valid. This general thicker stratum starts deeper inside the radically non-
classical region of micro-physical factuality where evolve the microstatesms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f )
of which the corpuscular-like singularities are immersed in ‘inner’ non-null quantum potentials
that cannot be manipulated from the outside of the microstate as it is required by the coding-
postulate (20’).
With respect to this generally possible representation, the probability trees with mutually
incompatible branches of the type represented in the Fig.2 appear now as a particular
alternative possibility characteristic of exclusively the microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n−c)
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that are subjected to Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty iff the coding-postulate (20’)
is employed 140.
So inside the framework [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] the channel (36) of adduction
of representations from dBDS(B), into the ‘scientific’ knowledge defined by a requirement of
communicable, consensual, observable and verifiable assertions, has all of a sudden gained the
massive final adhesion of one-trunk probability-trees of the universal type represented in the
Fig.3’. Correlatively, inside [IQM −QMHD − dBDS(B)] the degree of communication between
the purely representational formalism from dBDS(B) and the predictive formalism from QMHD,
tends to evolve. For instance, consider the [IQM −QMHD − dBDS(B)] probability pi(pj) that
the result of a momentum-measurement performed at a time t on a microstate with state-ket
|ΨG(r, t)〉 be pj . In dBDS(B) terms this probability can be symbolized as
pi(pj) =! [pi(r).pi[∇β(r, t) = pj ]]dr = ! [|ψG(r, t)|2 pi[∇ϕ(r, t)] = pj ]dr
(the writing pi[∇β(r, t) = pj ] is to be read: the probability that ∇β(r, t) possess the value pj).
The purely descriptive approach dBDS(B) does not define ways of verifying the factual truth
of this symbolization; but conceptually it permits to consider it as a dBDS(B) representation
of Born’s postulate:
|c(pj , t)|2 = pi(pj) =! [pi(r).pi[∇β(r, t) = pj ]]dr =! [|ψG(r, t)|2 pi[∇ϕ(r, t)] = pj ]dr
Which acts as a dBDS(B) specification of the significance of this postulate; while furthermore
inside [IQM −QMHD − dBDS(B)] the pertinence of this significance can be verified factually
by use of the equivalence (31) constructed accordingly to either the coding-postulate (35) or the
coding-postulate (20’) and in connection with the posit P2 from (7.III).2.3.7. This illustrates
how inside [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] arise new possibilities of developing the consensual,
predictive and verifiable representation of the microstates constructed in QM2.
The developments brought forth by the new de Broglie school formed in Portugal [2010]
enforce notably this last assertion.
The process illustrated above leads toward a genuine inversion of the conceptual status
of the approach dBDS(B) with respect to that of QMHD: dBDS(B) tends to gain a basic
conceptual status with respect to the un-intelligible QMHD algorithms for representing the
microstates and the measurements on these. These algorithms seem to swing in the air of thought
attached to a chord lowered from the level of classical conceptualization, by extrapolations
toward the microphysical factuality that they do not reach. While inside [IQM − QMHD −
dBDS(B)] the new representation of the microstates constructed here emerges like a building
rooted in the earth of the thinking about physical reality.
Which brings us to the following point.
(7.III).3.2 Return on the Debate Englert&alt. Dürr&alt, Finkelstein, Hiley&alt
Just a few more words on the debate Englert&alt. [1992], Dürr&alt [1993], Finkelstein [1995],
Hiley&alt [2000] cited in the preceding notes.
It is already clear at this point, I think, that the semantic distances that separate from one
another the approach practised inside QMHD from that practised in dBDS(B) are so numerous
and fundamental that any argument on the possibility or not to register a ‘trace’ in the sense of
dBDS(B) is simply devoid of significance if it is formulated by the use of the QHD formalism.
On the other hand, the stake of a valid answer to this problem – centred upon the more
precise question of the measurability by trace-registrations of the value of the dBDS(B) ‘guided
momentum’ (33) – appears to be very high. Indeed this answer can decide between:
 Either the nowadays QMHD representation of the microstates which in fact – as it
now stands – offers reliable consensual and verifiable predictions only on the microstates
ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c) devoid of any inner interference phenomenon, or a new representation
140It appears that the non-boolean Birkhoff-voan Neumann ‘logical’ structure characterizes the way in which
it is possible to code the results of measurerments, not the microstates themselves.
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of the microstates that offers verifiable predictions on any sort of unbound microstates, with or
without inner interferences.
And it will also decide between:
 Either a de Broglie-Bohm approach dBDS(B) that – if it is organically incorporated into a
new intelligible quantum mechanics worked out inside [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] – might
play there a basic conceptual, operational and representational role in which QMHD fails, or a
de Broglie-Bohm approach dBDS(B) that conserves its present status of only a mathematically
expressed metaphysics of microphysics that keeps fighting for the title of "interpretation" of an
un-intelligible QMHD.
In these conditions, and from the viewpoint of [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)], the per-
formance of the experiment EXP proposed in (7.III).2.3.5 deserves fully the effort for being
realized.
(7.III).4 BOUND MICROSTATES
We finally consider also the case of bound microstates (micro-structures of microstates in fact).
Thereby we come back to the general introduction to this work. Let us stabilize this loop by
expressing the connection.
Historically the representation of this sort of micro-structures has begun inside the classi-
cal physics via a top-down approach that associated classical models to entities from chemistry
and from molecular and atomic physics. This extrapolating progression came to stagnation
around 1900 and consequently the first ’quantum’ postulates came in (Bohr, Plank, Einstein’s
explanation of the photoelectric effect). These have acted like close precursors of the dramatic
full reversion, by Louis de Broglie, of the direction and the nature of the scientific construction
of knowledge on micro-phenomena: de Broglie’s corpuscular-wave model initiated a decidedly
bottom up approach along the vertical of conceptualization that ties the classical level of con-
ceptualization to the as yet never represented before accordingly to scientific legality. And
Schrödinger’s equation, by its first applications, has yielded so striking results that a new phase
of construction began.
But it began there where Schrödinger’s equation placed the new start. Namely with
mathematical representations of predictive statistics of results of quantum measurements of
which the processes of verification by – necessarily – long series of individual measurements,
were not yet represented.
IQM has only now constructed this lacking foundation, after nearly a century.
But with respect to the essential specificities of the descriptions of microstates such as
these have been organized in this work, first inside IQM and then inside the two successive
frameworks [IQM −QMHD] and [IQM −QMHD−dBDS(B)], the case of bound microstates is
now placed far up on the roof, under an accumulation of hyphens between specifically quantum
features, and classical ones. Under this transitional cover the strongest conceptual and formal
specificities of the microstates are devoid of contour:
- The human observer did not himself achieve deliberately the involved operation of
generation Gt. This operation has been achieved naturally before the beginning of the human
investigation. So from the point of view of its availability for being studied, a bound microstate
is like a classical “object”, it just pre-exists ‘there outside’. Now, when the basic role of the
operation of generation has become already clear, one can understand what loss of specificity
is entailed by this absence.
- In the absence of a deliberate human generation of the microstate, the measurements
have to be conceived in the classical manner, without successions [Gt.MesA] each one of which
involves first a realization of Gt; so they are achieved only via indirect acts of measurement
MesA, by use of test-microstates (for which the measurement evolution can obey the coding-
postulate (20’) (for instance Compton collisions), or they consist of field effects (Stark, Zeeman).
Furthermore the measurement-interaction itself is often realized statistically, by the direct action
of a big set of test-microstates, on a big set of replicas of the studied microstate (monochromatic
radiation incident on a collection of atoms of a definite kind, etc.) so that the obtained result
is a mean of the involved eigenvalues.
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- A bound microstate is permanently stably captured inside a small global space-time
support mentally assigned to the physical entities that are involved; these mental contours have
abstracted away the spatially unlimited wave-aspects that are devoid of a separable observ-
able significance. This artificially delimited physical space-time support is associated with an
abstract representation space where are lodged the values considered on the mechanical di-
mensions of qualification of the involved micro-systems. In a classical configuration space this
happens currently and nobody wonders why more than only four dimensions of representation
are considered. If in the case of a bound microstate one begins to wonder concerning this, then
much place for confusion is introduced. But precisely this happens because the general absence
of intelligibility of the formalism entails general suspicion.
- For a bound microstate – like in the case of an unbound one – the formal distinction is
very feeble between the state-function from the statistical state-ket of a considered microstate
|ψGt〉 and the corresponding de Broglie wave-function ΦGt . But for a bound state even the
conceptual-physical distinction – so progressively and painfully specified in this work – is sub-
jected to a new sort of confusion. Namely, for a bound structure of microstates the physical
specimens of the involved microstates are stably present, brought into factual existence by a
revolved and ’natural’ operation of generation that can be ignored, and they concentrate the
attention on them, while the abstract statistical features represented by the corresponding state-
ket are perceived as such, like in the classical physics; whereas for an unbound microstate the
strict reverse happens, the existence and the role of the physical specimens have been occulted
and the abstract representation by a state-ket has been reified because the formalism works
exclusively with this. Moreover the state-ket is from the start conceived to be also an eigenket
of the total energy observable H, which in this case is formally possible by ’degeneration’; but
conceptually this is a huge confusion, namely an identification of a descriptor of a set of sets of
predictive counts, with the descriptor of a sample of a physical wave-movement.
Etc.
All this creates many conceptual ghost-problems. All the more so as a theory of, specifi-
cally, quantum measurements, is not imperatively necessary for measurements on bound states.
In these circumstances and since in the present work the aim is to bring forth the specific
principles of a fully intelligible representation of the microstates, the bound microstates have a
very marginal conceptual role, which permits to postpone their treatment.
(7.III).5 CONCLUSION ON THE CHAPTER (7.III)
In the chapter 7.III – first inside [IQM − QMHD] and then in the completed framework
[IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] – we have outlined constructively a new representation of the
microstates. This representation has been centred upon the physical-operational definition of
the quantum measurements and upon the requirements of a general and fully intelligible Hilbert-
space representation of the predictions of outcomes of these measurements and of the verification
of these outcomes.
In the section (7.III).1 – via a first fundamental assertion Ass.1 and its proof – we have
first brought into evidence a deeply-set conceptual fact able to entail coherence of IQM and
QMHD with respect to an explicit requirement of individual measurability for – both – verifying
statistical predictions that have been established mathematically, as it is done in QMHD, and
also for constructing verifiable statistical predictions. This apparently trivial supplementary
requirement has in fact entailed major consequences. It has drawn into the light of attention
the whole approach from IQM and brought into evidence in what a way, by a strict use of
a small and define set of conditions of compatibility, IQM can strongly guide the elaboration
of the new representation of the microstates that is researched here, called a priori a second
Quantum Mechanics and denoted QM2. It has also permitted to pre-organise clearly the general
conceptual ground on which to try to achieve this elaboration.
In the section (7.III).2 the systematic reference to IQM and the mentioned extension of
the role of measurements to also the construction of predictive statistics – a sort of Columbus
egg – entailed a new assertion, Ass.2, of the possibility, for unbound microstates, to liberate
the researched new representation of the microstates from the a priori accepted necessity to
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make use of the Schrödinger equation. Stated in positive terms, Ass.2 claimed the possibility
for unbound microstates, to generate the predictive statistics by a formal-factual procedure
founded upon an only modelling usage of the involved Hilbert-space mathematical moulds and
upon effectively realized individual measurements.
The proof of the assertion Ass.2 for the particular case of microstates
ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c) led to the formal-factual equivalence (31)
[
∣∣ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff ≈pred. {∀A, ∀t, ∣∣ψGt1,H(r, t)〉ff /A}]verif .
where ∣∣ψGt1,H(r, t)〉ff 6= pred.| ∣∣ψGt1,H(r, t)〉
And this equivalence insures direct the access to the core (22)-(23) of a Hilbert-space representa-
tion of the predictions on microstatesms(unbound, 1)G(n−c), without the use of the Schrödinger
equation of the problem; while the verification of these predictions is insured by the assertion
Ass.1.
We have then tried to extend this – that seemed very satisfactory – to also the microstates
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) that involve interference and quantum potential. But this extension en-
countered from the start an unexpected obstacle in the way of the verifiability of the predictions
on the outcomes of measurements of the momentum observable. The source of this obstacle kept
stubbornly hidden in mist. A tortuous track has been followed in order to gain understanding
of the conceptual situation. A succession of objections emerged. First a sort of superficial,
symptomatic contestation of the pertinence of the additive Hilbert-space representation of type
(15”) of a microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f); this led to a negation of the relevance of the now
solidly installed distinction "beable"-"observable"; which led to identify the source of the prob-
lem inside this work, namely operational incompatibility of the additive representation with
the implicitly admitted coding-measurement procedure which entailed then recourse to the ap-
proach dBDS(B) that imposed itself as an essential constituent of the soil where one can hope
to grow an intelligible new representation of the predictions on the results of quantum mea-
surements performed on interference microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f), as well as verifiability
of such predictions.
Finally however the basic source of the problem appeared with its full methodological
generality, that Descartes had known and expressed, and this permitted to reach the conve-
niently generalized equation (1) for the eigenfunctions and eigenvalues of the momentum ob-
servable, wherefrom emerged a satisfactory Hilbert-space representation (38’)-(39)-(40) of the
microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) that is fully compatible with the assertion Ass.2 and the
equivalence (31).
As for the extension to also a one micro-state of two or several micro-systems, nothing
withstands the application to them of the assertion Ass.2 and (31); while the case of the bound
microstates is devoid of any importance of principle with respect to the purpose of this work.
Thereby a factually rooted representation of the unbound microstates has revealed its
contours; these are entailed by the association
[Ass.1, Ass.2, (22)-(23)]
where
(22) |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 ≈pred. {∀A, ∀t1, |ψG,H(r, t1)〉 /A}
(23) pi(ψG, aj) ≡Gt |Pr.j |ψG〉|2 = |c(aj)|2 , ∀j (Gleason)
and they are embodied by the relations
(31) [
∣∣ψGt,H(r, t)〉ff ≈pred. {∀A, ∀t, ∣∣ψGt,H(r, t1)〉ff /A}]verif .,∣∣ψGt1,H(r, t)〉ff 6=pred. ∣∣ψGt1,H(r, t)〉
(38’) Pvc−vd.
∏
m
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(39)
∣∣Ψ(r, t)Gt(G1,G2,...,Gm,...,GM )(r, t)〉
(1)
{∣∣∣∣∣∏
m
a exp ((i/~(pjm.km(r))t.r)
〉}
≡
{∣∣∣∣∣∏
m
a exp ((i/~(pjm.km(r))t.r)
〉}
,
∀j141,m = 1, 2, ...,M
The process that led to this result entailed a radical separation and clarification of the
own and independant role of the Hilbert-space mathematical representation (22)-(23) of pre-
diction on the outcomes of quantum measurements on unbound microstates, and it endows the
unbound microstates with autonomy with respect to the corresponding Schrödinger equation and
with power of optimization and control of the outputs of this equation.
While the channel
(36’) [MP (msG,cw), (1’) G↔ msG,cw, (14) msG,cw ≡ {σ(msG,cw)},
(37) P (cod)∀msG), (one-trunk probability-trees)]
of adduction into QM2 of elements from dBDS(B), entails for any unbound microstate the
possibility of a one-trunk probability-tree of the type from the Fig.3’, which connects deeply
the second quantum mechanics developed here, to classical mechanics on the one hand, and on
the other hand to the concepts and the mathematical representations from dBDS(B).
In (7.III).3 we have briefly discussed a new insight entailed by the construction from
(7.III).2 concerning the conceptual status of dBDS(B) relatively to that of QMHD.
Throughout the developments from (7.III) the IQM concepts of operationG of generation
of a microstate, of measurement-successions [G.MesA], of coding-postulate P(cod), have inti-
mately composed themselves with the essence (22),(23) of the QMHD Hilbert-space formalism
for expressing probabilistic predictions and with the model of a microstate and the guiding-
relation (33) from the dBDS(B) representation of micro-phenomena. Thereby the building-
blocks from the framework [IQM − QMHD − dBDS(B)] have implicitly fused together into a
new representation of the microstates.
In what follows we shall now briefly explicate the integrated contour and inner structure
of this new representation.
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(8.III) INTEGRATION OF QM2
The first framework [IQM−QMHD] adopted in this work for constructing a new representation
of the microstates has played the role of a scaffold around QMHD. It has permitted and guided
the insertion of QMHD into the general structure imposed by IQM. The process of insertion has
hit a limit in the case of microstatesms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) and this has drawn into play also the
approach dBDS(B); so a new conceptual scaffold has been used, [IQM −QMHD − dBDS(B)].
In what follows we drop now any scaffold and, by a final integration of all the main results
obtained up to now, we shall define the global shape and the essential contents of the second
quantum mechanics proposed here, as well as its neighbourhoods.
(8.III).1 The Three Source-Domains and Their Respective Roles in
the Generation of QM2
So the prime matter for constructingQM2 has been drawn out of IQM,QMHD and the approach
dBDS(B). The respective roles of these source-domains can be summarized as follows.
The Infra-(Quantum Mechanics), IQM. This has been constructed with the overt
purpose to induce the whole conceptual-operational-methodological structure of QM2, in a sense
similar to that in which the structure of an organic entity is induced by its genetic code. IQM
has acted as a structure of instructional commands to which have been referred the data as
well as the lacunae involved by QM2. Thereby the role of IQM has been both constructive and
selective. It has eliminated as non-conformal with it the general mathematical representation
of quantum measurements; it has explicitly called for a general model of a microstate and
for coding-measurement successions founded on this model; it has explicitly required definite
coding-postulates; and throughout the chapters (6.II) and (7.III), step by step, it has dictated
refusals, specifications, re-organizations, new constructs.
The de Broglie-Bohm approach, dBDS(B). This approach started in Louis de
Broglie’s Thesis, with the Jacobi formulation of classical mechanics and optics142 where the
conditions that restrict the ‘geometric approximation’ have been suppressed (de Broglie [1924],
[1956], [1963]). This representation has been then progressively specified.
But the process of specification did not individualize a definite concept of microstate,
neither conceptually nor in a physical-operational way.
Though from the start de Broglie’s representation has been mathematical, nevertheless it
remained global, continuous, very much a-observational. It concerned as a whole the universal
substratum of the physical reality where this or that local form was zoomed on in imagination.
142That stems from very far (Descartes, Newton, Huygens).
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Individualizing words did appear (mainly the unhappy word ‘particle’), as well as recourse to an
imaginary ‘observer’ from time to time. But these occurrences have been kept independent of any
organized concern about consensus in the sense of operational and verifiable inter-subjectivity.
In this sense de Broglie’s global approach – notwithstanding the experimental confirmation of
his seminal relation p = h/λ143 – remained basically a sort of metaphysical extension of math-
ematical physics that specifies in a physical-mathematical representation Spinoza’s ‘substance’.
Even Louis de Broglie’s theory of measurements inside his subsequent theory of double solu-
tion formulated so much later (de Broglie [1956)], [1957)], denoted here as dBDS(B)) remains
just an explanation of the a priori and fully accepted theory of measurements from QMHD; a
conceptual device juxtaposed like a channel for connecting explicitly QMHD such as it stands
to de Broglie’s double-solution interpretation of QMHD. In short, Louis de Broglie did not offer
his own representation otherwise than just an elaborated interpretation of QMHD. Nor did he
desire for it another status.
Bohm’s 1952 work possessed the same sort of characters.
Inside [IQM −QMHD] and [IQM −QMHD− dBDS(B)] however, de Broglie’s work has
offered the model of a microstate, the guiding law (33), and the coding-postulate (35). Thereby
– and on the basis of the crucial hypothesis that the experiment EXP has been performed and
has established the calculability from the registered data, of the instantaneous and evolving
momentum-value (33) – dBDS(B) contributes to the foundations of QM2. Nevertheless, con-
sidered globally, dBDS(B) still remains for the moment just a vast and extraordinarily rich
reservoir of deep and mathematically worked-out views and representations that can connect
QM2 explicitly and in detail to the classical mechanic, to the classical optic, and – most pre-
ciously – to the whole basic physical factuality wherefrom in the future might emerge a scientific
theory of teleportation, as well as many other unpredictable advances144.
The nowadays Hilbert-Dirac formulation of Quantum Mechanics, QMHD.
The Hilbert-space representation of microstates is highly convenient for the representation of
the probabilistic predictive contents of QMHD (via the relations (22) and (23)). Moreover this
representation has been impressively developed into a very complex and powerful system of
mathematical tools. Therefore the preservation of a non-restricted Hilbert-space representation
constitutes a considerable practical purpose, notwithstanding the fundamental inadequacy of
the QMHD theory of quantum measurement. But the additive representation of type (15”) of
the state-ket of a microstatems(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) that involves a non-null quantum potential,
has been found to lead to predictions that are not verifiable (and probably factually incorrect).
That is why in (7.III) we have so decidedly researched the modified Hilbert-space representation
(38’)-(39)-(40) of a microstate ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) that permits to conserve the use of (22)
and (23).
In short, for QM2 the main importance of QMHD consists of the Hilbert-space formalism
for representing the probabilistic predictions.
(8.III).2 The Basic Assumptions from QM2
IQM is globally conserved inside QM2 :
1. The structural immersion-postulate in IQM.
IQM as a whole is conserved inside QM2 in the role of an explicit pre-organized instruc-
tional epistemological-operational-methodological structure that constraints a priori the process
of construction of QM2. The possibility of a structure like IQM is by itself a basic procedural
novelty that insures intelligibility and control.
A massive but selective importation of QMHD postulates:
2. The MQHD are conserved, with the following exceptions :
- The measurement-postulates are all suppressed.
143Very notably and curiously, this relation has been derived from precisely a condition of consensus between
two imagined observers ! And a relativistic condition! (MMS [1994]).
144It is stunning that such a major work is not fully translated in English.
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- For microstates with possibility of quantum fields the QMHD additive representation
is cancelled and the representation (39) replaces it.
New specifically QM2 postulates
3. The individual modelling postulate
[MP (msG,cw)+ (1’) (G↔ msG,cw)](valid for any sort of individual microstate).
4. The Schrödinger equation of evolution of the state-ket of a microstate.
5. The definition (33) of de Broglie’s instantaneous and evolving momentum-
value p(r, t), posited to be valid for any sort of microstate.
6. The coding-measurement postulates (20’) for the microstates
ms(unbound, 1)G(n−c)) and (35) for ANY unbound microstate.
7. The general representation (33’) of the generalized concept Pvc−vd of a
momentum-observable.
8. The Hilbert-Dirac representation (38’)-(39)-(40) of microstates
ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f).
Via the postulates 3, 4, 5, the dBDS(B) representation is unified with QM2, whereby
it gains access to scientific expressions (consensual representations of predictions and verifica-
tions).
(8.III).3 The Main Characteristics of the Process of Construction of
QM2
Throughout the chapters (6.II) and (7.III) various features of what has been a priori named
QM2 have emerged in a scattered chaotic way. Now these features will just be summarized in a
more organized way. The summary, moreover, will be synthetic in the extreme. Any elaboration
will be banished.
As stated before, inside this work the purpose is not to offer a fully achieved new theory
of microstates; it is only to identify the conceptual loci wherefrom un-intelligibility is spouting
inside QMHD, to clean these away, and to open up a well-defined general framework where a
method acts that guarantees the possibility of a subsequent elaboration of a fully intelligible
and self-consistent new representation of the microstates.
Details on the role of IQM.
* The global inner structure of the formalism from QM2 satisfies strictly all the gen-
eral requirements of IQM, that are qualitative but syntactic requirements. These are recalled
beneath:
* The representation is rooted directly in the a-conceptual factual physical-operational
reality. This establishes the zero-level of conceptualization. Therefrom the process of conceptu-
alization progresses step by step, constructively, on the direction bottom-up on the vertical of
human conceptualisation (fig.1).
* The individual level of conceptualization, and the statistical one, are explicitly and
radically distinguished from one-another.
* The microstates are classified according to the definitions from (2.I)1.
* The passage from the individual level of conceptualization, onto the statistical one is
webbed by repeated individual coding-measurement-successions [G.MesA]. The possible sort
of acts of measurement – that inside the general approach IQM remained undefined – is deter-
mined, for each class of microstates separately, by the model posited for a microstate.
* The description of any microstate is a primordially transferred [, δ,N0]-probabilistic
description (9”).
* If the coding-postulate that is made use of is of the type (20’) – which according
to QM2 is possible only for the class of microstates ms(free, 1)G(n−c) – the construction of
corresponding primordially transferred probabilistic description can be inserted into a tree-like
structure of the general type defined in (3.I).1, Fig.2, of which the content varies in its details
with the type from (2.I)1) of the considered microstate. (cf. the figures 2, 3, 4).
* If the coding-postulate that is made use of is of the type (35) – which according to
QM2 is possible for any unbound microstate but is the unique possibility for the microstates
from the class ms(free, 1)cG(q−f) – the corresponding primordially transferred probabilistic
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description can be represented by a one-trunk probability-tree as defined in (7.III).3.1, Fig.3’.
In QM2 these tree-like structures summarize in graphic language a deep and complex unity
of the representation of quantum measurements. We reproduce beneath a superposition of the
figures 2 and 3.
* The inclusion of IQM protects QM2 of all the interpretation problems that have con-
sumed such quantities of ink (cf. MMS [2013]v3).
Fig. 2. The coding postulate (35) is generally valid. It generates a tree of the type of that
from the Fig.3’ from (7.III).3.1, consisting of just a trunk of simultaneous measurement of r and
p surmounted by the two conceptualized probablistic crowns. The one-trunk probability-tree of
any microstate – whether a microstate ms(free, 1)G(n−c)) or a microstate ms(free, 1)cG(q−f)
– is rooted deeper into the a-conceptual factuality than any branches-probability-tree of a
microstate ms(free, 1)G(n−c).
Remarks on the process of construction.
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** Throughout the chapters (6.II) and (7.III) IQM has instilled the organizing distinction
between the individual level of conceptualization, the statistical level, and the meta-statistical
one. By reference to these – usual – levels of conceptualization, another sort of mixed individual-
statistical level has been entailed by the definitions from (2.I).1, namely in the case of the class
of ’one microstate of two or more microsystems’ considered in Bell’s work on locality ((3.I).2
and the Fig.4).
An emergence of this kind – like also the specific problems raised in (7.III).3 by
momentum-measurements on microstates ms(free, 1)cG(q−f) (’beable’, ‘observable’ ) – illustrate
the basic and very peculiar role played inside QM2 by the concept of operation of generation
G of a microstate: Because a ‘mechanic’ is researched concerning entities each one of which is
posited to consist of a wave that does not accept mechanical qualifications but that involves one
or more localized elements, ‘singularities’ (called ‘particles’) that do accept mechanical qualifi-
cations and of which moreover the dynamic depends of characters of the wave, the unformulated
laws of thought that usually govern the questions concerned with the distinction ’inside-outside
a given whole’, are perturbed. The mechanical qualifications of microstates concern elements
from the insides of the microstates that are the studied ‘wholes’. While in classical mechanics
we got used to deal with the dynamic of the considered whole itself.
** Furthermore, via the assertions Ass.1 and Ass.2 IQM has instilled a fusion between,
on the one hand the purely mathematical Hilbert-space predictive representation, and on the
other hand the factual -mathematical predictive construct (31). The factual-mathematical con-
struct (31) doubles and controls factually the purely mathematical outputs of the Schrödinger
equation of the problem, when these can effectively be generated ; while when these cannot
be obtained in fact, the construct (31) offers factual independence with respect to the purely
mathematical outputs of the equation. From a necessity that entails unconditional acceptance
of effects of approximations that cannot be foreseen, the specification and the solution of the
Schrödinger equation of the problem have become just an option that can be dispensed with
nowadays, in the era of Moore’s law that still works, and of which anyhow the already accumu-
lated effects at least will subsist. InQM2 the connection between the essence of the Hilbert-space
mathematical representation of the predictions (22)-(23), and on the other hand ‘the problem’,
are insured by an independent formal-factual procedure.
** The IQM request of an explicit model of a microstate has led in (6.II).1 to the
modelling postulate MP (msG,cw) associated with (1’) G ↔ msG,cw and (14) msG,cw ≡
{σ(msG,cw)}. In 7.III this model has founded the coding-postulates (20’) and (35).
QM2 versus dBDS(B).
*** dBDS(B) connects QM2 with the Hamilton-Jacobi formulation of the classical Me-
chanics and Optics, while on the other hand it roots it the microphysical factuality by the
corpuscular-like-wave model of a microstate.
***Via the channel of adduction (??) he mathematical formalizations from dBDS(B)
become a rich reservoir of deeply conceived and carefully worked out representations, precious
for a future development of QM2.
*** The supply from the part of dBDS(B) is considerable.
QM2 versus QMHD.
**** Notwithstanding the radical modification of the representation of quantum measure-
ments, the very powerful operational and algebraic Hilbert-Dirac mathematical representation
of the predictions concerning measurements on microstates developed inside QMHD is entirely
conserved inside QM2.
But it is conserved cleaned of mixture with the question of verification.
**** As for the question of verification of the predictions, in QM2 this question is as-
serted separately and is separately treated. This, in fact, is what has led to a radical change
of the representation of the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(q−f) via the introduction of the new
representation (38’)-(39)-(40).
Global summary.
QM2 has a clear-cut and fully intelligible structure.
It is founded in IQM.
Under the constraints imposed by IQM and with the purpose to offer a unified Hilbert-
space representation of measurement, prediction, and verification required to be, in principle,
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independent of the Schrödinger equation, QM2 is constructed on the basis of the assertions
Ass.1 and Ass.2 associated with the predictive Hilbert-space algorithm (22)-(23) from QMHD.
This construction has entailed a radical re-structuration of the representation of the
microstates ms(unbound, 1)cG(q−f) that, in its turn, has led to recourse to the de Broglie-Bohm
approach dBDS(B). Which connects QM2 with the classical mechanics and optics and roots it
directly into the microphysical factuality.
The whole obtained in this way is, I think, fully intelligible from all the points of view
– genetic, factual, logical, mathematical – and it is explicitly inserted in its whole context, the
conceptualized context as well as the as yet never conceptualized before (via the operations of
generation G).
(9.III) BRIEF FINAL CONSIDERATIONS ON
THE REPRESENTATION OF MICROSTATES
(9.III).1 UNIVERSALITY
It is often felt that QMHD is endowed with a particular sort of universality and it is sometimes
asserted that this is entailed by the fact that any material entity is a structure of microstates.
But this belief is illusory, for at least two reasons, one epistemological and the other one formal.
The epistemological reason . In quantum mechanics a fragment of physical reality
that is considered in order to create new scientific knowledge145 on, specifically, this fragment,
is placed just upon the extreme frontier between a still strict absence of such knowledge, and
all that has been previously conceptualized in scientific terms (Fig.1, Fig.2). Inside QMHD
this extreme character is not immediately perceivable because the individual level of scientific
conceptualization is occulted in consequence of a nearly exclusively top-down approach. Only
the statistical level is represented explicitly because it has been the first one encountered by
the top-down progression. Nevertheless the individual level is irrepressibly involved and active.
And the radically marginal location of the process of creation of knowledge imprints upon the
emerging descriptions – the ‘transferred primordial descriptions’ that in IQM have been denoted
D/G,msG, V / – a specific character that is not apparent in the descriptions that are familiar
to us.
And I hold that those who perceive universality in the formalism of quantum mechanics
(cf. Aerts [1981]), in fact, more or less clearly, perceive the presence of ‘transferred primordial
descriptions’, with the unavoidable relativities that mark them and their primordially statis-
tical character that emerges irrepressibly. They also feel more or less faintly that this sort of
‘primordial’ descriptions is not confined to the case of microstates; that the symbol ‘msG’ can
be replaced by the symbol of a quite general entity, say ‘œG’ (for ‘object-of-study entity’) gen-
erated as such by the operation ‘G ’146. They somehow perceive, though in a still unspeakable
way, that the study of microstates introduces an instance of a general epistemological method
that is necessary and sufficient for starting at no matter what local but total relative zero of
knowledge: A general method for starting a process of creation of new and communicable local
knowledge that, by its structure, shall permit consensus and verification.
And indeed transferred descriptions emerge quite currently inside the classical processes
of conceptualization, as much as when micro-entities are involved 147. But in the case of micro-
entities – because they are so difficultly accessible to interaction – all the involved descriptive
145That is, communicable, consensual and verifiable knowledge, not a subjective one, for instance imagined or
metaphysical.
146cf. MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006], [2014], etc.
147Henri Boulouet broght into evidence this very important conceptual fact, both in private communications
and in his PhD thesis [2014], Univ. of Valenciennes.
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features are filtered out radicalized, non-degenerate, mutually separable, pure; and that is why
the concept of primordially transferred description has revealed itself explicitly for the very first
time only inside microphysics, and has entailed new and striking questions of intelligibility as
well as mathematical specificities.
The formal reason . The concept of Hilbert-vector-space – via Gleason’s theorem –
offers a very expressive framework for just lodging inside it "factual probability laws" (MMS
[2014]) that have been established outside this Hilbert-vector-space. And the concept of prob-
ability is omnipresent inside human thought. But the mentioned possibility – little known and
little understood – has no necessary connection whatever with, specifically, microstates. It is
illusory to believe that there exists a direct logical relation between, for instance, social sciences
in general, and on the other hand the concept of microstate; or even between the psychology
of classical conceptualization, and microstates. In this sense expressions like "quantum social
science" or "quantum cognitive science" are utterly misleading.
The way of representing factual probabilities via vectors from a Hilbert-space have to be
strictly separated from the concept of microstate.
Similar considerations can be made concerning the general principles that found the
construction of all the relativized descriptions from IQM.
The general, basic, and decisively powerful construction of relativized descriptions and
of the representational structures generated by these, constitute the object of a discipline –
a method of relativized conceptualization denoted MRC – that is independent of the study
of microstates, notwithstanding that this discipline has been suggested by the examination of
the formalism of the quantum mechanics. I have developed MRC into a rather complex whole
where logic, probabilities and information theory are unified ; and this whole incorporates IQM
as a particular application to the case of microstates. But this does not in the least entail that
MRC is a ‘quantum’ method.
As for mathematical physics, and in general for mathematical science, we are still far
from thoroughly understanding the conditions that restrict the acceptable, or fertile, or optimal
association between, on the one hand, this or that mathematical formal system, and on the other
hand a given domain of what we call ‘reality’, physical or social or economical reality, etc. And
the same assertion holds for the techniques, in particular for engineering. This introduces the
following last point.
(9.III).2 FACTS, MATHEMATICS, KNOWLEDGE
The approach developed in this work brings into evidence very general and fundamental ques-
tions concerning the relations, inside a mathematical theory of a domain of physical facts,
between: the nature of the considered physical factuality; the cognitive situation that is in-
volved; the sort of descriptive purpose that acts; and the mathematical framework that is made
use of.
In this work, in order to bring into evidence the relations of this kind, I have tried to
create a contrast between two different and mutually independent sorts of descriptive systems,
IQM and QMHD, and to explicate the conditions that can organize a mutual consistency.
IQM is a qualitative but formalized structure determined exclusively by the cognitive relations
and the various local cognitive aims that are involved when one wants to generate knowledge
on microstates. Whereas QMHD has been directly elaborated as ‘a mathematical theory of
microstates’. The contrast has permitted to establish to what a degree detailed semantic and
factual contents must be poured into a mathematical theory of microstates in order to insure
consensual and verifiable prediction. Indeed in the absence of instillation of such contents –
and well formed accordingly to clearly elaborated criteria specific of the particular aim that is
involved – the mathematical ‘theory’ claimed to concern a given domain of physical entities, in
fact remains disconnected from that domain of facts. It simply does not..... ‘make sense’.
The semantic void from a mathematical theory of ‘real’ entities is always felt ; and usually
it is apprehended as an unintelligibility of which the source cannot be located nor specified.
When this sort of unintelligibility works the human mind secretes in a reflex way a propensity
to consider the mathematical formalism as if it were itself a physical reality of some superior
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essence, out of reach and immutable like a galaxy or like gravitation. In consequence of this
reflex tendency a mathematical formalism that is applied to an important domain of physical
entities, but is not understood, is transmuted into an independent ‘fact’, it is reified, and in the
same time it is also divinised into an ‘extraordinary’ entity that slips out of conceptual control
and is transmuted into an idol. Jung and René Girard would have had much to say about this
sort of effects of the collective unconscious.
This process of divinisation can also generate a superposed strong penchant to generalize
the ‘extraordinary’ mathematical representation, to the representation of everything. Which
leads to arbitrary, long and very difficult elaborations devoid of any clearly stated utility or
justification.
Therefore I think that in the present stage of development of human thought it has
become urgent to concentrate upon the elaboration of a general method for generating scientific
knowledge where – in particular – be stated the conditions of connectivity between the aim
to create mathematized knowledge, and on the other hand, the way in which the adequate
mathematical tools can be forged and handled optimally with respect to the specific data from
the desired process.
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INSTEAD OF A GENERAL CONCLUSION
It is likely that the reader of this attempt has been often surprised and even repelled. In as
much as this is so the reason, I think, is that it is very unusual in physics to make explicit use
of epistemological and methodological arguments and constructions. Anyhow, since now this
work is exposed, it has become possible to accept or to reject it advisedly.
In the present work QM2 will reach the status of only a conceptual skeleton. But – as
such – it might manifest force of life. In the realm of human representations this sort of miracle
is current. The principles are the spirit and the spirit can breathe life into the descriptional
matter. And if this happens in our case a whole new body of formal representation will grow
for the skeleton constructed here, by its subsequent interactions with other minds.
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